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Generally, I trust people to tell me the truth. When I ask a stranger at a
bus stop whether line 4 stops there, I expect the stranger to (unconsciously)
follow Grice’s (1989) maxim of Quality, i.e., my conversational partner will
try to make their contribution to our conversation one that is true. This
trust is essential; if a society lacks the trust that most people will engage in
cooperative information exchange, the merit of its entire linguistic practice
is in jeopardy. Why would I even try asking the stranger about the bus if I
cannot trust that they will try to say something true?
At the same time people simply love to watch others break the maxim of
Quality or even to break it themselves. We love reading or watching obvi-
ously false reports about unlikely romances in nineteenth century England,
fire-breathing dragons, talking animals, heroic aliens and futuristic societies.
Not only do we fill our bookcases, bedroom walls and minds with stories
and images that we know to report false ‘facts’, we also love to extensively
discuss these falsities. High schools oblige their students to rehearse and
study their society’s most famous false stories (e.g., Hamlet or Van den Vos
Reynaerde) and people collectively create extensive online encyclopedias
reporting on their favourite sets of falsities (e.g., One Wiki to Rule Them All
or Wookieepedia).
People can only enjoy this blatant breaking of the maxim of Quality
precisely because it is out in the open for everyone that the relevant stories
are false. It is usually clear from the context that they are untrue and hence
can be kept separate from other discourse. This is one of the hallmarks
of our fiction telling practices (and what distinguishes it from its cousin
‘lying’ that, I hope, fewer people enjoy). Nobody is deceived into believing
something false, nobody is harmed and we can maintain the general trust




This dissertation focuses on modelling the different ways we use language
to engage with fiction and how these uses relate to non-fictional but related
language uses such as assertion and lying. This general challenge subdivides
itself into several puzzles involving different kinds of statements. The aim of
the present dissertation is to engage in the existing debates on these puzzles
by developing a coherent semantic analysis that deals with these distinct
statements in a systematic way.
The central conundrum (and the starting point of the study of the se-
mantics of fiction in general) is to distinguish regular non-fictional talk
from fictional talk (see chapters 3 and 4). Whereas non-fictional discourse
is typically about real world objects (e.g., Trump, the Eiffeltower, my aunt),
fictional discourse typically features fictional names, i.e., names of fictional
characters or objects such as ‘Frodo’, ‘The Toothfairy’ or ‘the Fountain of
Youth’. To illustrate, suppose Tolkien told me that his friend C.S. Lewis was
born in Belfast by stating (1). Compare this to Tolkien’s written statement
(2) in his novel The Hobbit:
(1) C.S. Lewis was born in Belfast.
(2) In a hole in the ground there lived a hobbit.
By uttering (1) Tolkien engaged in non-fictional discourse, by writing down
(2) Tolkien engages in fictional discourse. The aim here is to explain why,
whereas statements such as (1) are considered to be true or false, statements
such as (2) are not really true or false, but rather determine what is true in a
fictional world separate from the actual world; (2) makes it true in the world
of the The Lord of the Rings saga that a hobbit lived in a hole in the ground.
A complication here is that many things will be true in a fiction that were
never actually stated in the fictional narrative. For instance, it is true in
the world of The Lord of the Rings that water is H2O, that the sun rises in
the east and that handkerchiefs are squares of thin fabric used for personal
hygiene. What’s more, sometimes statements found in a fictional story do not
determine what is true in the fictional world in this way. Consider Kesey’s
written statements in his novel One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest:
(3) Then, just as she’s rolling along at her biggest and meanest, Mc-
Murphy steps out of the latrine door right in front of her, holding
that towel around his hips – stops her dead! She shrinks to about
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head-high to where that towel covers him, and he’s grinning down
on her.
Although these statements express that nurse Ratched (who previously grew
to the size of a truck) shrinks to the size of a hobbit, they cannot be taken at
face value. The narrator is schizophrenic and hence unreliable; it is not true
in the world of One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest that Ratched shrinks in size.
Rather it is probably true that she was taken aback and that the narrator
perceived this as shrinking in size. Such cases of unreliable narration pose
an additional puzzle for an account of fictional discourse (see chapter 8).
Moreover, sometimes people talk about fiction and use fictional names in
statements that are not part of a fictional story. For instance, I may utter (4)
or (5):
(4) In The Lord of the Rings, Frodo was born in the Shire.
(5) According to The Lord of the Rings, Frodo was born in the Shire.
(4) and (5), like fictional statement (2), tell us something about a fictional
world. However, like the non-fictional statement (1), (4) and (5) seem to be
really true! But do statements (4) and (5) really mean the same thing (see
chapter 7)? To complicate things, I can also utter a statement such as (6):
(6) Frodo was invented by Tolkien.
Arguably, (6) expresses something that is really true. But, assuming the
name ‘Frodo’ refers uniformly to one object, how can we make sense of the
apparent truth of both (4) and (6)? If Frodo is the kind of thing that was
‘born’ in a certain region, how can he have been ‘invented’ by someone (see
chapter 6)?
Conversely, sometimes we may find a statement within a fictional story
that is really true about non-fictional objects (see section 4.6.2). For instance,
in Fleming’s fictional novel Thunderball we come across the following state-
ment:
(7) New Providence, the island containing Nassau, the capital of the
Bahamas, is a drab sandy slab of land fringed with some of the most
beautiful beaches in the world. (Friend (2008))
(7) expresses information that is simply true. New Providence does indeed
contain Nassau and is fringed with beaches. Does this then mean that it
is not part of the fictional story? And if it is part of the story, how can we
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explain that I may learn topographical facts about the Bahamas from reading
(7) in the fictional novel Thunderball?
Finally, whenever one attempts to model our fiction-telling practices, it
is important to keep fictional discourse separate from lies (see chapter 5).
Suppose I am invited to a party that I do not want to attend. I could utter (8)
while I am feeling perfectly fine and hence lie:
(8) [Cough, cough] Sorry, I have a cold.
Although both lie (8) and fictional statement (2) are strictly false, we want
to maintain a distinction between these two types of utterances; a semantic
definition of fiction should not also apply to lies and vice versa. Intuitively,
we may want to appeal to the notion of an intention to deceive; whereas I
had an intention to deceive my addressee with my utterance of (8), Tolkien
never intended to deceive anyone into believing that a hobbit lived in a hole
by writing down (2). However, sometimes it seems like we can lie without
any intention to deceive. Suppose a student accused of plagiarism is called
to the dean’s office. The student knows he plagiarized, the dean knows he
did, the student knows that the dean knows, etc. However, it is also well
known that the dean will not punish anyone who explicitly denies their
guilt. When asked the student therefore says:
(9) I didn’t cheat on the exam. (adapted from Carson (2006))
If (9) is a real lie, then lies apparently do not necessarily involve an intention
to deceive. But then how can we distinguish lying from fiction telling?
1.1.2 Theoretical ingredients
This dissertation introduces and explores a coherent semantic theory of the
different types of statements described above called the ‘workspace account’.
It is an extension of Stalnaker’s (1970, 1978, 1984, 2002) widely adopted
pragmatic common ground framework. In this framework assertions are
modelled as proposals to update the ‘common ground’ of a conversation
(i.e., the set of propositions that are mutually presupposed by speaker and
hearer). The Stalnakerian common ground framework is based on coopera-
tive information exchanges: Conversations in which interlocutors gradually
add more and more information to their common ground because more
and more propositions are asserted and accepted. Since the workspace ac-
count is aimed at modelling fictional discourse (e.g., Tolkien’s production
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of his fiction novel The Lord of the Rings) and fiction authors do not, strictly
speaking, engage in cooperative information exchange (e.g., the commu-
nicated information in The Lord of the Rings is strictly false), I will need to
extend this basic Stalnakerian notion of common ground. In developing the
present extension of the common ground framework I have taken inspira-
tion from (amongst other things) Eckardt’s (2014) and Stokke’s (2013; 2018)
‘unofficial common ground accounts’ (that separate the common ground
for non-fictional discourse from common grounds for fictional discourse),
Matravers’ (2014) theory of narrative interpretation (according to which our
primary engagement with narratives – entertaining its content – is the same
whether the narrative is fictional or not) and Lewis’ (1978) widely adopted
possible world analysis of statements of the form ‘In story s, φ’.
The notion of common ground will be represented in different formal
ways in the dissertation. Familiarity with basic set theory and propositional
logic is assumed. Familiarity with Kamp’s (1981) Discourse Representation
Theory will be useful in reading the dissertation but not strictly necessary
because the formalism is specified and explained where introduced. The
DRT notation is the most frequently used notation in this dissertation be-
cause this formalism allows me to illustrate the different kinds of common
ground updates and the anaphoric dependencies that are involved in the
example sentences in a visually efficient manner.1
1.2 Overview of dissertation
1.2.1 Summary of each chapter
Chapter 2: Common ground: In sensu composito or in sensu diviso
In chapter 2 I introduce the notion of common ground and its role in Stal-
naker’s pragmatic framework. I briefly discuss previous challenges that
have been posed to traditional common ground definitions and spell out a
novel challenge posed by non face-to-face communication using a relational
analysis of de re beliefs. Basically, standard common ground definitions are
in terms of iterative de re attitudes but surely Tolkien never had any de re
beliefs about me (one of his readers). But then how can we talk about the
1As will become clear there is also a theoretical incentive to opt for a formalism that gives
a structured representation of the common ground. See chapter 4.
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conversation or common ground between Tolkien and his readers? I propose
and compare two potential refinements of standard common ground defini-
tions based on Abelard’s distinction between generality in sensu composito
and in sensu diviso.
Chapter 3: Unofficial common grounds
In chapter 3 I turn to fiction. I introduce the basic puzzle in the semantics
of fiction of modelling the quarantining of fictional discourse from non-
fictional discourse. I discuss and formalise existing Stalnakerian accounts
that model fictional discourse, i.e., Stokke’s and Eckardt’s unofficial common
ground accounts where fictional statements update an unofficial common
ground that is kept separate from the official common ground used for
assertions. I critique both accounts on how they deal with two prima facie
conflicting intuitions concerning fictional content. First, that fictional truths
are only accepted temporarily. Second, that we do retain information about
fictional truth even after engaging with the fiction somehow.
Chapter 4: The workspace account
In chapter 4 I introduce a novel Stalnakerian approach to model fictional
and non-fictional discourse, i.e., the workspace account. I first discuss two
theoretical ingredients of the account: Matravers’ theory of fiction interpreta-
tion and Lewis’ analysis of the fiction operator. I then discuss the basic ideas
of the workspace account and formalise them. Assertions and fictional state-
ments both uniformly update a temporary common ground (the workspace)
during the ongoing discourse. What distinguishes the speech acts is how
they update the stable common ground, i.e., with information of the form
‘In story s, φ’ or with plain φ. I will argue that the workspace account avoids
the difficulties associated with the unofficial common grounds described in
chapter 3. I briefly discuss two possible extensions of the workspace account:
a version of the account where fiction that mentions real world entities is de
re about these entities and an analysis of export of fictional truth as based
on analogical reasoning with parafictional information.
The chapters that follow deal with possible applications and refinements
of this basic account. Sometimes these adjustments can easily be translated
to the unofficial common ground accounts. I will discuss this when relevant.
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Chapter 5. Lies, bald-faced lies and parafictional updates
In chapter 5 I explore the challenges posed by modelling lying in a common
ground framework and discuss two possible strategies (open to unofficial
common ground accounts and the workspace account) to deal with these. I
argue that bald-faced lies (i.e., statements that are called “lies” but that do
not involve an intention to deceive) are best analysed as fictional statements
rather than as actual lies. I briefly introduce and counter five objections to
this view.
Chapter 6: The challenge of metafictional anaphora
In chapter 6 I introduce metafictional discourse (i.e., statements about fic-
tional entities as fictional entities) and the different variants of the problem
of the wrong kind of object, i.e., if Frodo is a flesh and blood hobbit, how
can he also have been invented by Tolkien? I specify the challenge posed by
the possibility of co-predication and anaphoric dependencies across metafic-
tional and parafictional discourse for dynamic semantic approaches. I focus
on pronominal anaphora across mixed parafictional/metafictional discourse
or ‘metafictional anaphora’. I evaluate four different possible solutions in
the workspace account.
Chapter 7: The ‘In’ and ‘According to’ operators
In chapter 7 I argue, contra common practice, that there is a relevant seman-
tic difference between the ‘In story s’ and ‘According to story s’ operators.
I explore three novel observations concerning the diverging linguistic be-
haviour of these operators and propose two distinct semantic analyses to
account for these. Sentences of the form ‘In story s, φ’ receive the widely
adopted Lewisian analysis of parafictional statements. Sentences of the form
‘According to s, φ’ are analysed as indirect speech reports.
Chapter 8: Unreliable narration and imaginative resistance
In chapter 8 I discuss the need for some kind of revision operation for
workspace updates and how this relates to the overall project of a Matraver-
sian ‘uniform’ analysis of fictional and non-fictional discourse. The rest of
chapter 8 is based on a co-authored paper with Dr. Emar Maier. We present
an extension of the workspace account that takes into account the role of
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(unreliable) narrators and the phenomenon of imaginative resistance by
incorporating insights from belief revision.
1.2.2 How to read this dissertation
The most straightforward way of reading this dissertation is to read all chap-
ters in consecutive order. This way the reader will obtain a comprehensive
overview of the workspace account and its different applications. If the
reader is interested in a particular topic they may choose to skip chapter
2 (and rely on an intuitive understanding of what it is to have a common
ground with someone who is not acquainted with you) and start with chap-
ters 3 and 4 to familiarize themselves with the basics of the workspace
account and the motivations behind it. After reading chapters 3 and 4 the
reader can move on to any of the subsequent chapters 5, 6, 7 or 8. The text
may at some points include references to ideas, analyses or examples in
earlier and later chapters (other than chapters 3 and 4) but these may be
skipped. Chapter 7 may also be read completely independently if one has
read section 4.2.2.
1.3 Previous publications
Most of the research presented in this dissertation is based on (parts of)
papers that have been presented at conferences. Some research is based on
previously published papers. Every chapter starts with a short description
of what parts of the text are taken from what publication and what has been
added or changed. Below is an overview of which papers formed the basis
for which chapters:
Chapter 2: Common ground: In sensu composito or in sensu diviso
Semeijn, M. (2019). Common ground: In sensu composito or in sensu
diviso. In Proceedings of 22nd Amsterdam Colloquium. ILLC.
Chapter 3: Unofficial common grounds
Semeijn, M. (2017). A Stalnakerian analysis of metafictive statements. In
Proceedings of the 21st Amsterdam Colloquium. ILLC.
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Chapter 4: The workspace account
Semeijn, M. (2017). A Stalnakerian analysis of metafictive statements. In
Proceedings of the 21st Amsterdam Colloquium. ILLC.
Semeijn, M. (2019). Interacting with fictions: The role of pretend play in
Theory of Mind acquisition. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10(1):113-
132.
Chapter 5: Lies, bald-faced lies and parafictional updates
Semeijn, M. (2020) Bald-faced lies and parafictional updates. unpublished
manuscript.
Chapter 6: The challenge of metafictional anaphora
Semeijn, M. (2019) The challenge of metafictional anaphora. In Sikos, J.
and Pacuit, E., editors, At the Intersection of Language, Logic, and Information,
124-143. Springer, Berlin.
Semeijn, M., Zalta, E. N. (2021). Revisiting the ‘wrong kind of object’ prob-
lem. Organon F, 28(1):168-197.
Chapter 7: The ‘In’ and ‘According to’ operators
Semeijn, M. (2020). The ‘In’ and ‘According to’ operators. In Proceedings of
the ESSLLI & WeSSLLI Student Session 2020.
Chapter 8: Unreliable narration and imaginative resistance
Maier, E., Semeijn, M. (forthcoming). Extracting fictional truth from unre-
liable sources. In Maier, E. and Stokke, A., editors, The Language of Fiction.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
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2 Common ground: In sensu
composito or in sensu diviso
This chapter is a rewritten and expanded version of ‘Common ground:
In sensu composito or in sensu diviso’ in Proceedings of 22nd Amsterdam
Colloquium. The most substantial differences between this chapter and
the proceedings paper include: First, an expansion of the discussion of
the notion of common ground and its traditional definitions (section
2.2.1). Second, the addition of a brief discussion of previous challenges
concerning the inapplicability of these traditional definitions to cases
of real-life communication (section 2.3.1). Third, the addition of a dis-
cussion of the different notions of felicity resulting from the proposed
common ground definitions (section 2.5.1).
2.1 Introduction
The central aim of this dissertation is to model our engagement with fiction
in Stalnaker’s (1970, 1978, 1984, 2002) pragmatic framework, i.e., in terms of
what is and what isn’t ‘common ground’ between interlocutors. To prepare
the way for the application of the notion of common ground to the case of fic-
tion in subsequent chapters, I will first focus solely on exploring and refining
this notion in the current chapter. Several challenges to traditional common
ground definitions will first have to be addressed, including especially a
novel challenge that I introduce concerning conversational participants
that are not acquainted with each other. Traditional ‘textbook’ definitions
of common ground are based on face-to-face conversations where people
have iterative attitudes towards each other. For instance, we can define
common ground as common belief: p is common ground between a and
b iff a believes that p, b believes that p, a believes that b believes that p, b
believes that a believes that p, etc. However, note that if a believes that b has
I would like to thank Bart Geurts, Christopher Badura and three anonymous Amsterdam
Colloquium 2019 reviewers for valuable input and suggestions.
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a certain belief, this means that a has a belief about her interlocutor b. This
is problematic because the concept of common ground has – without much
hesitation – been extended to non-face-to-face communication (e.g., Stokke
(2013); Eckardt (2014); Semeijn (2017); Maier and Semeijn (forthcoming);
Zucchi (forthcoming)) in which the speaker is known to the hearer but the
hearer is not known to the speaker, such as books, broadcasted speeches
or blogposts.1 For instance, it is common ground between biographer Ray
Monk and myself that Wittgenstein was Austrian. However, definitions of
common ground in terms of attitudes towards one’s interlocutor do not
apply to this type of communication; I may have beliefs about Monk but
obviously Monk does not have beliefs about me. Monk merely has beliefs
about the beliefs of ‘the reader(s)’, whoever that may be. It would follow
that there could never exist any common ground between Monk and his
readership. This is unsatisfactory since Monk and myself do seem to respec-
tively produce and interpret the biographical text against a background of
shared assumptions.
Non-face-to-face conversations pose a challenge to anyone who wants to
formulate an account of our engagement with fiction in terms of common
ground. If you want your account of fiction to not only apply to face-to-face
‘around the campfire’ fiction telling, but also apply to more stereotypical
cases of fiction telling such as Tolkien’s fictional novel writing, you will
have to assume a notion of common ground that can be extended to non-
face-to-face communication. The central aim of this first chapter is thus to
get this basic challenge posed by non-face-to-face communication out of the
way so we can proceed in subsequent chapters to analyse our engagement
with fiction in terms of common ground. I will restrict the discussion in this
chapter to cases of non-fictional conversations. If the reader is primarily
interested in semantics of fiction, they may continue with section 2.2, skip
the rest of the current chapter and – for the rest of the dissertation – rely on
an intuitive understanding of something being common ground between
people that are not acquainted.
I first discuss the concept of common ground and its role in Stalnaker’s
pragmatic framework (section 2.2). Second, I briefly discuss three challenges
that have previously been posed to traditional common ground definitions
1I use the terms ‘speaker’ and ‘hearer’ for, respectively, the person that produces some
communicative act (e.g., by saying it or by writing it down) and the person that receives
and interprets the communicative act (e.g., by hearing or reading it).
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(Section 2.3.1). Next, I spell out a novel challenge to traditional common
ground definitions posed by non-face-to-face communication using a rela-
tional analysis of de re belief that makes explicit the acquaintance relations
involved in de re beliefs (Section 2.3.2). Next, I introduce Abelard’s distinc-
tion between generality in sensu composito and in sensu diviso and, in line
with this distinction, propose two potential refinements of common ground
definitions (Section 2.4). I discuss how we obtain two essentially different
notions of the felicity of speech acts on the two definitions and, finally, show
how the case of an acquaintance that hasn’t revealed themselves as a con-
versational participant may aid us in deciding between the two definitions
(Section 2.5).
2.2 Common ground
2.2.1 Common ground and assertions
The notion of common ground not only is a key concept in pragmatics,
but it (and related notions such as ‘mutual belief’, ‘mutual knowledge’
or ‘joint attention’) also plays an important role in other fields including
philosophy (e.g., Friedell (1969); Lewis (1969); Schiffer (1972)), epistemic
logic and computer science (e.g., Fagin et al. (1995); Meyer and Van der
Hoek, (1995)) in explaining how agents can coordinate their actions.2 For
instance, we avoid multiple collisions in traffic because it is common belief
between drivers that they should drive on the right side of the road; it’s not
enough if all drivers mutually believe that drivers should drive on the right.
To coordinate action they must also believe that the other drivers believe
this, etc.
Stalnaker uses the concept of common ground to model communicative
practices in collaborative inquiry. More specifically, Stalnaker’s framework
models how people’s assertions contribute to a growth of shared informa-
tion. The common ground framework is thus a type of dynamic semantic
framework. The basic idea of dynamic approaches is that the meaning of a
statement is its ‘context change potential’, i.e., how it updates an informa-
tion state called the conversational ‘context’. Traditionally, there has been a
debate in dynamic semantics over what this conversational context exactly
2See van Ditmarsch et al. (2009) for an overview of the history of concepts such as ‘common
knowledge’ and ‘common belief’ and various definitions that have been offered.
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is. On a ‘psychologistic’ interpretation of the context (e.g., Geurts (1999);
Kamp (2015); Maier (2017)) it is an agent’s mental state. Speech acts are
thus defined in terms of how they update a specific agent’s propositional
attitudes. On a ‘common ground’ interpretation of the context such as Stal-
naker’s (see also e.g., Heim (1982); Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991); van der
Sandt (1992).) it is a representation of the common ground between speaker
and hearer. Speech acts are thus defined in terms of how they update the
(interlocutor neutral) common ground (but see Hamm et al. (2006) for a
conciliatory view).
In Stalnaker’s framework, the common ground of a certain conversation
is the set of presuppositions mutually shared by the conversational par-
ticipants. This notion has a dual function: First, assertions are analysed as
proposals to update the common ground. Second, the notion of common
ground is used to explain how a shared background can guide the produc-
tion and interpretation of speech acts. For instance, suppose Mary makes
the following assertion about an upcoming party:
(10) Nobody is coming to the party.
Firstly, through this assertion Mary proposes that it becomes common
ground between her and her hearer (let’s call him John) that nobody is com-
ing to the party. In other words, she proposes to further limit the ‘context
set’ (i.e., the set of possible worlds compatible with the common presup-
positions) by removing possible worlds in which someone does come to
the party. Secondly, Mary can felicitously say (10) (and her assertion can
be properly understood by John) precisely because it was already common
ground between Mary and John that there is a party before Mary’s asser-
tion. If it hadn’t been, Mary’s assertion would not have been pragmatically
well-formed.
2.2.2 Traditional definitions of common ground
According to Stalnaker (2002), a prima facie intuitive and simple approxi-
mation of the concept of common ground is to define it as common belief. I
dub this the ‘belief-based’ conception of common ground. Stalnaker defines
common belief as follows:
[A] proposition φ is common belief of a group of believers if and
only if all in the group believe that φ, all believe that all believe it,
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all believe that all believe that all believe it, etc. (Stalnaker, 2002,
p.704)
This formulation is often copied by semanticists that work with Stalnaker’s
pragmatic framework (e.g., Stokke (2013); Zucchi (forthcoming)). However,
strictly speaking the formulation is ambiguous between a de re and a de
dicto reading: Do all believers believe de re of all believers that they believe
that φ, or do all believers believe de dicto that “all believers believe that
φ”?3
The difference in interpretation comes out when we formalise the notion
of common ground. Standard textbook analyses of notions such as common
belief and common knowledge are in terms of iterative de re attitudes that
people have towards each other. For instance, proposition 2.5 in the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on common knowledge (Vanderschraaf
and Sillari (2014)) defines common knowledge in terms of a ‘hierarchy’ of
statements of the form ‘a knows that b knows that c knows that ... φ’ (see also
e.g., Geurts (2020); Schiffer (1972, p.30)). Common ground (on a belief-based
conception) can thus be formalised as follows: p is common ground between
everyone in some community of conversational participants iff (where Cx
means x is a conversational participant and Bxφ means x believes that φ):
∀x(Cx → Bx p)
∀x∀y((Cx ∧ Cy)→ BxBy p))
∀x∀y∀z((Cx ∧ Cy ∧ Cz)→ BxByBz p))
...
In words, everyone in the community believes that p; everyone in the
community believes of all members of the community that they believe that
p; everyone in the community believes of all members of the community
that they believe of all members of the community that they believe that
p; etc. From this we can derive a hierarchy of iterative de re attitudes. For
instance, if a, b, and c are the conversational participants of some community
(i.e., Ca, Cb and Cc), p is common ground in the community iff a, b and c all
believe that p; a believes that b believes that p; a believes that c believes that
p; etc.4
3Arguably, there is even a third interpretation possible where all believers believe de re
of the group of believers that it collectively believes that φ. I leave exploration of this
option to further research.
4Here and in the rest of this chapter I am assuming the principle of positive introspection
(see Rendsvig and Symons (2019) for an overview of different epistemic logics and their
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In a similar vein, we can talk about common ground between speaker
and hearer of a particular speech act in terms of iterative de re beliefs: p is
common ground between speaker a and hearer b iff:
Ba p Bb p
BbBa p BaBb p
BaBbBa p BbBaBb p
...
...
In words, a and b both believe that p; b believes that a believes that p; a
believes that b believes that p; etc.5 So when Mary says (10) to John she
proposes that it becomes the case that she believes that nobody is coming to
the party; that John believes this; that she believes that John believes this;
that John believes that she believes this; etc. Similarly, Mary’s assertion (10)
is felicitous because Mary believes that there is a party; John believes this;
Mary believes that John believes this; John believes that Mary believes this;
etc.
Alternatively, common ground can be defined in terms of common accep-
tance. This is the notion of common ground that Stalnaker (2002) eventually
adopts (see also e.g., Stokke (2013, 2018)): p is common ground between a
and b iff (where Ax p means x accepts that p):
Aa p Ab p
BbAa p BaAb p
BaBbAa p BbBaAb p
...
...
principles): If a believes that p, then a also believes that a believes that p, etc. In other
words, our attitudes are transparent to ourselves.
5Some theorists prefer to give a precise finite definition of these seemingly infinite concepts
such as common belief and common knowledge. One way of doing this is by means
of a recursive definition. For example, let q represent the fact that some proposition p
is common belief between a and b. q is true iff a and b believe both p and q. See e.g.,
Barwise (1988) for a comparison of such definitions and the iterative definition. Another
way of doing this is to model knowledge and belief in Kripke models (i.e., in terms of
accessibility relations between possible worlds) and define common knowledge through
the transitive closure of the union of all individual agents’ accessibility relations (see
Fagin et al. (1995)). Roughly put, p is common knowledge between a and b iff p is true
in all possible worlds that are accessible through some chain of a’s and b’s accessibility
relations. I will ignore these issues and use infinite definitions in the following since




In words, a and b both accept that p; a believes that b accepts that p; b
believes that a accepts that p; etc. Stalnaker (2002) defines ‘acceptance’ as
a propositional attitude that is similar to belief but doxastically neutral. I
can for instance accept that Santa lives on the North Pole for the sake of
conversation while I do not believe this. I dub this the ‘acceptance-based’
conception of common ground.
More recently, common ground has been defined as common commitment
(e.g., Geurts (1997)): p is common ground between a and b iff (where Cx,yφ
means x is committed to y to act on φ being true):
Ca,b p Cb,a p
Cb,aCa,b p Ca,bCb,a p
Ca,bCb,aCa,b p Cb,aCa,bCb,a p
...
...
In words, a is committed to b to act on p being true; b is committed to a
to act on p being true; b is committed to a to act on it being true that a is
committed to b to act on p being true; a is committed to b to act on it being
true that b is committed to a to act on p being true; etc.
2.3 Real-life communication
The above definitions of common ground abstract away from actual lan-
guage use in several ways. This has spurred a general movement in phi-
losophy and semantics of challenging and redefining traditional notions of
common ground so as to make them applicable to real-life communication.
In this section I first briefly discuss three challenges that have previously
been posed to traditional definitions of common ground (and related notions
such as common knowledge). These challenges are relevant to the current
undertaking of applying the notion of common ground to our stereotypical
engagement with fiction, e.g., reading a fictional novel. Second, I introduce
a novel challenge – that is also relevant to this end – concerning the appli-
cation of traditional common ground definitions to communication where
conversational participants are not acquainted.
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2.3.1 Steps towards a functional notion of common ground
No infinite iteration of attitudes
A central and widely discussed problem with the belief-based and acceptance-
based definitions of common ground (and related notions such as common
knowledge) is that they involve infinite iterations of propositional attitudes.
Obviously, actual people don’t form infinitely many beliefs about each
other’s mental state. They will usually not get beyond third or fourth or-
der beliefs. So, given that the iteration will always be broken off at some
point in real life, there can never actually exist any common ground be-
tween conversational participants. To avoid this issue we may choose to talk
about ‘partial common belief’ or p being ‘first-order belief’, ‘second-order
belief’, etc. depending on how many iterations of beliefs the conversational
participants have formed.
In this dissertation I follow Lewis’ suggestion that the infinite structure
in common ground definitions represent “a chain of implications [that
follow from our beliefs], not of steps in anyone’s actual reasoning. Therefore
there is nothing improper about its infinite length” (Lewis, 1969, p.53).
For instance, the infinite iteration of beliefs in the belief-based definition
of common ground represents the ‘implicit’ beliefs of the conversational
participants (i.e., what they would believe if they were perfectly rational
and had unlimited cognitive capacities) rather than their actual ‘explicit’
beliefs (see also Heal (1978); Clark and Marshall (1981); Barwise (1988)).
Geurts’ (2020) commitment-based definition of common ground adopts a
similar ‘normative’ approach; commitments express norms for behaviour,
not actual cognitive attitudes, and hence can iterate infinitely.
Graded beliefs
Another issue with traditional common ground definitions (that are for-
mulated in terms of attitudes) is that they presuppose full-blown belief
or acceptance. However, sometimes people can be more or less certain of
their beliefs. People can have a less than full-blown first-order belief (e.g.,
I may believe that I locked the door but am not one hundred percent sure
about this). Moreover, people can be more or less sure about higher-order
beliefs. This can for instance occur when conversational participants are
dealing with unreliable communication channels and are not sure whether
a certain communicative act has been transmitted and hence whether their
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interlocutor has updated their beliefs (see ‘the coordinated attack problem’,
e.g., Akkoyunlu et al. (1975); Gray (1978); Cohen and Yemini (1979); Fagin
et al. (1995)). Hence, in such situations there cannot exist common ground.
A possible weakening of notions of common ground in terms of full-blown
belief (or acceptance) is to talk about graded beliefs and hence graded com-
mon ground. For instance, we can use the notion of common p-belief where
x p-believes some proposition φ iff x believes φ with at least a probability of
p (see e.g., Brandenburger and Dekel (1987); Stinchcombe (1988); Monderer
and Samet (1989)) In this dissertation I mostly abstract away from this issue;
in most of the following discussion I assume full-blown belief in and accep-
tance of propositions and hence full-blown common ground. An exception
to this is the discussion in chapter 8 where confidence in some information
being common ground is expressed in terms of an entrenchment ordering
on propositions.
No simultaneous attitudes or commitments
A less well-known issue with traditional definitions of common ground
and related concepts such as common knowledge is that they require si-
multaneous attitudes or commitments. This has spurred a debate in logic
of distributive systems on how to obtain common knowledge in systems
where messages may be delayed (see e.g., Halpern and Moses (1990); Fagin
et al. (1999); Panangaden and Taylor (1998)). However, the requirement of
simultaneous attitudes or commitments has received very little attention in
semantics. This is somewhat surprising because the requirement makes tra-
ditional common ground definitions inapplicable to many forms of real-life
communication.
Reconsider the belief-based conception of common ground between
speaker a and hearer b. According to this definition, for some proposition p
to be common ground the speaker has to believe p (i.e., Ba p). However, this
can’t simply mean that a believes p at some point in time. This would entail
that we can merely establish that p is common ground simpliciter; depend-
ing on whether there exist points in time (past, present or future) at which
a and b have the required attitudes, p is common ground or not. However,
we want to use the concept of common ground as a dynamic notion, i.e.,
what is common ground can change over time. Hence we somehow want to
be able to talk about p being common ground at a certain time t1 because
conversational participants have the relevant attitudes towards p at t1 (and
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not being common ground at some other time t2 because conversational
participants lack the relevant attitudes at t2).
Prima facie, to arrive at such a notion we can – on a belief-based definition
of common ground – assume the following time indexing: p is common
ground at t1 between speaker a and hearer b iff (where Btxφ means x believes






















In words, a and b both believe at t1 that p; a believes at t1 that b believes at
t1 that p; etc. When either a or b stops having one of the relevant iterated
beliefs at a later time t2 (e.g., the speaker no longer believes that the hearer
believes that p, i.e., ¬Bt2a Bt2b p), it is no longer common ground that p at t2.
The above time indexed definition of common ground does not apply to
all forms of real-life communication. Discourse can stretch out over time
so that the speaker’s act of producing a particular utterance may be hours,
days or years before the hearer’s interpretation of the utterance (e.g., in
the case of answering machine messages, books, blogposts, letters, etc.).
Hence it is possible that the times at which the speaker has propositional
attitudes relevant to establishing common ground only partly overlap, or
do not overlap at all, with the times at which the hearer has the relevant
propositional attitudes. Consider, for instance, my reading of Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus. Since Wittgenstein died long before I was born, whatever he be-
lieved, accepted or was committed to act on being true, he did so before I
ever believed or accepted anything or was committed to act on anything be-
ing true. Hence we never had any attitudes or commitments simultaneously
(let alone simultaneous beliefs about what the other currently believes),
and thus – on the above common ground definition – there never was any
common ground between Wittgenstein and myself.6
6Similar problems concerning delays in communication can pop up in less extreme
scenarios. For instance, Halpern and Moses (1990) show that (even if the hearer engages
with the speech act while the speaker still has the appropriate attitudes), if there is no
fixed time for a message to arrive, there cannot arise common knowledge (e.g., there is
no point at which the speaker can be sure that the hearer has received the message and
has updated her attitudes. They can be sure if and when they receive a confirmation
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A possible strategy is to bite the bullet and maintain that, indeed, there
can never exist common ground between a speaker and a hearer if they have
no simultaneous attitudes or commitments. However, although it may seem
acceptable to maintain that there is no common ground between Wittgen-
stein and myself (e.g., because I’m not a ‘proper’ hearer of Wittgenstein’s
assertions), the same problem of non-simultaneous attitudes can occur on a
much shorter time span involving clearly proper hearers. Suppose that a fa-
ther on his deathbed writes “The Irish crown jewels are hidden in Nouvion”
in a letter to his favourite daughter that she is meant to read when he is dead.
Intuitively, the statement in the letter is an assertion made by the father with
his daughter as proper hearer. However, on the above definition of common
ground, it cannot be analysed as such since the speech act cannot have been
a proposal to update simultaneous common beliefs between father and
daughter with the information that the crown jewels are in Nouvion.7
More importantly, the above strict notion of common ground will not
do for the purposes of this dissertation. I aim to model our stereotypical
engagement with fiction (e.g., the communication between Tolkien and
myself through The Lord of the Rings) in terms of common ground. We thus
need a different, less stringent notion of common ground that can apply to
discourse that stretches over time and involves non-simultaneous attitudes
or commitments between hearers and (possibly deceased) speakers.8
Semanticists that want to apply the notion of common ground to dis-
course that involves non-simultaneous attitudes or commitments may opt
to borrow notions from the logic of distributed asynchronous systems such
as φ being ‘epsilon common knowledge’ (Halpern and Moses (1990)) (i.e.,
everyone will know within ε time units that φ, etc.), ‘eventual common
knowledge’ (Halpern and Moses (1990); Fagin et al. (1999)) (i.e., everyone
knows φ at some point in time, etc.) or ‘concurrent common knowledge’
message but at this point the sender of that confirmation message cannot be sure that
their message has already arrived, etc.).
7This scenario also shows that although the issue of non-simultaneous attitudes or com-
mitments arises naturally in cases of deceased unacquainted authors, it is a separate
issue from whether speaker and hearer are acquainted.
8Some people may be hesitant to apply the term ‘common’ ground in the above examples
precisely because the attitudes are not simultaneous. Since my general aim is to give
a uniform analysis of different types of communication in Stalnaker’s common ground
framework, I will stick to this term. An alternative strategy would be to rephrase
Stalnaker’s theory and define speech acts as proposals to update a ‘(shared) background’,
‘(shared) ground’ or ‘context’.
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(Panangaden and Taylor (1998)) (i.e., attitude updates do not have to be
simultaneous but are causally related in a consistent manner). I leave ex-
ploration of what notion of common knowledge would be most useful to
future research.
For the purpose of this dissertation I tacitly assume the following simple
definition of time indexed common ground that borrows elements from the
concept of eventual common knowledge but defines common ground as
existing between time slices of conversational participants. p is common








a ∃t(t ≥ t1 ∧ Btb p)
Bt1a ∃t(t ≥ t1∧ Bt2b ∃t(t ≤ t2∧
Btb∃t
′(t′ ≤ t ∧ Bt′a p)) Bta∃t′(t′ ≥ t ∧ Bt
′
b p))... ...
Hence some proposition p is not defined as being common ground at a
specific point in time or being common ground simpliciter, but rather being
common ground between conversational participants at certain points in
time. In the case of the father at his deathbed, the father believes some
proposition p at t1; the daughter believes p at t2; the father believes at t1 that
his daughter will believe that p (at some later time); the daughter believes at
t2 that her father believed that p (at some earlier time); etc. This is enough to
say that it is common ground that p between father at t1 and daughter at t2.10
Setting aside issues concerning acquaintance for now, the communication
between Wittgenstein (or Tolkien) and myself also falls under this definition;
the author had the appropriate beliefs in his time, I have the appropriate
beliefs in my time and hence there exists common ground between us.
9Because this is a definition of common ground between only one speaker and one hearer,
it can display an asymmetry in attitudes that is not present in generalized common
ground definitions (i.e., between time slices of more than two conversational partici-
pants). Assuming that the production of a speech act is always prior to its interpretation,
the speaker believes that the hearer has or will have certain attitudes, whereas the hearer
believes that the speaker has or had certain attitudes.
10If either conversational participant lacks the appropriate beliefs at some other time (e.g.,
the daughter no longer believes p at t3, i.e., ¬Bt3b p) there exists no common ground
between those time slices of the interlocutors (e.g., it is not common ground that p
between father at t1 and daughter at t3).
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2.3.2 Communication without acquaintance
In this subsection I introduce a novel challenge to traditional definitions
of common ground concerning unacquainted conversational participants.
As shown above, traditional textbook common ground definitions in terms
of attitudes seem to involve beliefs about others, i.e., de re beliefs. In other
words, they take face-to-face11 conversations – where conversational par-
ticipants are acquainted with each other – as a model for communication
in general. However, people that are not acquainted can also communicate
(e.g., Monk who communicates with his readers). We thus need to further
adjust our definition of common ground. To clearly show the worry, I will
in this section reformulate the belief-based definition of common ground
under a relational analysis of de re attitudes that makes explicit the required
acquaintance relations. In the rest of this chapter I will focus on belief-based
common ground definitions but the discussed issues and solutions straight-
forwardly extend to common ground definitions in terms of other cognitive
attitudes such as acceptance. It is an open question whether they also extend
to a commitment-based conception of common ground.12
Relational analysis of de re belief
In the relational analysis of de re belief (Kaplan (1968); Lewis (1979). See
also Cresswell and Von Stechow (1982)) if a believes de re of b that he is Q,
this means that there is an acquaintance relation between a and b, and that a
believes that the person he knows through this acquaintance relation is Q.
De re beliefs are thus in essence de dicto beliefs paired with an acquaintance
relation that links the believer to the res. Such an analysis allows us to
account for so-called Ortcutt scenarios (see Quine (1956)): Suppose you and
your favourite nephew Nick are driving to your uncle’s birthday party in
separate cars. Nick cuts you off on the highway but, although you see a
glimpse of the driver, you do not realize that it is Nick nor recognize Nick’s
car. You become angry at the driver and form the de re belief about Nick that
11Here ‘face-to-face’ conversations do not require conversational participants to actually
be in front of each other. It is sufficient if they know who they are currently talking to
(e.g., an online chat conversation with a friend is also a ‘face-to-face’ conversation).
12The main question here is whether we can make a distinction between de re and de
dicto commitments; intuitively, ‘a being committed to b to act on it being true that b is
committed to a to act on p being true’ is different from ‘a being committed to b to act on
it being true that the hearer is committed to a to act on p being true’.
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he is a complete ass but lose sight of the car quickly. When entering your
uncle’s house, however, you are greeted by Nick’s enthusiastic embrace and
are reinforced in your de re belief about Nick that he is a great guy. Does
this mean that you have logically inconsistent de re beliefs, i.e., that Nick
is a complete ass and a great guy? The relational analysis of de re beliefs
can explain why not: You are acquainted with Nick through the car incident
and you believe that the person you saw on the highway is a complete
ass. You are simultaneously also acquainted with Nick through regular
family gatherings and believe that the person you are acquainted with
through family gatherings is a great guy. Hence your de re beliefs – which
are comprised of perfectly coherent de dicto beliefs – are not inconsistent.
The relational analysis implies that if a has a de re belief about b, then a
has a de se belief (e.g., a has a belief about “the person that I saw on the
highway”). I follow Lewis (1979) in analysing all attitudes (including de re
attitudes) as essentially de se attitudes, i.e., as self-ascription of a property.
So if a believes de re of b that he is Q, then a is acquainted with b, and a self-
ascribes the property of being such that “the person that I am acquainted
with is Q”. This is represented as follows:
∃R1[R1(a, b) ∧ B∗aλi[Q(
ιv[R1(i, v)])]]
In the above formula ∃Rn[Rn(x, y)] means that there is an acquaintance
relation Rn such that x is acquainted with y through Rn. B∗xP means that x
self-ascribes the property P. The term λx[φ] denotes the property of being
an x such that φ. I use the letters i, i’, i” etc to denote the de se center, i.e., the
self. In the rest of this chapter I will abbreviate ιv[R1(i, v)] (i.e., “the person
that I am acquainted with through relation R1”) as
ιRi1.
Here and henceforth I assume that identity is always a salient acquain-
tance relation; everyone is always acquainted with themselves as themselves
(de se). In the cases I discuss, identity is the only relevant acquaintance
relation we have to ourselves.
Iterative de re beliefs
Iterative de re beliefs further complicate this picture. I adopt Maier’s (2009a)
analysis of iterative de re attitudes where if a believes de re of b that b
believes de re of c that she is Q (i.e., in the earlier notation BaBbQc), then
this entails that a is acquainted with both b and c and that a self-ascribes the
property of being such that b is acquainted with c and that the former self-
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ascribes the property of being such that “the person that I am acquainted
with is Q”:








So, if Ann believes de re of Bob that he believes de re of Chrissy that she
is cool then [1] Ann is acquainted with both Bob and Chrissy through
respectively acquaintance relations R1 and R2, [2] Ann believes that the
person she is acquainted with through R1 is acquainted with the person she
is acquainted with through R2 and [3] Ann believes that the person she is
acquainted with through R1 believes that the person he is acquainted with
is cool.
We can thus rewrite the common ground definition in terms of de re
beliefs as follows (making the required acquaintance relations explicit): p is
common ground between speaker a and hearer b iff:13
B∗aλi[p] B∗bλi[p]
∃R1[R1(b, a) ∧ B∗bλi[B
∗ι
Ri1
λi′[p]]] ∃R1[R1(a, b) ∧ B∗aλi[B∗ιRi1
λi′[p]]]















So, both speaker and hearer self-ascribe the property of being such that p;
both are acquainted with the other and self-ascribe the property of being
such that the person they are acquainted with self-ascribes the property of
being such that p, etc.
Non-face-to-face conversations
The above reformulation of the traditional definition makes explicit why
de re common ground definitions do not apply to non-face-to-face commu-
nication. I suggest that we can distinguish (at least) three distinct types of
non-face-to-face communication that we do intuitively describe in common
ground terminology but that traditional definitions do not apply to. I will
13Arguably, there is an additional implicit assumption that interlocutors have their iterative
de re beliefs through the same constant acquaintance relation.
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dub these ‘messages in bottles’, ‘anonymous fan letters’ and ‘double-blind
reviews’:14
• Message in a bottle: conversations where the identity of the speaker
is known but that of the hearer isn’t and hence (although the hearer
has de re beliefs about the speaker) the speaker does not have de re
beliefs about the hearer. For instance, suppose you receive and read
a message in a bottle from a famous person like Sting. Intuitively, it
is common ground between Sting and you that there are monkeys on
his desert island. However, here the speaker a is not acquainted with
the hearer b (i.e., ¬∃R1[R1(a, b)]). Conversations through books, blog
posts, broadcasted speeches etc. are cases of such conversations with
several hearers.
• Anonymous fan letter: conversations where the identity of the hearer
is known but that of the speaker isn’t and hence (although the speaker
has de re beliefs about the hearer) the speaker does not have de re
beliefs about the hearer. For instance, intuitively, it is common ground
between Sting and the writer of an anonymous fan letter that his voice
is like the morning sun. However, here the hearer is not acquainted
with the speaker (i.e., ¬∃R1[R1(b, a)]).
• Double-blind review: conversations where the identity of neither con-
versational participant is known and neither conversational participant
has de re beliefs about the other. For instance, intuitively, it is common
ground between reviewer and author in a double-blind peer review
process that the submitted paper should not exceed 20 pages. However,
in these cases neither speaker nor hearer is acquainted with the other
(i.e., ¬∃R1[R1(a, b)] ∧ ¬∃R2[R2(b, a)]).
14Actually, these distinctions raise questions about what constitutes an acquaintance re-
lation. Intuitively, I am acquainted with Monk, but Sting is not acquainted with the
writer of the anonymous fan letter because – even though I’ve never met him – I know
Monk through his book, reading about him on Wikipedia, someone referring to him
etc. and this is not true for Sting and the anonymous admirer. However, is Sting not in
essentially the same way (though maybe in an impoverished sense) also acquainted
with the anonymous admirer (or the reviewee with the anonymous reviewer) through
the love-letter (or the review) (see e.g., Jeshion (2010); Recanati (2009))? Maybe anony-
mous fan letter conversations or double-blind review conversations (i.e., conversations
where (at least) the hearer is not acquainted with the speaker) are in fact not possible.
However, such a concession would not dissolve the problem with de re common ground
definitions; discourse where the hearer is unknown still seems possible.
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In the above types of communication either the speaker is not acquainted
with the hearer, the hearer is not acquainted with the speaker, or neither
is acquainted with the other. Hence the above iteration of de re beliefs
cannot materialize in these cases and so there can exist no common ground
between speaker and hearer (i.e., between Sting and the person that finds
his message, between Sting and his secret admirer or between anonymous
author and reviewer). This is unsatisfactory since these conversations do
seem to involve producing and interpreting the relevant texts against a
shared background. For instance, it is felicitous for the anonymous reviewer
to write “Maybe this point relates to Grice’s third maxim” but not to write
“Maybe this point relates to Bridget’s paper” because it is common ground
what Grice’s third maxim is, but not who Bridget is.
The same problem arises in a generalized definition of common ground
in terms of de re beliefs. If we make all acquaintance relations explicit, such
definitions would be rewritten as follows: p is common ground between all
conversational participants in some community iff:
∀x(Cx → B∗xλi[p])
∀x∀y((Cx ∧ Cy)→ (∃R1[R1(x, y) ∧ B∗xλi[B∗ιRi1
λi′[p]]]))








In words, everyone in the community self-ascribes the property of being
such that p; everyone in the community is acquainted with everyone in
the community and self-ascribes the property of being such that the person
they are acquainted with self-ascribes the property of being such that p;
etc. Here in the cases of two-person conversations through messages in
bottles, anonymous fan letters and double-blind reviews, at least one of the
conversational participants (the speaker or the hearer) is not acquainted
with at least one of the other conversational participants (i.e., ∃x∃y(Cx ∧
Cy ∧ ¬∃R1[R1(x, y)])) and hence there can be no common ground in the
relevant community.
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2.4 Redefining common ground
Now that I have spelled out the challenge posed by non-face-to-face con-
versations to traditional common ground definitions, I will propose two
potential fixes to these definitions. The two fixes are inspired by the intuitive
idea that, although Monk may not have de re beliefs about (all) his readers
individually, he does have general beliefs about ‘his readers’ and what they
believe. In this section I discuss two ways of fleshing out the notion of
general belief (i.e., in sensu composito and in sensu diviso) and propose two
definitions of common ground based on these.
2.4.1 Generality in sensu composito and in sensu diviso
The two notions of common ground that I will propose are inspired by
Abelard’s distinction between two types of generality (as discussed by
Lewis (1969)): in sensu composito or ‘collective’ (Section 2.4.2) and in sensu
diviso or ‘distributive’ (Section 2.4.3).15 If I believe a general rule in sensu
composito then I have a general de dicto belief. For instance, if a considers
all flowers to be pretty in sensu composito, then she believes ‘that all flowers
are pretty’ (i.e., Ba∀x(Fx → Px) where Fx and Px respectively mean x is a
flower and x is pretty). This means that there may be flowers that a does
not believe to be pretty (for instance because she fails to realize that they are
flowers).
Conversely, if I believe a general rule in sensu diviso then I have a general
disposition to form singular de re beliefs in every relevant situation. For
instance, if a considers all flowers to be pretty in sensu diviso, then she
believes of every flower, if she sees it, that it is pretty (i.e., ∀x(Fx → (Sax →
BaPx)) where Sxy means x sees y)16. This means that a might not recognize
every flower as a flower (might even lack the concept of ‘flower’ altogether)
but still believes of every flower that she comes across that it is pretty.
15Bermúdez (2003) construes from Braithwaite’s (1932) account of generality the following
intermediate concept of general belief: if a believes that flowers are pretty then a believes
of every flower that she sees and considers to be a flower, that it is pretty (i.e., ∀x((Fx ∧
Sax ∧ BaFx)→ BaPx)). I leave exploration into the merits of extending this notion to a
common ground definition for future research.
16Contrary to Bermúdez (2003) and Meggle (2003), I represent the fact that a has a disposi-
tion to form de re beliefs by a conditional: if a is in the relevant situation (e.g., sees a
flower), then a forms the appropriate beliefs.
28
2.4 Redefining common ground
2.4.2 In sensu composito common ground
Definition
First, I will present the in sensu composito definition of common ground. An
in sensu composito understanding of general thought by a about the mental
states of conversational partners would be as follows: a believes (or self-
ascribes the property of being such) that ‘all conversational partners in the
community believe that p’ (i.e., in our earlier notation: Ba∀x(Cx → Bx p), in
the present notation: B∗aλi[∀x(Cx → B∗xλi′[p])]). This leads to the following
definition of generalized common ground in terms of general de dicto
belief: p is common ground between all conversational participants in some
community iff:
∀x(Cx → B∗xλi[p])
∀y(Cy→ B∗yλi[∀x(Cx → B∗xλi′[p])])
∀z(Cz→ B∗z λi[∀y(Cy→ B∗yλi′[∀x(Cx → B∗xλi′′[p])])])
...
In words, everyone in the community believes that p; everyone in the com-
munity believes that everyone in the community believes that p; etc. Hence
p can be common ground in a community even though nobody has any
de re beliefs about anyone. All that is required is that people have appro-
priate beliefs about what ‘everyone in the community of conversational
participants’ believes.
I speculate that most semanticists that talk about common ground in a
large community of interlocutors (e.g., Monk and his readership) tacitly
assume (a version of) the in sensu composito definition of common ground.
In fact, Schiffer (1972), Meggle (2003) and Maier and Semeijn (forthcoming)
provide notions of common belief and common ground in a community that
are similar to the above in sensu composito definition of generalized common
ground. However, I assume that problems concerning our inability to form
iterative de re attitudes relate to the absence of the relevant acquaintance
relations – not to the number of conversational participants per se. Hence,
these problems can also occur in a two-person (non-face-to-face) discourse.
In other words, the in sensu composito definition of common ground is just
as relevant when we talk about common ground between one speaker and
one hearer, i.e., in a community of two. An in sensu composito understanding
of general thought about conversational participants would lead to the
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following definition of common ground between speaker and hearer in a
two-person discourse in terms of de dicto beliefs about ‘the speaker’ and ‘the
hearer’:17 p is common ground between speaker a and hearer b iff (where

















So, both speaker and hearer believe that p; the hearer believes that ‘the
speaker’ (whoever it is) believes that p; the speaker believes that ‘the hearer’
(whoever it is) believes that p; etc. Again, p can be common ground without
hearer or speaker forming any de re beliefs. All that is required is that
they have the appropriate beliefs about what ‘the speaker’ or ‘the hearer’
believes. So – applying the in sensu composito notion of common ground to
the mini-discourse between Mary and John – when Mary asserts (10) that
nobody is coming to the party, she proposes that it becomes the case that she
believes that nobody is coming to the party; that John believes this; that she
believes that ‘the hearer’ (whoever it is) believes this; that John believes that
‘the speaker’ (whoever it is) believes this; etc. Similarly, Mary’s speech act
(10) is felicitous because Mary believes that there is a party; John believes
this; Mary believes that ‘the hearer’ believes this; John believes that ‘the
speaker’ believes this; etc.
Application to four types of conversation
The in sensu composito definition is supposed to be a general definition
of common ground that, unlike traditional definitions, applies to all four
types of communication distinguished in the previous section (i.e., face-to-
face conversations, messages in bottles, anonymous fan letters and double-
blind reviews). For reasons of space I only show how this works for the
17We can derive these iterations from the general common ground definition because,
in case speaker a and hearer b are aware that they are in a two-person discourse, a
and b are both conversational participants (i.e., Ca and Cb), a believes that ‘the hearer’
is a conversational participant (i.e., B∗a λi[C
ιx[Hx]]), b believes that ‘the speaker’ is a
conversational participant (i.e., B∗b λi[C
ιx[Sx]]), etc.
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definition of common ground between one speaker and one hearer in a two-
person discourse but the derivations for the generalized common ground
definitions are similar.
Let’s first consider conversations of type ‘double-blind review’ where
neither speaker nor hearer is acquainted with the other. In such cases neither
conversational participant has any de re beliefs about the other, nor do they
believe the other to have these. I assume that the speaker does have iterative
de dicto beliefs about the mental state of ‘the hearer’ (whoever that may be)
and vice versa (e.g., the reviewer believes that ‘the hearer’ believes that p,
the reviewee believes that ‘the speaker’ believes that p, etc). In other words,
the mental states of the conversational participants are properly described
by the iteration of de dicto beliefs of the in sensu composito definition on p.
30. Hence, on an in sensu composito understanding of common ground, it
is common ground between speaker and hearer that p in this scenario and
hence the definition shows how communication can take place.
Next, consider ‘anonymous fan letter’ conversations, i.e., conversations
where the identity of the hearer is known but that of the speaker is not. I
assume that also in these types of conversations, both interlocutors have
iterative de dicto beliefs about the mental state of ‘the hearer’ and ‘the
speaker’. For instance, in the conversation between Sting and his anony-
mous admirer, Sting believes that ‘the speaker’ (whoever that may be)
believes that Sting’s voice is like the morning sun (p) and the admirer
believes that ‘the hearer’ believes that p. Hence in this scenario it is also
common ground that p on the in sensu composito definition. Apart from
the relevant de dicto beliefs, one conversational participant (the speaker)
also has de re beliefs about their interlocutor. I assume that in anonymous
fan letter conversations, the identity of the hearer is ‘known’. This means
that both speaker a and hearer b believe de re of b that they are the hearer
(i.e., B∗bλi[i =
ιx[Hx]] ∧ ∃R1[R1(a, b) ∧ B∗aλi[
ιRi1 =
ιx[Hx]]]), both believe
that the other has this de re belief, etc. Hence although Sting only has de
dicto beliefs about the mental state of ‘the speaker’, the admirer can form
de re beliefs about Sting’s mental state. Assuming we believe the logical
consequences of our beliefs, we can for instance derive that since the ad-
mirer believes that ‘the hearer’ believes that p (B∗aλi[B∗ιx[Hx]λi
′[p]]) and the
admirer believes de re of Sting that he is ‘the hearer’, that the admirer also
believes de re of Sting (through the same acquaintance relation) that he
believes that p: ∃R1[R1(a, b) ∧ B∗aλi[B∗ιRi1
λi′[p]]]). Moreover, Sting and the
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admirer both have iterative de re or de dicto beliefs about the others’ (de re
or de dicto) beliefs about their interlocutor.
‘Message in a bottle’ conversations (i.e., conversations where the hearer is
acquainted with the speaker but not vice versa) are the exact mirror image
of anonymous fan letters and hence the same reasoning applies to those. In
such cases the hearer has de re beliefs about the speaker but not vice versa.
Last, in face-to-face conversations, both conversational participants are
acquainted with the other and have de re beliefs about their interlocutor’s
mental state. I assume that apart from these de re beliefs, interlocutors also
have the appropriate iterative de dicto beliefs about the beliefs of ‘the hearer’
and ‘the speaker’. Hence we can also say that p is in sensu composito common
ground in these types of conversations.
2.4.3 In sensu diviso common ground
Definition
Next, I turn to the in sensu diviso version of a common ground definition. To
formulate the in sensu diviso definition, we need to rewrite in conditional (or
in sensu diviso) form the relational analysis of de re attitudes. In words, if
a believes in sensu diviso of b that he is Q, then if there is an acquaintance
relation from a to b, then a believes (or self-ascribes the property of being
such) that the person he knows through this acquaintance relation is Q. This
gets translated as ∀R1[R1(a, b)→ B∗aλi[Q
ιRi1]].
An in sensu diviso understanding of a general thought by a about the
mental states of conversational partners would be as follows: It is true of all
conversational partners in some community that if a is in a relevant situation
with the conversational participant, then a believes of this person that they
believe that p (i.e., in our earlier notation: ∀x(Cx → (Rax → BaBx p)) where
Rxy means x is in a relevant situation with y). For now, I will assume that ‘the
relevant situations’ are situations where an acquaintance relation obtains18
so that it is true of all conversational partners in some community that if
there is an acquaintance relation from a to the conversational participant,
then a believes that the person she is acquainted with believes that p. This
gets translated as ∀x(Cx → ∀R1[R1(a, x) → B∗aλi[B∗ιRi1
λi′[p]]]). This leads
18We can put further constraints on the relevant types of acquaintance relations. See section
2.5.2.
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to the following definition of generalized common ground in terms of
conditional de re belief:19 p is common ground between all conversational
participants in some community iff:
∀x(Cx → B∗xλi[p])
∀x∀y((Cx ∧ Cy)→ ∀R1[R1(x, y)→ B∗xλi[B∗ιRi1
λi′[p]]])








So, everyone in the community believes that p; for everyone in the commu-
nity it is true that for everyone in the community, if the one is acquainted
with the other, then the one believes that the person they are acquainted
with believes that p; etc. So, again, no de re beliefs are required for p to be
common ground in a community. Common ground can exist in a commu-
nity where no two people are acquainted. It is merely required that people
would form the appropriate de re beliefs about one another if they were
acquainted (and would believe that the others would as well).
In sensu diviso common ground between speaker a and hearer b is defined





λi′[p]]] ∀R1[R1(a, b)→ B∗aλi[B∗ιRi1
λi′[p]]]















So, both speaker and hearer believe that p; if the hearer is acquainted with
the speaker, then the hearer believes that the person they are acquainted
19Meggle (2003) provides an alternative ‘in sensu diviso’ version of a generalized common
ground definition that boils down to the traditional definition in terms of de re beliefs.
This version does not seem to do justice to the fact that a general in sensu diviso belief
involves a disposition to form de re beliefs. Moreover, it suffers from the problems
described in section 2.3.2 and hence is, in the context of this discussion, not the most
interesting version of an in sensu diviso definition.
20We arrive at these iterations from the general common ground definition because a and b
are conversational participants (i.e., Ca and Cb).
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with believes that p; if the speaker is acquainted with the hearer, then the
speaker believes that the person they are acquainted with believes that p;
etc. So p can be common ground between speaker and hearer even though
neither has any de re beliefs about the other. All that is required is that they
would form the right de re beliefs about each other if they were acquainted
(and would believe the other would do so as well).
So when Mary asserts (10) that nobody is coming to the party, she pro-
poses that it becomes the case that she believes that nobody is coming to the
party; that John believes this; that, if she is acquainted with John, then she
believes of John that he believes this; that, if John is acquainted with Mary,
he believes of Mary that she believes this; etc. Similarly, Mary’s speech act
(10) is felicitous because Mary believes that there is a party; John believes
this; if Mary is acquainted with John, then she believes that of John that he
believes this; if John is acquainted with Mary, then he believes of Mary that
she believes this; etc.
A potential worry with the above in sensu diviso definitions is that they
universally quantify over acquaintance relations, making the formulas triv-
ially true when there are no relevant acquaintance relations. On the standard
material implication analysis of conditionals, quantification over an empty
domain is trivially true (e.g., given that there are no unicorns, it is true of all
things that if they are a unicorn, then they are pink, black, robots, etc.). For
the generalized de re and in sensu composito definitions (which also involve
quantification) this does not lead to serious difficulties (i.e., it implies that
if there are no conversational participants (i.e., ¬∃xCx), then everything is
trivially common ground). However, consider the in sensu diviso definition
for common ground between speaker a and hearer b. If a is not acquainted
with b (i.e., ¬∃R1[R1(a, b)]), then it is trivially true that for all acquaintance
relations, if they are from a to b, then a believes de re of b that they believe
that p (i.e., ∀R1[R1(a, b) → B∗aλi[B∗ιRi1
λi′[p]]]). The definition thus implies
that if a and b are not acquainted, everything is trivially common ground
between them. This is problematic because the in sensu diviso definition is
supposed to apply to cases of non-face-to-face conversations and tell us
whether some proposition is common ground in those situations or not.
To overcome this issue with the in sensu composito common ground defini-
tions, we need a non truth-functional account of conditionals: Given that the
antecedent (p) is false, the conditional (p→ q) can still be true or false. For
instance, we can take ‘→’ (at least when embedded under a quantification
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over acquaintance relations) to denote an ‘indicative conditional’ and adopt
the Stalnaker/Lewis (Stalnaker (1968); Lewis (1973)) possible world analysis:
p→ q is true iff in the closest (or most similar) possible worlds to the actual
world where p is true, q is also true.21 If p is in fact true, the actual world is
the closest possible p-world to the actual world (and hence q must be true
in order for the conditional to be true). Given this analysis, even if a is not
acquainted with b, then still ∀R1[R1(b, a) → B∗bλi[B
∗ι
Ri1
λi′[p]]] may be true
or false: True if the closest possible worlds where a is acquainted with b are
such that a believes de re of b that they believe that p. False if this isn’t the
case.
Application to four types of conversations
Again, I will show how the four distinguished types of face-to-face and
non-face-to-face communication are supposed to fit into the in sensu diviso
definition.
First, I will consider non-face-to-face conversations where neither speaker
nor hearer is acquainted with the other as in double-blind peer reviewing.
In such conversations, neither interlocutor has any de re beliefs about the
other, nor believes the other to have these.22 However, I assume that the
interlocutors do have a disposition to form the appropriate de re beliefs; if
they had been acquainted, they would have formed the relevant iteration
of de re beliefs about each other (e.g., reviewer a would have believed de
re of the author b that they believe that the submitted paper should not
exceed 20 pages (p): ∀R1[R1(a, b) → B∗aλi[B∗ιRi1
λi′[p]]]).23 In other words,
the mental states and dispositions of interlocutors in conversations of this
type satisfy the iteration of mental states and dispositions described in the
21See chapter 4 for Lewis’ application of this analysis of conditionals to counterfactuals
and in particular the fiction operator ‘In f, φ’.
22They may, as described above, have de dicto beliefs about the mental state of ‘the speaker’
or ‘the hearer’.
23Arguably this may not be true for all possible acquaintance relations. For instance, if a
saw b on the beach but does not realize that that was the person they are reviewing, a
probably will not believe de re of b that they believe that the submitted paper should not
exceed 20 pages. This suggests that an in sensu diviso definition in fact requires further
constraints so that it only quantifies over acquaintance relations ‘in the context of the
conversation’. See section 2.5.2 for further discussion.
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in sensu diviso definition on page 33. Hence p is common ground in this type
of conversation under the in sensu diviso definition.
Next, I will consider conversations of type ‘anonymous fan letter’ where
the speaker is acquainted with the hearer and has de re beliefs about them
but not vice versa. I assume that in such a situation, although the hearer
does not have any de re beliefs about the speaker, they do have a disposition
to form these, had they been acquainted. The speaker, on the other hand, has
de re beliefs about the hearer and their mental state (e.g., the anonymous
admirer a believes de re of Sting b that he believes that his voice is like
the morning sun (p): ∃R1[R1(a, b) ∧ B∗aλi[B∗ιRi1
λi′[p]]]) However, from the
fact that there is such an acquaintance relation we cannot derive that a has
the appropriate beliefs for all acquaintance relations. Hence, to make his
definition work, the defender of the in sensu diviso definition will have to
assume that in ‘anonymous fan letter’ conversations, there is not only this
acquaintance relation from a to b, but a also still has a general disposition
(that the existent acquaintance relation and accompanying beliefs are in line
with) to form the appropriate beliefs if he were otherwise acquainted with b:
∀R1[R1(a, b)→ B∗aλi[B∗ιRi1
λi′[p]]].24 Hence on the in sensu diviso definition p
is common ground in conversations of this type.
‘Message in a bottle’ conversations are the exact mirror image of ‘anony-
mous fan letter’ conversations (where the hearer, rather than the speaker,
has de re beliefs about their interlocutor) and work similarly.
Last, in face-to-face conversations, both interlocutors have iterated de re
beliefs about each other. Again, we assume that in addition to having de
re beliefs about their interlocutor, speaker and hearer also have a general
disposition to form the appropriate de re beliefs if they were otherwise
acquainted. Hence the in sensu diviso definition also applies to these kinds
of conversations.
24An alternative strategy for the defender of an in sensu diviso definition is to assume
a weaker version of the definition which requires a to either be acquainted and
have the appropriate beliefs, or have a disposition to have these beliefs if a were
acquainted:∃R1[R1(a, b) ∧ B∗a λi[B∗ιRi1





Now that I have presented two possible strategies to improve upon tradi-
tional definitions of common ground, we can try to decide between them.
Most importantly, we can compare how well they fit our intuitive under-
standing of common ground. Lewis (1969) has argued that a general rule
is convention only if people believe it in sensu diviso, i.e., only if people re-
spond in accordance with the rule in all relevant instances (whether they are
aware of this or not). Similarly, one could argue that q is only truly common
ground when people form the appropriate de re beliefs about conversational
participants whenever they are acquainted with them. However, it is not
obvious that Lewis’ reasoning extends to the concept of common ground.
I will first discuss what implications the different definitions have for the
notion of felicity. Then I will discuss the case of the shy acquaintance that
may help us decide between the two definitions.
2.5.1 Felicity and counterfactual success
Remember that common ground is not just what we propose to update
with assertions, but also determines what speech acts are felicitous or ap-
propriate in a particular context. For instance, reconsider the mini-discourse
between Mary and John. If it is common ground that there is a party (q),
then Mary can felicitously assert (10), i.e., that nobody is coming to the
party (p). Otherwise, her speech act would not be not felicitous. The in
sensu diviso definition is crucially different from traditional common ground
definitions in terms of iterative de re beliefs and in sensu composito common
ground definitions because it defines context (and hence felicity) in terms of
conditional beliefs, rather than actual beliefs. Hence, whereas for the de re
and in sensu composito definitions the felicity of a speech act p in a context c
is dependent on whether p will lead to successful communication in c, for
the in sensu diviso definition it is dependent on whether p leads to successful
communication in the context of the face-to-face version of the relevant
conversation c′, which may or may not be identical to c.
To illustrate, consider Mary and John’s discourse under the traditional
de re and in sensu composito definitions of common ground. Suppose that it
is common ground that there is a party (q). On the de re common ground
definition, if q is common ground, then Mary and John are in a face-to-face
conversation and Mary believes de re of John that he believes that q. On the
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in sensu composito definition, if q is common ground, then Mary has (possibly
in addition to de re beliefs about John) the de dicto belief that ‘the hearer’
believes that q in all four distinguished types of conversation. Hence, if
Mary wants to engage in cooperative communication, she would in fact say
that nobody is coming to the party (p) (which presupposes q) because she
would expect her interlocutor to understand her utterance of p. Similarly, if
q is common ground, John would be able to interpret Mary’s assertion in
face-to-face conversations and (under the in sensu composito definition) in
all distinguished types of non-face-to-face conversations (because he either
believes de re of Mary that she believes q or because he believes that ‘the
speaker’ believes that q). If q is not common ground, either Mary will not
say p (e.g., because she doesn’t believe that her interlocutor believes that q)
or John will not be able to interpret p (e.g., because he does not believe his
interlocutor believes that q). Hence on both definitions, if the speech act p is
predicted to be felicitous (because it is common ground that q), this implies
that p will also actually lead to successful communication.
The in sensu diviso definition is crucially different because it provides a
notion of felicity that is tied to conditional success. For instance, in a non-face-
to-face conversation between Mary and John of type ‘double-blind review’
(where neither is acquainted with the other) it can, in theory, be common
ground that there is a party (q) even though Mary believes that ‘the hearer’
does not believe that q, John believes that ‘the speaker’ does not believe
that q, etc. Still it would be common ground that q as long as it is true that
if Mary and John were acquainted, they would form the right de re beliefs
about one another. Mary’s assertion that nobody is coming to the party (p)
is thus predicted to be felicitous even though p would not actually lead
to successful communication; Mary would not actually utter p if she were
trying to engage in cooperative communication (because – although if she
were acquainted with John, she would believe of him that he believes that q
– she does not currently believe that ‘the hearer’ believes that q) and, even
if Mary did utter p, John would not even be able to interpret p (because –
even though if he were acquainted with Mary, he would believe of her that
she believes that q – he does not currently believe that ‘the speaker’ believes
that q).
In other words, it seems that the intuitive idea behind the in sensu diviso
definition is to take face-to-face conversations as a model for communication
and define felicity in terms of what speech acts would lead to successful com-
munication in the face-to-face version of the relevant conversation. Hence
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we end up with an essentially different notion of felicity on the in sensu
diviso definition than on de re and in sensu composito definitions. Whether
some speech act is felicitous in some context thus becomes a separate issue
from whether the speech act will actually lead to successful communication
in that context. Some people may find this an unintuitive divorce and hence
may want to avoid such a notion of common ground. Assuming we want
a definition of common ground that also applies to non-face-to-face con-
versations, they are thus pushed into the direction of the in sensu composito
definition. This is the notion of common ground that I will assume in subse-
quent chapters. I will end this chapter with a discussion of a particular kind
of conversation that can help us tease apart the two available notions of
common ground for non-face-to-face conversations (in sensu composito and in
sensu diviso) and hence help us decide which fits our intuitive understanding
better.
2.5.2 The shy acquaintance
To clearly see the difference between the two notions of common ground
(and hence the two notions of the felicity of speech acts), suppose Thea
signed up for a program where participants send weekly ‘diary entries’ to
an anonymous reader. Unbeknownst to Thea, she has been sending her
diary entries to her favourite nephew Nick who signed up to the program
to be an anonymous reader. Nick quickly found out that he is receiving his
aunt’s diary entries but has so far been too shy to admit this to Thea. Sup-
pose Thea is interested in architecture and her latest diary entry contained
the information that The Sims was originally designed as an architecture
simulator (q). According to the in sensu diviso definition of common ground,
it is not common ground between Thea t and her nephew n that q – Thea is
acquainted with the hearer but does not believe of him (under that acquain-
tance relation) that he believes that q (i.e., ∃R1[R1(t, n)∧¬B∗t λi[B∗ιRi1
λi′[q]]]).
According to the in sensu composito definition, it is common ground between
Thea and her nephew that q – Thea has the appropriate beliefs about what
‘the hearer’ believes (i.e., B∗t λi[B
∗ι
x[Hx]λi
′[q]]) and the hearer is her nephew
Nick (even though Thea does not recognize him as such).
An anonymous Amsterdam Colloquium 2019 reviewer has judged a com-
parable case to form an argument in favour of the in sensu diviso definition:
If Thea would meet her nephew at her husband’s birthday party, surely
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she would not be licensed to base the production of her speech acts on the
assumption that q is shared background knowledge. For instance, it would
not be correct for her to say (11):
(11) I gave my husband that architecture simulation game.
since she does not expect her nephew to understand what game she is
talking about. Similarly, the linguistic behaviour of the nephew will be as if
he has no idea what game Thea is talking about (since he does not want to
expose himself as a reader).
I agree with the reviewer’s judgement but argue that in the above example
conversation it would also not be common ground that q on an in sensu
composito understanding. This is because during the birthday conversation
Thea does not believe that ‘the hearer’ (of that conversation)25 believes
that q. The difference between the in sensu composito and the in sensu diviso
definition in fact only comes out in conversations where Thea believes that
‘the hearer’ (of that conversation) believes that q. So the relevant situation to
consider is one where Thea is writing another diary entry; here Thea believes
that ‘the hearer’ believes that q (because the previous entry contained this
information) and she is acquainted with the hearer (i.e., her nephew) but
does not believe of him that he believes that q. Although intuitions may vary
concerning this and related cases, I take these considerations to form a prima
facie argument for the in sensu composito definition of common ground, i.e.,
in this situation it is common ground between Thea and her nephew that q.
For instance, it would be felicitous for Thea to write (11) in such a situation
precisely because she expects ‘the reader’ to understand what she is talking
about (and the reader has the appropriate beliefs about ‘the writer’ as well).
A possible response to the above argument in favour of the in sensu com-
posito definition is to add further constraints on acquaintance relations in the
in sensu diviso definition. Intuitively, the mere existence of an acquaintance
relation is not enough to establish that conversational participants are in a
‘relevant situation’ for common ground. Reconsider a who believes flowers
to be pretty in sensu diviso. For a to be in a relevant situation for establishing
25This indexical element implicit in the in sensu composito definition also explains how
for instance two people can have multiple common grounds, i.e., they may not realize
that their interlocutor in one communicative exchange is the same as their interlocutor
in some other communicative exchange. Common ground is thus in fact defined as




general in sensu diviso belief, it is not enough for a just to be acquainted
with a flower. Arguably, if I hit a on the back of the head with a bouquet of
flowers, she is acquainted with the flowers but not in a relevant situation
because she does not see the relevant flowers. In other words, the fact that a
does not consider those flowers to be pretty does not disprove her general
in sensu diviso belief that flowers are pretty. Similar constraints could be put
on the relevant acquaintance relations necessary for establishing in sensu
diviso common ground. Although it is challenging to make such notions
precise, we could develop a version of in sensu diviso common ground that
requires that conversational participants are acquainted in the context of the
relevant conversation. In other words, we don’t just consider counterfactual
situations where conversational participants are acquainted simpliciter but
rather where the relevant conversation is face-to-face.26 Such an account
would arguably predict that Thea’s speech act is felicitous because Thea is
not acquainted with her nephew in the context of writing the diary entries
and would believe de re of him that he believes that q if she were. I leave
exploration of how to make the notion of ‘being acquainted in the context
of the relevant conversation’ more precise and the differences between this
adjusted in sensu diviso definition and the in sensu composito definition to
future research.
2.6 Conclusions
The main contribution of this chapter is a proposal of two potential re-
finements of traditional definitions of common ground in terms of de re
attitudes in order to make them applicable to non-face-to-face communi-
cation. These come forth from Abelard’s distinction between generality in
sensu composito (i.e., speaker and hearer have iterative de dicto beliefs about
the mental states of ‘the speaker’ and ‘the hearer’) and in sensu diviso (i.e.,
speaker and hearer form iterative de re beliefs about the mental states of
speaker and hearer if they are acquainted with them). I have shown that
the in sensu diviso definition makes the felicity of speech acts depend on
26Similarly, the four different types of discourse that have been distinguished in section
2.3.2 can be reformulated with these further constraints. For instance, a conversation is
of the type ‘double-blind review’ iff conversational participants are not acquainted in the
context of the conversation. Hence close colleagues may engage in such a non-face-to-face
conversation even though they are otherwise acquainted.
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counterfactual successful communication, i.e., what speech acts would lead
to successful communication in the face-to-face version of the relevant con-
versation. Therefore this definition is less suitable for my purposes. I will
henceforth in this dissertation assume the in sensu composito definition of
common ground. Lastly, I have argued that the case of the shy acquaintance
forms a prima facie argument in favour of an in sensu composito definition.
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This chapter is a rewritten and significantly expanded version of the first
three sections of ‘A Stalnakerian analysis of metafictive statements’ in
Proceedings of 21st Amsterdam Colloquium. A small part of subsection 3.4.2
is adapted from ‘Revisiting the ‘wrong kind of object’ problem’ which
is a co-authored paper with Prof. Dr. Edward N. Zalta in Organon F. The
most substantial differences between this chapter and the proceedings
paper include: First, the inclusion of an introduction to the basic puzzle
of fictional discourse as the need to quarantine fictional content (section
3.1). Second, the addition of a formalisation of the unofficial common
ground accounts in the DRT formalism and an introduction of DRT
(section 3.3.2). Third, the inclusion of a more elaborate discussion of
parafictional discourse and different semantic analyses of it.
3.1 Introduction
The current and the next chapter deal with the central puzzle that has
kick-started the study of the semantics of fiction: How do we model the
difference between fictional and non-fictional talk? In a dynamic semantic
framework this boils down to the question of what kind of context updates
result from assertions on the one hand and so-called ‘fictional statements’
on the other. Reconsider the example of Tolkien’s assertion about his friend
C.S. Lewis (1):
(1) C.S. Lewis was born in Belfast.
Such non-fictional speech acts have to be distinguished from fictional state-
ments, i.e., statements that are part of a fictional narrative. For instance,
Tolkien’s written statement (2) which is a quote from The Hobbit:
(2) In a hole in the ground there lived a hobbit.
I would like to thank three anonymous Amsterdam Colloquium 2017 reviewers for
valuable input and suggestions.
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Whereas assertions such as (1) are statements about the real world that are
actually true or false, fictional statements are usually analysed as neither
true nor false. Rather, they are fictional truth-makers; Tolkien’s writing of
(2) makes it true in the world of The Lord of the Rings that a hobbit lived in a
hole in the ground.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, in Stalnaker’s dynamic frame-
work, assertions are defined as proposals to update the common ground
between speaker and hearer. For instance, by asserting (1), Tolkien proposes
that it becomes common ground that C.S. Lewis was born in Belfast. Because
the common ground framework is modelled after cooperative information
exchanges – where people share beliefs through assertions to increase their
shared background – it is challenging to model conversations in which
people say things they believe to be (strictly) false, such as when people tell
a fictional story (e.g., Tolkien does not actually believe that a hobbit lived in
a hole in the ground). To illustrate, fictional statements such as (2) cannot be
modelled as assertions, i.e., as simple updates of the common ground. On a
simple de re belief-based conception of common ground1 this would entail
that, after fictional statement (2), it is common belief between Tolkien a and
myself b that in a hole in the ground there lived a hobbit (p), i.e., Ba p, Bb p,
BaBb p, BbBa p, etc. Such an analysis quickly runs into difficulties.
First of all, p leads to an inconsistent common ground. Arguably, p im-
plies that hobbits exist (q) and hence this also becomes common ground
(i.e., Baq, Bbq, etc.). However, before engaging with The Lord of the Rings it
was probably already common ground between Tolkien and myself that
there are no such creatures as hobbits (i.e., Ba¬q, Bb¬q, etc.). An update
that leads to an inconsistent common ground is, in itself, not necessarily
problematic if it is clear how to resolve the inconsistency (see section 3.3.1
and chapter 8). However, if we model fictional statements as assertions,
inconsistencies are problematic because it becomes unclear how to proceed;
it is unclear which of the inconsistent propositions should be removed from
our common ground to make it consistent again. While it is very unintuitive
to remove q from the common ground because it is so obviously true to
Tolkien and myself that hobbits do not exist, removing p from the common
ground defeats our original purpose of modelling the updates resulting
from fictional statements.
1The same issues that are described below – concerning inconsistency and quarantining –
come up on in sensu composito or acceptance-based conceptions of common ground.
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Second, even if the proposition expressed by some fictional statement is
not inconsistent with our previous common ground in any obvious way
(e.g., some of the propositions that are expressed by a ‘realistic’ fictional
narrative such as Austen’s Pride and Prejudice ‘might as well have been
true’), we still would not want to admit that this proposition truly becomes
common ground. At least, this fictional information is not common ground
in the same sense as it is common ground between Tolkien and myself
that C.S. Lewis was born in Belfast. We do not mix fact and fiction in this
way. Rather, fictional content should somehow be ‘quarantined’ from non-
fictional content.
In the current chapter I will discuss and present formalisations of existing
Stalnakerian accounts that model fictional discourse and the quarantining
of fictional content: Eckardt’s (2014) and Stokke’s (2013, 2018) ‘unofficial
common ground accounts’ (section 3.2). I will critique both accounts on
how they deal with two conflicting intuitions concerning fictional content.
First, that fictional truths (e.g., that hobbits exist) are only accepted while we
engage with the fiction. Second, that we do, somehow, retain information
about fictional truths even after engaging with the fiction. This allows us to
properly interpret a continuation of the fictional discourse after a break and
engage in so-called ‘parafictional discourse’ (section 3.4).
3.2 Unofficial common grounds
Eckardt’s (2014) and Stokke’s (2013, 2018) unofficial common ground ac-
counts are Stalnakerian accounts that provide a way to separate fictional
content from non-fictional content.2 In both Eckardt’s linguistically moti-
vated approach and Stokke’s philosophically motivated approach, a sharp
distinction is drawn between fiction interpretation and non-fiction interpre-
tation. This is in line with the traditional and dominant theory of fiction
(e.g., Currie (1990); Walton (1990)) according to which fiction interpretation
(which involves the cognitive attitude of imagination) is fundamentally
different from non-fiction interpretation (which involves belief). Whereas
an assertion that expresses a proposition p is a mandate to believe p, a fic-
2See Keiser (forthcoming) for a recent critical discussion of Stokke’s account of assertion
and the distinction between official and unofficial common grounds. See also Green
(2017) who also suggested that modeling fictional discourse requires positing multiple
common grounds between interlocutors.
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tional statement that expresses p is a mandate to imagine p in the game of
make-believe licensed by the fictional narrative.
Likewise, in Stokke’s and Eckardt’s Stalnakerian frameworks, assertions
and fictional statements update the common ground in fundamentally dif-
ferent ways. Assertions are defined as proposals to update, in Stokke’s
terminology, the ‘official common ground’. This is the set of mutually pre-
supposed propositions concerning actual states of affairs. For instance, after
assertion (1) the official common ground between Tolkien and his addressee
is updated with the proposition that C.S. Lewis was born in Belfast. Fictional
statements, on the other hand, are defined as proposals to update or create
an ‘unofficial common ground’3 related to the relevant fictional narrative.
This is the set of propositions that are mutually presupposed by the ad-
dressee and author of a fictional story while engaging with the fiction, i.e.,
those that are updated with the propositions expressed by the narrative. For
instance, after fictional statement (2), the unofficial common ground between
Tolkien and his reader that is specifically related to Tolkien’s The Lord of
the Rings saga is updated with the proposition that there lived a hobbit
in a hole in the ground. Because we normally engage in different fictional
narratives, a typical ‘complete common ground’ between two people will
contain one official common ground concerning actual states of affairs, and
several unofficial common grounds related to different fictions (e.g., the
common ground between a friend and myself may consist of one official
common ground, a The Lord of the Rings unofficial common ground, a Harry
Potter unofficial common ground, a Pride and Prejudice unofficial common
ground, etc.).4
Unofficial common grounds have to be construed as acceptance-based;
Tolkien and I do not actually believe but merely accept that there is a hobbit
called Frodo, believe that the other accepts this, etc. The separation of
unofficial common grounds and the official common ground allows us to
construe the official common ground (for now)5 as belief-based; Tolkien
3In Eckardt’s terminology: proposals to update or create STORY0.
4Alternatively, following the ‘fragmented mind’ programme (see e.g., David (2015)),
one could formulate an account involving one compartmentalized common ground.
What are unofficial common grounds in Stokke’s and Eckardt’s accounts, are different
compartments related to different fictions in this framework. Beliefs concerning actual
states of affairs (part of the official common ground in the unofficial common ground




and I both believe that C.S. Lewis was born in Belfast, believe that the other
believes this, etc.
3.3 Formalisation
3.3.1 Sets of propositions
We can represent the complete common ground (C) as a n-tuple of one
official common ground (C0), and several numbered unofficial common
grounds (C1, ..., Cn). Here both the official common ground and unofficial
common grounds are defined as sets of possible world propositions (rather
than sets of possible worlds):
C = 〈C0, C1, ..., Cn〉
Assertions are defined as proposals to update (∗) the official common
ground:
C +A p = 〈C0 ∗ p, C1, ..., Cn〉
To model how fictional statements update unofficial common grounds,
we must distinguish between two cases: Either a fictional statement is a
proposal to update an already existing unofficial common ground (e.g.,
when continuing to read The Lord of the Rings), or a fictional statement is
a proposal to create a new unofficial common ground (CBASE) and update
this common ground (e.g., when starting to read a new fictional novel):
C +Fi p =
{
〈C0, C1, ..., Ci−1, Ci ∗ p, Ci+1, ..., Cn〉if 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
〈C0, C1, ..., Cn, CBASE ∗ p〉, otherwise.
This formalisation raises two questions: First, what exactly is the content
of CBASE? In other words, what is mutually presupposed by the addressee
and author of a fictional story when starting to engage in a new fictional
narrative? Is CBASE a copy of the official common ground (CBASE = C0), a
tabula rasa (CBASE = ∅), or something in between (see e.g., Lewis (1978),
Ryan (1980) or Lamarque (1990))? In the formalisations presented here I
assume that CBASE is a copy of the official common ground between speaker
and hearer and hence contains all mutually presupposed propositions con-
cerning actual states of affairs. Assuming that CBASE is a tabula rasa, or
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something in between a tabula rasa and a copy of the official common
ground (cf. Eckardt (2014), see also footnote 7), is also compatible with the
unofficial common ground accounts but would lead to different formalisa-
tions.
Assuming that CBASE is a copy of the official common ground enables us
to resolve anaphoric links in the unofficial common ground, so when a novel
mentions terrorist attacks in Paris, we already have a ‘discourse referent’ for
that city, and all kinds of background information predicated thereof. This
is in line with the idea that we’re never interpreting a text in a vacuum, but
understand it against a background or importation of factual information
about the actual world, as in Lewis’ (1978) counterfactual analyses of truth
in fiction, Ryan’s (1980) Principle of Minimal Departure, Walton’s (1990)
Reality and Mutual Belief Principles, and especially Friend’s (Friend (2017))
Reality Assumption. In all these theories, fictional worlds are assumed to
be as much as possible like (or, in Lewisian terms ‘as close as possible to’)
the real world as the story permits.6 Assuming that CBASE is a copy of the
official common ground not only allows us to import information into unof-
ficial common grounds that we intuitively find true in for instance The Lord
of the Rings (e.g., that the sun rises in the east) but also information that we
may find difficult to accept as true in The Lord of the Rings (e.g., that Paris is
the capital of France or that Tolkien wrote a book called The Lord of the Rings).
However, the alternatives (i.e., analysing CBASE as a tabula rasa or something
in between) are very difficult to make precise. Both options have to involve
some kind of accommodation of the information necessary to appropriately
interpret the fictional narrative.7 The difficulty lies in specifying exactly
what information should enter the common ground and what information
shouldn’t. For example, in order to appropriately interpret the fictional story
that mentions terrorist attacks in Paris, the unofficial common ground will
at least have to include the information that Paris is the capital of France.
But this information is only comprehensible if it also contains background
information about what France is. This background information will then
inevitably refer to yet many other things that again need further accom-
6See Franzén (forthcoming) for an in depth discussion of the Reality Principle.
7In fact, Eckardt opts for an analysis where new unupdated unofficial common grounds
are something in between a copy of the official common ground and a tabula rasa; they
specify a very unrestricted set of worlds STORY0 (e.g., it is not common ground that
frogs cannot speak at the start of a fictional discourse) that is updated with appropriate
content as the fictional discourse proceeds.
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modation of information. Hence it is unclear where such accommodation
processes end.
The second question raised by the formalism is about the ∗ operator.
Updating a common ground with some proposition p is usually formalised
as C ∪ {p} rather than C ∗ p, when common grounds are defined as sets of
propositions (C ∩ p when common grounds are defined as sets of possible
worlds). However, especially with fictional statements, simply joining sets
of propositions can lead to inconsistent common grounds. For instance,
given that we assume CBASE to be a copy of the official common ground,
CBASE will contain the information that hobbits do not exist.8 Thus when
we come across (2) when we start to read The Hobbit, taking the union of the
sets of propositions leads to an inconsistent unofficial common ground. We
require an operator that is suitable for such inconsistent updates and tells
us how to resolve them (e.g., a belief revision operator, a Lewisian operator
or a probability distribution update). Such an operator would in the above
case of reading The Hobbit have to entail that after an update with (2), it is
unofficial common ground that there lived a hobbit in a hole in the ground
and not unofficial common ground that hobbits do not exist. I will elaborate
on one such belief revision update mechanism developed by Maier and
Semeijn (forthcoming) for modelling such fiction updates in chapter 8. For
now we may simply assume that ∗ denotes the kind of operator described.
3.3.2 Discourse representation structures
In most of this dissertation I will use the box notation of Discourse Repre-
sentation Theory (DRT) developed by Kamp (1981) to represent common
grounds. In this subsection I will first briefly introduce the basics of the
DRT formalism9 and then use it to represent the unofficial common ground
accounts.
8In case the reader finds it unintuitive that this is common ground (and hence that Tolkien
also accepted this) at the start of the fictional discourse, see the discussion in section 8.2.
9For a more elaborate introduction to basic DRT syntax and semantics see Geurts et al.
(2016); Kamp and Reyle (1993).
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Introducing DRT
DRT offers a formalism to model dynamic context updates of (multi-sentence)
discourse.10 This context is represented as a structured entity in so-called
Discourse Representation Structures (DRS’s). Mirroring the debate in dy-
namic semantics over what a conversational context exactly is, DRS’s have
been used to represent the context interpreted as a Stalnakerian common
ground (e.g., Heim (1982); Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991); van der Sandt
(1992)) and have been used to represent the context interpreted as an agent’s
individual mental state (e.g., Geurts (1999); Kamp (2015); Maier (2017)). As
the present aim is to define speech acts in terms of common ground updates,
here DRS’s represent Stalnakerian common grounds.11
To illustrate DRT’s box notation, consider assertion (1) in a straightfor-
ward cooperative information exchange. In DRT, noun phrases or ‘NP’s’
(e.g., the proper name ‘C.S. Lewis’) in a discourse are mapped to ‘discourse
referents’ placed under several conditions. A common ground updated with





The top part of the DRS introduces a discourse referent. We may think of this
as akin to existential quantification. Box (12) thus contains the information
that there is an x. The bottom part of the DRS introduces conditions that
specify properties of and relations between discourse referents. Hence, (12)
also contains the information that x is named C.S. Lewis and that x was
born in Belfast.
Subsequent assertions will update DRS (12) by adding more discourse
referents and conditions as the discourse unfolds. For instance, suppose
Tolkien continued his discourse with (13):
(13) He wrote The Chronicles of Narnia.
10A similar theory has been developed by Heim (1982) independently.
11Later in this dissertation, when I focus on situations where the hearer’s and the speaker’s
conceptions of what is common belief diverge (e.g., successful deceptive lies (chapter 5)
or cases of unreliable narration (chapter 8)), I will suggest that it is more interesting to
model part of the hearer’s beliefs, i.e., what they consider to be common ground.
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The DRT formalism allows us (amongst other things) to model how and
when anaphoric references in an ongoing discourse work. First, we update









As (14) shows, a new discourse referent is added for the new NP introduced
in the discourse (i.e., ‘The Chronicles of Narnia’). Moreover, the pronoun ‘he’
in (13) triggers the presupposition that there is a masculine entity (denoted
by the dashed box) (cf. van der Sandt (1992)) and we update the DRS with
the information that this masculine entity wrote y. Anaphora resolution in
DRT involves equating discourse referents introduced by anaphora with
appropriate and accessible12 discourse referents in a way that leads to a
maximally coherent final output DRS. For instance, we resolve the presup-







12Intuitively, a discourse referent is accessible if it is equally or less deeply embedded in the
DRS (see Geurts et al. (2016) for specifics). For instance, x would not be accessible to y if
(13) followed a statement such as (i) because x would be embedded under a negation:
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The information expressed by the entire discourse is thus that there is an
entity x that is called Lewis, there is an entity y that is called The Chronicles
of Narnia, x was born in Belfast and x wrote y.
DRS’s are thus representations of the information expressed in a partic-
ular discourse as it unfolds. Hence DRT includes a ‘middle level’ between
language and the world; discourse determines certain DRS structures and
these in turn can be true about or ‘verified by’ the world. DRS’s are verified
in a model M by an ‘embedding function’ f from discourse referents to
individuals. For instance, DRS (15) is verified by f in M iff the domain of f
includes at least x and y and according to M, f (x) is called Lewis and was
born in Belfast, f (y) is called The Chronicles of Narnia and f (x) wrote f (y).
Unofficial common grounds in DRT
Complete common grounds, containing an official common ground and
(several) unofficial common grounds, can also be represented with DRS’s.
For instance, the complete common ground between Tolkien and myself
updated with Tolkien’s assertion (1) and fictional statement (2) from The













Here I assume that the official common ground between Tolkien and his
reader already contained all sorts of background information before the
discourse started (e.g., that water is H2O and that Paris is the capital of
France) represented by the ‘. . . ’. Because a new unofficial common ground
is a copy of the current official common ground, this information is also
included in the unofficial common ground for The Lord of the Rings.
3.4 Two conflicting intuitions
Now that I have presented the basic motivations for and formalisations
of the unofficial common ground accounts, I will turn to criticizing the
accounts in this section. I will argue that the accounts fail to account for two
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prima facie conflicting intuitions concerning the temporary acceptance of
fictional truths.
3.4.1 Permanent or temporary unofficial common grounds
To grasp the following discussion, it is important to keep in mind a crucial
difference between Stokke’s (2013; 2018) and Eckardt’s (2014) frameworks. In
Stokke’s account, unofficial common grounds are essentially temporary and
are contrasted with “more permanent, ‘official’, common grounds" (Stokke,
2013, p.53). Unofficial common grounds exist only for the purpose and
duration of the fictional discourse. Because we engage with many different
fictions over the course of our lives, a typical complete common ground
will thus consist of one permanent official common ground and several
temporary unofficial common grounds that last as long as the relevant
fictional discourse lasts.
On the other hand, Eckardt does not discuss whether unofficial com-
mon grounds are temporary or permanent. On the simplest construal of
Eckardt’s theory, which I will assume in what follows, unofficial common
grounds are just as permanent as the ‘normal’ official common ground, i.e.,
once created, unofficial common grounds continue to exist alongside the
official common ground and interlocutors can continue to switch between
official and unofficial common grounds in subsequent discourse. Usually, a
complete common ground will thus consist of one official common ground
and an ever-growing number of coexisting unofficial common grounds that
continue to be accessible.
3.4.2 Fictional and parafictional discourse
Analysing unofficial common grounds as essentially temporary allows
Stokke to account for the intuition that the acceptance of fictional truths is
temporary. Intuitively, I for example only momentarily accept that hobbits
exist for the purpose of reading The Lord of the Rings. Once I stop engag-
ing with the fictional discourse, I no longer accept this. However, there
is another, prima facie conflicting, intuition that we want to account for
when modelling our engagement with fiction: There is a strong sense in
which I do retain some information about fictional content after engaging
with the narrative. This is what allows me to continue properly interpreting
fictional discourse even after a break. For instance, even after taking a break
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in reading The Lord of the Rings, I am able to correctly interpret (17) when I
pick up the novel again:
(17) Gollum [...] held aloft the ring.
I can correctly interpret (17) because I know what Ring Tolkien is referring
to and who Gollum is. Somehow, this information is still common ground
between (and hence accessible to) the people that engaged with the novel.
Moreover, it allows me to engage in a discussion of what is true in a par-
ticular fiction I have engaged in. For instance, even after reading The Lord
of the Rings, I do remember that Bilbo is Frodo’s cousin and would correct
someone who stated otherwise. For instance, I could end up in the following
discussion:
(18) Anne: Did you know that Frodo from The Lord of the Rings was
adopted by his uncle?
Merel: What? That’s not true. Bilbo is Frodo’s cousin.
So, after reading The Lord of the Rings, although I no longer accept or imagine
the content that I entertained while engaging with the fictional statements
of the narrative, I do not forget it. Hence I can engage in, in Recanati’s (2018)
terminology, ‘parafictional discourse’ that is based on what I have read.13 It
is important to clearly distinguish parafictional statements from fictional
statements, i.e., statements that are part of a fictional narrative. Both fictional
and parafictional statements can provide us with information about what is
true in some fiction. But whereas fictional statements determine what is true
in the fiction (e.g., the fact that (2) is part of The Hobbit makes it true in The
Hobbit that a hobbit lived in a hole in the ground), parafictional statements
report on what is true in the fiction; they are statements about what is true
in or according to some fiction that are not a part of the original fictional
story, but rather feature in communication about the content of a particular
fictional work.
Parafictional discourse can be ‘implicit’ or ‘explicit’ depending on whether
the statements include a fiction operator such as ‘In story s,’ or ‘According
13Theorists employ several different (sometimes conflicting) terminologies for these and
related statements. For instance, fictional statements have also been called ‘fictive state-
ments’ (Currie (1990)), ‘textual statements’ (Zucchi (2001)) and ‘authorial diktats’ (Ninan
(2017)). Parafictional statements have also been dubbed ‘metafictive statements’ (Currie
(1990)) (not to be confused with ‘metafictional statements’, see chapter 6), ‘paratextual
statements’ (Zucchi (2001)) and ‘contensive statements’ (Ross (2012)).
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to story s,’.14 For instance, my answer in (18) is an implicit parafictional
statement:
(19) Bilbo is Frodo’s cousin.
Alternatively, I could have responded to the question in (18) with explicit
parafictional statement (20) or (21):
(20) In The Lord of the Rings, Bilbo is Frodo’s cousin.
(21) According to The Lord of the Rings, Bilbo is Frodo’s cousin.
Intuitively, parafictional statements – unlike fictional statements – are not
just fictionally true but really true or false depending on actual states of
affairs, i.e., the content of the relevant fictional stories. The fact that Tolkien’s
novel The Lord of the Rings was written in a certain way makes my statements
(19), (20) and (21)15 actually true and makes a statement like (22) actually
false:
(22) In The Lord of the Rings, Frodo is Bilbo’s grandmother.
Importantly, a sentence like (2) that is found in The Lord of the Rings,
could also function as an implicit parafictional statement if it were used in a
discussion on the content of The Lord of the Rings. This shows that whether
a utterance is a fictional statement or an implicit parafictional statement is
largely a matter of context; the same sentence can function as a fictional
statement (when found in a fictional work) or as an implicit parafictional
statement (when found in a discussion on the content of the fictional work).
Arguably, there is even a sense in which one can construe sentences that
are not a verbatim part of a fictional narrative, but that are part of what is
relevantly entailed by the story and entertained by the reader while engaging
with a narrative, as an (implicit) continuation of the fictional discourse (see
Semeijn and Zalta (2021)). For instance, I may think (and maybe even mutter)
14As Sainsbury (2014) notes, parafictional discourse can also feature other fiction operators
such as ‘partial fiction operators’ like ‘In/According to the first three chapters of s’ or
fiction operators such as ‘It is argued in/clear by s that’. Following Voltolini (2019), I
take these to be derivative of the ‘In story s’ or ‘According to story s’-operators.
15In fact, in chapter 7 I will argue – contra consensus – that the ‘In story s’ and ‘According to
story s’ operators require separate semantic analyses. The proposed analyses imply that
whereas a parafictional statement such as (20) is really true, a parafictional statement
such as (21) is strictly speaking false. Until chapter 7 I will largely ignore this discussion
and focus mostly on parafictional statements with ‘In story s’-operators since I take
these to be the primary fiction operators.
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something of the form (19) while reading The Lord of the Rings, even though
(19) is never explicitly stated in the novel. Arguably, such a ‘statement’ can
be construed as part of the fictional discourse since it takes place within the
initial pretence of the novel.
Semantic analysis
One of the central objectives of a semantics of fiction is to provide a seman-
tic analysis of parafictional statements that takes into account the different
functions of fictional versus parafictional discourse and that can explain
why parafictional statements such as (19), (20) and (21) ring true, whereas a
statement such as (22) rings false. There is no consensus on what the appro-
priate semantic analysis of parafictional discourse is. Much of the current
debate centers around the question of whether parafictional discourse is
‘internal’ or ‘external’ to the fiction. Discourse is internal when we describe
the fictional world from a perspective within the fiction (e.g., talking about
Frodo’s quest to destroy the Ring as if it really took place). Discourse is
external if we describe the fictional world from a perspective outside of the
fiction (e.g., talking about Frodo’s quest to destroy the Ring as part of the
fictional events described in a fictional story). In other words, the debate
is on whether parafictional statements constitute an unofficial extension of
fictional discourse (and the pretence involved in this discourse), or whether
parafictional statements are essentially a kind of non-fictional discourse, i.e.,
modalized assertions about the content of a fictional narrative.
According to theorists such as Everett (2013), implicit parafictional state-
ments such as (19) constitute an (unofficial) extension of the original pretence
initiated by Tolkien. Anne and myself talk about Frodo and Bilbo as if they
really existed. However, if I had responded to Anne’s question in (18) with
the explicit parafictional statement (20), I would have adopted an exter-
nal perspective to talk about The Lord of the Rings and hence made a type
of assertion. Thus implicit parafictional discourse receives an essentially
different semantic analysis from explicit parafictional discourse.
Most theorists, however, treat implicit and explicit parafictional state-
ments on a par. There is no relevant semantic difference between answering
Anne’s question in (18) with either an implicit or an explicit parafictional
statement: (19) is simply an abbreviation of (20).16 These authors can be
16Admittedly, the terminology used in this dissertation is biased towards this analysis.
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subdivided into two main camps: First, authors such as Recanati (2018) and
Evans (1982) consider parafictional discourse in general to constitute an
extension of the original fictional discourse. Both (19) and (20) are truth-
valueless continuations of the The Lord of the Rings-pretence and hence
constitute internal discourse.17 By contrast, authors such as Currie (1990),
Zucchi (2017) and Ninan (2017) claim that, whereas engaging in fictional
discourse requires an internal perspective and involves pretence, neither
implicit nor explicit parafictional statements involve pretence. Parafictional
statements in general are simply modalized or hedged assertions about
actual states of affairs in the world (i.e., statements about the content of a
particular work of fiction).18
3.4.3 Parafictional updates on unofficial common grounds
I take both an Eckardt-style and Stokke’s unofficial common ground ac-
counts to treat parafictional discourse on a par with fictional discourse, i.e.,
as operating on unofficial common grounds. For instance, both (19) and (20)
are analysed as proposals to update the The Lord of the Rings unofficial com-
mon ground. Eckardt does not explicitly discuss parafictional discourse but
does describe unofficial common grounds as representations of the content
of the fictional stories. Moreover, an Eckardt-style type of unofficial common
ground account – where unofficial common grounds are non-temporary – is
ideally suited to model the possibility of parafictional discourse: The The
Lord of the Rings unofficial common ground does not evaporate but remains
available for updating even after reading The Lord of the Rings precisely
because we retain information about what is true in some fiction (and can
discuss this) even after our engagement with it. Stokke explicitly discusses
a mini-discourse that is most naturally analysed as implicit parafictional
discourse.19 He discusses the statement
17Although, for Recanati, parafictional discourse does contain an irreducible external
component.
18As Zucchi (2017) points out, this is not to say that a sentence such as (19) could never
be used in a game of pretence (e.g., I could write a fan-fiction story that is parasitic
on Tolkien’s narrative and that features (19)). It’s just that when (19) features in a
discussion on the content of The Lord of the Rings – when there is a clear sense that it
is a true statement somehow and when it can be replaced by the explicit parafictional
statement (20) – then it is an assertion.
19Interestingly, Stokke suggests in a footnote (Stokke, 2018, p.74) that his account of fictional
statements updating unofficial common grounds is compatible with Lewis’ (1978)
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(23) Hobbits have hairy feet. (Stokke, 2013, p.55)
in answer to the question “Who has hairy feet?" and analyses it as a proposal
to update the unofficial common ground related to The Lord of the Rings. This
statement can be interpreted as an implicit parafictional statement (i.e., as
part of a discussion on The Lord of the Rings) because there is a clear sense in
which it is a true statement that could felicitously be replaced by the explicit
parafictional statement:
(24) In The Lord of the Rings, hobbits have hairy feet.
Moreover, on either an implicit or explicit variant of the discourse it would
be perfectly reasonable to reply: “Okay, true... But let’s not talk about The
Lord of the Rings right now."
In other words, the unofficial common ground accounts seem to fit the Re-
canati/Evans analysis of parafictional discourse: Both fictional and parafic-
tional statements update unofficial common grounds and are hence treated
on a par.20 This is problematic for a number of reasons. First, there are in-
dependent reasons to prefer the Currie/Zucchi/Ninan analysis, related to
analysis of fictional statements as being covertly prefixed by fiction operators of the
form ‘In s,’. Here we thus have further evidence that Stokke sees no relevant difference
between fictional and parafictional discourse. However, as will become clear in section
4.2.2, Lewis’ semantic analysis only applies to parafictional statements. Extending it
to fictional statements would have the unintuitive consequence of predicting that all
sentences in The Lord of the Rings are true.
20Because Stokke only discusses implicit parafictional statements, an analysis where ex-
plicit parafictional statements operate on the official common ground as assertions (cf.
Everett (2013)) is also possible in his account. In fact, yet another construal of Stokke’s
account is possible. In the present discussion I take Stokke’s example sentence (23) to
be an example of a true implicit parafictional statement. However, the example is not
completely univocal; we can imagine the same discourse being placed in a context
where (23) is part of a pretend conversation parasitic on The Lord of the Rings. Then (23)
is a fictional statement, we cannot unproblematically replace it by (24), and we would
expect a response such as “That’s right! I saw one the other day”. If we adopt this
reading of (23), the option to analyse parafictional statements as modalized updated of
the official common ground is still open to Stokke. (Strictly speaking this option is also
open to Eckardt who does not explicitly discuss parafictional discourse). However, on
such a version of Stokke’s unofficial common ground account we still run into issues
with temporality described below: whether (23) is analysed as an implicit parafictional
or a (parasitic) fictional statement, both types of discourse can occur decades after
engaging with a fiction and hence Stokke still requires unofficial common grounds to
be continuously accessible.
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the behaviour of indexicals (see Zucchi (2017)). More importantly, the Reca-
nati/Evans view does not allow us to ascribe truth values to parafictional
statements: They are, like fictional statements, not really true or false but
rather fictionally true or false. However, as for instance Currie (1990) and
Zucchi (2017) argue, we intuitively do want to maintain that (19) and (20)
are true statements.
Aside from these independent theoretical reasons to not adopt the Re-
canati/Evans analysis, this particular analysis leads to additional issues
in the unofficial common ground accounts. Both an Eckardt-style view
and Stokke’s account run into difficulties in accounting for the prima facie
conflicting intuitions of the temporary acceptance of fictional truth on the
one hand, and the fact that we do somehow retain fictional content after
engaging with fictional narratives (and can hence engage in parafictional
discourse) on the other hand. On the Eckardt-style view, unofficial common
grounds are non-temporary (i.e., they continue to be accessible after engag-
ing with the fictional narrative) and hence (although we can account for
the possibility of parafictional discourse) we cannot account for the first
intuition that fictional truths are only accepted temporarily. In Stokke’s
framework, unofficial common grounds are essentially temporary. How-
ever, to account for the occurrence of parafictional discourse such as (23),
Stokke qualifies this by saying that “an unofficial common ground need
not be temporary in the sense of lasting a short time. There are arguably
common grounds that we all make use of from time to time, which are
unofficial in the sense that we all know that the information they contain is
fictional, or the like, but which nevertheless continue to be operative for a
very long time." (Stokke, 2013, p.55). In other words, in order to account for
parafictional discourse (as operating on unofficial common grounds), Stokke
has to admit that unofficial common grounds remain operative long after
engaging with the fictional narrative. But in what sense are such unofficial
common grounds still temporary if they remain accessible after engaging
with a fictional narrative (as in an Eckardt-style theory)? Hence Stokke runs
into difficulties trying to account for both intuitions described above, ending
up with unofficial common grounds that are both essentially temporary and
continuously operative.
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3.5 Conclusions and next steps
This chapter has introduced Eckardt’s and Stokke’s unofficial common
ground accounts that distinguish an official common ground that is up-
dated by assertions from unofficial common grounds that are updated by
fictional statements. I have argued that both versions of the account run into
difficulties concerning the temporariness of unofficial common grounds.
Part of the difficulty is that both accounts seem to assume an analysis of
parafictional statements as akin to fictional statements (i.e., as proposals to
update or create an unofficial common ground). This leads to an incentive
to construe unofficial common grounds as temporary and an incentive to
construe them as non-temporary.
An obvious strategy to improve the unofficial common ground accounts
would be to adopt the Currie/Zucchi/Ninan analysis of parafictional dis-
course and analyse parafictional statements as proposals to update the offi-
cial common ground with hedged propositions of the form ‘In/According
to story s, φ’. If we combine this with a story of how interlocutors can de-
rive previous unofficial common grounds based on hedged parafictional
information in the official common ground (and thus continue with inter-
rupted fictional discourse), we would be able to construe unofficial common
grounds as truly temporary, i.e., only existing for the purpose and dura-
tion of the fictional discourse. As will become clear in the next chapter,
the workspace account resembles this proposed improved version of the
unofficial common ground accounts.
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This chapter is a rewritten and significantly expanded version of sec-
tions 4 and 5 of ‘A Stalnakerian analysis of metafictive statements’
in Proceedings of 21st Amsterdam Colloquium. Parts of section 4.2.1 are
adapted from ‘Interacting with fictions: The role of pretend play in The-
ory of Mind acquisition’ in Review of Philosophy and Psychology. The most
substantial differences between this chapter and the proceedings paper
include: First, an expansion of the discussion of Matravers’ theory of
fiction interpretation (section 4.2.1) and Lewis’ analysis of parafictional
discourse (section 4.2.2). Second, the inclusion of a formalisation of the
workspace account in DRT (section 4.4.2). Third, the expansion of the
discussion of fictive opening (section 4.5). Fourth, the addition of two
suggestions for possible extensions of the account (section 4.6).
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter I introduce a novel Stalnakerian approach to address the basic
puzzle of the study of the semantics of fiction, i.e., to model how content
expressed by fictional discourse is quarantined from non-fictional content.
The proposed account – the ‘workspace account’ – takes inspiration from the
previously discussed unofficial common ground accounts (see chapter 3),
Matravers’ (2014) theory of fiction interpretation and Lewis’ (1978) analysis
of parafictional statements.
This chapter starts with a brief introduction of the theoretical ingredients
of the account that haven’t previously been discussed: Matravers’ theory
(section 4.2.1) and the Lewisian fiction operator (section 4.2.2). I will then
discuss the basic ideas of the workspace account (section 4.3) and offer a
formalisation of them (section 4.4). I will argue that the proposed account
avoids the difficulties associated with the unofficial common ground ac-
counts (see previous chapter). It can account for the intuition that fictional
I would like to thank three anonymous Amsterdam Colloquium 2017 reviewers for
valuable input and suggestions.
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truths (e.g., that there is hobbit named Frodo) are only accepted temporarily
and for the intuition that we do retain information about fictional truth
somehow after engaging in fictional discourse, which allows us to engage
in parafictional discourse (section 4.4.3) and properly continue with the
fictional discourse after a break (section 4.5). I end this chapter with a brief
discussion of two possible extensions of the workspace account: A version of
the account where fiction that mentions Napoleon is de re about Napoleon
(section 4.6.1) and an analysis of export of fictional truths as analogical
reasoning (section 4.6.2).
4.2 Theoretical ingredients
Before discussing the main ideas of the workspace account, it will be useful
to introduce two of its key inspirations: Matravers’ theory of fiction inter-
pretation (section 4.2.1) and Lewis’ analysis of the fiction operator (section
4.2.2).
4.2.1 Matravers’ two stage model
The workspace account is inspired by Matravers’ (2014) theory of fiction
interpretation. Matravers follows Friend (2008; 2011a; 2012) in criticizing
the widely adopted ‘consensus view’ (Walton (1990); Currie (1990)) that
draws a sharp distinction between fiction interpretation and non-fiction
interpretation, i.e., whereas nonfictional truths are to be believed, fictional
truths are to be ‘imagined’. He argues that the characterizations of the
cognitive attitude of imagination that are on offer (e.g., Currie (1990); Meskin
and Weinberg (2006)) apply equally to non-fiction as well. For instance,
simulationists characterize imagination as ‘running mental states offline’,
which indicates an absence of direct perceptual inputs and of a motivation
to act. So, when reading The Hobbit I use my imagination because I have no
direct perceptual inputs of Bilbo and no incentives to act upon the described
events. However, Matravers points out that when I read a non-fictional
article about Donald Trump in The New York Times, I also have no direct
perceptual inputs of Trump nor a direct motivation to act and hence also




According to Matravers, the fundamental flaw in the consensus view is
its confusion of the distinction between engaging with fiction and engag-
ing with non-fiction, with the more fundamental and cognitively primary
distinction between engaging with ‘confrontation situations’ and engaging
with ‘representation situations’. In confrontation situations, people have a
direct possibility to act because their mental states are caused by perceptual
inputs from objects in their immediate surroundings (e.g., a situation in
which a tiger enters your house and you have the possibility to run and
shout for help). In representation situations, by contrast, people have no
direct possibility to act because their mental states are caused by mere rep-
resentations of objects (e.g., a situation in which someone tells you about a
tiger that entered your house yesterday). Engaging with either a fictional or
a non-fictional narrative is simply an example of being in a representation
situation (where you have no direct possibility to act). Hence, at least our
primary engagement with fictional narratives (e.g., reading The Lord of the
Rings) involves essentially the same cognitive processes as engaging with
nonfictional narratives (e.g., reading a biography such as Monk’s The Duty
of Genius). Whether a narrative is fictional or non-fictional, when we read or
listen to it, we simply entertain its content by building a representation or
‘mental model’ based on the incoming discourse.1 Hence, insofar as there
is a role for the concept of ‘imagination’ in Matravers’ framework, it is
something that is at play for both fiction and non-fiction.
Matravers does not discard the distinction between fiction and non-fiction
entirely. In his ‘two stage’ model of narrative interpretation only the first
stage (i.e., entertaining a narrative’s content) is neutral with regards to fic-
tionality. In the second stage the distinction between fiction and non-fiction
becomes apparent: “Put very roughly, simulating fiction scenarios does not
result in our forming beliefs and simulating non-fictional scenarios does
result in our forming beliefs.” (Matravers, 2014, p.27). In other words, while
reading The Hobbit may involve the same cognitive processes as reading
1In fact, there is a debate on whether ‘merely entertaining’ content is even possible
(see Recanati (forthcoming-a, forthcoming-b) for a recent discussion). On ‘cancellation
accounts’, understanding a proposition implies accepting it as true. This acceptance
can subsequently be cancelled (e.g., in case we engaged with fiction). On a cancellation
version of the workspace account, fictional and non-fictional discourse uniformly update
the stable belief-based common ground directly. Fictive closure would be a cancellation
operation through which the updated stable common ground is ‘cancelled’ and added
to the previous stable common ground under the relevant fiction operator.
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The Duty of Genius, the reader will have a disposition to believe the enter-
tained content in the case of the biography, and a disposition not to believe
the entertained content in the case of the fictional novel. Importantly, for
Matravers this is a rough characterization of the fiction/non-fiction divide;
we cannot base a definition of fictional or non-fictional narratives on the
presence or absence of a disposition to believe its content. What prevents us
from doing so is the fact that fictional narratives can also contain content that
we are disposed to believe (e.g., I may be inclined to learn facts about 19th
century etiquette in England from reading Pride and Prejudice). However, at
present my main aim is to define fictional and non-fictional statements. Such
definitions do not imply anything about whether fictional narratives can also
contain non-fictional statements or vice versa. I construe Matravers’ theory
as allowing for a sharp distinction here: we have a disposition to believe the
content of non-fictional statements (or assertions) and a disposition not to
believe the content of fictional statements.2
Before moving on it will be useful to highlight an issue the reader may see
in Matravers’ theory at this point. After engaging with a fictional narrative
(e.g., after entertaining thoughts about Frodo and the Ring), you simply
have a disposition not to believe the entertained content. So fictional content,
unlike non-fictional content, just ‘evaporates’ after reading or listening to
some story. This is not satisfactory. As was discussed in the previous chapter,
there are two prima facie conflicting intuitions that a theory of fictional and
non-fictional discourse should explain. Matravers’ theory is able to account
for the intuition that fictional truths are only accepted temporarily but it
does not account for the intuition that people somehow retain knowledge
about what is true in some fiction after engaging with it. After reading The
Lord of the Rings I probably don’t believe that Frodo was born in the Shire, but
I do retain this information in some (quarantined) way. Part of the appeal
of the consensus view is that it can account for this latter intuition. The
cognitive attitude of imagination is supposed to function in a way that is
parallel to the cognitive attitude of belief. So, after reading The Lord of the
Rings, I do not believe that Frodo was born in the Shire, but this is still a part
of my imagination (or simulated belief) based on The Lord of the Rings.
As discussed in the previous chapter, unofficial common ground accounts
that render unofficial common grounds permanent do account for the sec-




ond intuition. Ideally, we would have a theory that can preserve this benefit
of such a theory without inheriting the difficulties discussed. The workspace
account is an attempt at formulating a Stalnakerian theory that takes the
best of both worlds and thus can account for both described intuitions. As
will become clear below, the main ‘fix’ is to add to Matravers’ framework a
disposition to believe parafictional content based on the entertained content
after engaging with fictional discourse. The next section introduces Lewis’
analysis of parafictional discourse which I adopt as part of the workspace
acccount.
4.2.2 The Lewisian analysis of the ‘In s’-operator
I adopt Lewis’ (1978) analysis 2 of the ‘In story s’-operator. Lewis treats this
operator as an intensional operator, i.e., as quantifying over possible worlds.
Below is a simplified representation of this operator’s semantic definition:
“In s, φ” is true iff in all possible worlds compatible with s, φ is true
The obvious question now is what makes a world “compatible” with some
fiction. In his seminal paper ‘Truth in Fiction’ (1978), Lewis goes through
several analyses of this notion.
First, we cannot simply take worlds compatible with s to be worlds where
the plot of s is enacted. A basic problem with this analysis is that the actual
world could be one of those worlds but in the actual world s is a fictional
narrative. This relates to Kripke’s (1980) well received point that, even if –
purely by coincidence – our world turned out to have included someone
named ’Sherlock Holmes’ who solved crimes in 19th century London, still
the name ‘Holmes’ as used by Arthur Conan Doyle would not refer to this
person. Doyle wrote his novels as pure fiction and never met this real-life
Holmes. Hence it is false in our world (one of the worlds where the plot of
the Sherlock Holmes novels is enacted) that the name ‘Holmes’ in s refers to
someone. But surely it should come out true in the world of the fiction that
the name ‘Holmes’ in s refers to someone!
Lewis argues that to overcome these difficulties we must consider a
fictional narrative not as an abstract set of propositions but as something
that involves an act of story-telling (and hence a story-teller). We thus arrive
at Lewis’ first attempt at an analysis of truth in fiction:
Analysis 0: “In s, φ” is true iff in all possible worlds where s is told as
known fact (rather than fiction), φ is true
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Although all worlds where s is told as known fact are worlds where the
plot of s is enacted, the actual world is not amongst these worlds. Hence we
avoid the difficulties described above.
Analysis 0 gets basic facts concerning explicit truth in fiction right. For
instance, it is explicitly stated in the Sherlock Holmes novels that Holmes
smokes a pipe and so this is true in all worlds where the story is told as
known fact. Hence the analysis rightly predicts that it is true in the Sherlock
Holmes novels that Holmes smokes a pipe. However, Analysis 0 disregards
implicit fictional truths, i.e., things that are not explicitly stated in the fiction
but that we nevertheless consider to be true in it. For instance, it is true in
the Sherlock Holmes novels that water is H2O, that whales are mammals
and that “Holmes does not have a third nostril” (Lewis, 1978, p.41). Such
fictional truths are ‘imported’ into the fiction as part of the background
information that we assume when engaging with a fiction. However, none
of these things is actually stated in the Sherlock Holmes novels, nor do they
follow from what is explicitly stated. This means that there are possible
worlds where the Sherlock Holmes stories are told as known fact but where
the above things are false! Hence it is not true in all worlds compatible with
the Sherlock Holmes novels that water is H2O, that whales are mammals and
that Holmes does not have a third nostril. Implicit fictional truths therefore
do not come out as true in the fiction on Analysis 0.
Lewis argues that in order to incorporate background information into
the analysis fictional truth, we have to analyse the fiction operator as a
counterfactual, i.e., what is true in s is what would be true if s were told as
known fact. In other words, we take the actual world as our ‘starting point’
and see what it would be like if s were told as known fact in our world. On
Lewis’ (1973) analysis of counterfactuals, a statement of the form ‘If φ, then
ψ’ is true iff some possible world where φ and ψ are true is closer to the
actual world than any world where φ is true but ψ is not true. A world is
‘closer’ to some other world if it is more similar to it. Hence, a counterfactual
‘If φ, then ψ’ is true iff ψ is true in all φ-worlds that are closest (most similar)
to the actual world. Application of this analysis of counterfactuals to the
case of fiction gives us Analysis 1:
Analysis 1: “In s, φ” is true iff in all possible worlds where s is told as
known fact that are closest to the actual world, φ is true
Worlds where the Sherlock Holmes novels are told as known fact and water is
H2O are closer to the actual world than worlds where the Sherlock Holmes
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novels are told as known fact and water is not H2O. Hence, Analysis 1
correctly predicts that implicit fictional truths are true in the fiction. Lewis
thus incorporates a version of the Reality Principle (see section 3.3.1) into
his analysis of fictional truth, i.e., when engaging with fiction assume the
fictional world to be as much like our own world as the text allows.
Last but not least, Lewis discusses one final complication; Analysis 1
makes little-known and even unknown facts relevant to fictional truth. On
Analysis 1, whatever is actually the case will also be true in the fiction
(unless explicitly contradicted by it). But, given that it is the case that Trump
won the elections in 2016, is it then also true in the Sherlock Holmes novels
that Trump wins the elections in 2016? Admitting this would force us to
admit that what is true in a fiction is subject to constant change (as what
is really true is subject to constant change). Whether or not we want to
allow (the constant) importation of such ‘remote’ and irrelevant fictional
truths is a matter of debate (see e.g., Friend (2017)). However, as Lewis
argues, sometimes little-known facts can be detrimental to the plot (as it
was envisioned by the author) of a fictional narrative. This can lead to
counterintuitive results. For instance, in The Adventure of the Speckled Band,
Holmes claims to have solved a murder case by showing that someone has
been killed by a viper that climbed up a bell rope. Gans (1970) has argued
that, since vipers cannot actually climb ropes, either it’s true in The Adventure
of the Speckled Band that the snake reached its victim some other way, or
Holmes has not solved the case at all. This is not intuitive; Holmes is always
right!
If we want to resist Gans’ conclusions (i.e., want our analysis to predict
that it is true in The Adventure of the Speckled Band that Holmes was right
about the viper climbing the bell rope), truth in fiction should not depend on
little-known facts. Doyle (and his readers) didn’t realize that vipers cannot
climb ropes and hence this doesn’t come out as true in the fiction. On Lewis’
final analysis 2, fictional truth depends on what was general common belief
when the fiction was written:
Analysis 2: “In s, φ” is true iff in all possible worlds where s is told as
known fact that are closest to the community of origin’s overt concep-
tion of the actual world, φ is true
Here the “community of origin’s overt conception of the actual world”
consists in the overt beliefs about the actual world in the community of
origin of the relevant fiction. The ‘overt beliefs’ of a community are the
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beliefs that are generally and openly shared, i.e., general common beliefs.
Analysis 2 allows us to still import truths such as that water is H2O. This
is overt belief in the community of origin of the Sherlock Holmes novels,
i.e., generally common belief between Doyle and his readers. However,
information such as that Trump wins the election in 2016 or that vipers
cannot climb ropes will not be imported into the fiction. Although a single
reader of the Sherlock Holmes novels may personally believe either of
these things (and it may even become overt belief after the fiction has been
published), it is not part of the community of origin’s overt beliefs about
the actual world and hence not part of what is true in the Sherlock Holmes
novels.
4.3 Workspaces
Now that I have introduced its main theoretical ingredients, I will turn to in-
troducing the workspace account. I will start with an informal discussion of
the account’s key components in this section and then turn to formalisations
in section 4.4.
The workspace account incorporates a concept similar to Stokke’s (2013;
2018) temporary unofficial common ground: A ‘workspace’. As in Stokke’s
unofficial common ground account, a distinction is drawn between the
stable (official) common ground and a temporary common ground. The
stable common ground between any group of people contains their shared
presuppositions concerning actual states of affairs. This common ground
can (for now) be construed as belief-based (e.g., it is stable common ground
between Tolkien and myself that Paris is the capital of France because we
both believe this, believe that the other believes this, etc.). It is ‘stable’ in
so far as content that enters the common ground remains common ground
persistently unless and until possible belief revision forces us to revoke it
(e.g., Tolkien and I persistently believe that Paris is the capital of France).
The workspace is a temporary common ground that contains all shared
presuppositions between a speaker and hearer while engaging with some
specific discourse. In line with Matravers’ theory of narrative interpreta-
tion, the starting assumption of the workspace account is that our primary
engagement with a fictional discourse (e.g., reading or listening to a story) in-
volves the same interpretative processes as engaging with a non-fictional dis-
course. Hence, unlike Stokke’s unofficial common grounds, the workspace
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is neutral with respect to fictionality.3 I assume that what is part of the
workspace between a speaker his hearers at the onset of a new fictional
or non-fictional discourse is a copy of the current stable common ground.
For non-fiction this just embodies the central tenets of Stalnakerian context
dependence and presupposition satisfaction. For instance, I can start a new
non-fictional discourse and felicitously assert something about terrorist
attacks in Paris because it is stable common ground between us what Paris
is. Hence the workspace will also contain this information and hence my
assertion will be interpretable to my interlocutor. For fiction this amounts to
an implementation of the Reality Principle, i.e., that when we engage with
a fiction we understand it against a background or importation of factual
information about the actual world. This workspace is then updated with
the propositions that are expressed in the discourse, i.e., the propositions
that are entertained (or used in ‘mental model building’) by speaker and
hearers while engaging in the discourse.4 For instance, while reading The
Lord of the Rings it is temporarily common ground between Tolkien and
myself that Frodo was born in the Shire. Likewise, while reading Monk’s
biography of Wittgenstein The Duty of Genius, it is temporarily common
ground between Monk and myself that Wittgenstein was Austrian. The
workspace is construed as acceptance-based; when updating the workspace
we are merely entertaining this content, not believing it. Thus Tolkien and I
temporarily commonly accept that Frodo was born in the Shire and Monk
and I temporarily commonly accept that Wittgenstein was Austrian, i.e., we
both temporarily accept this while engaging with the discourse, temporarily
believe that the other accepts this, etc.5
3The term ‘workspace’ is also used by Nichols and Stich (2000) in their cognitive approach
to pretend play. Their account incorporates a ‘Possible World Box’ which is a ‘workspace’
(that is kept separate from our beliefs) in which our cognitive system builds and
temporarily stores representations of possible worlds. However, unlike my account’s
workspace, this possible world box is only operational in the case of pretend play
(e.g., fictional discourse) and related tasks. Non-fictional interaction (e.g., non-fictional
discourse) operates on the belief box.
4A similar idea is developed in Kamp’s (2018) mentalistic framework. Kamp introduces a
compartment (Kdis) for the neutral place where we build representations of the content
of the current discourse before forming judgements about the truth of the propositions
expressed by Kdis.
5Actually, in these non face-to-face cases, hearer and speaker do not simultaneously
engage in the discourse and hence do not have the relevant (temporary) attitudes
simultaneously. See section 2.3.1.
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Unlike the stable common ground that exists permanently and unlike
Stokke’s unofficial common grounds, the workspace is truly temporary.
It remains in use and existence solely for the purpose and solely for the
duration of a specific conversation. In other words, speaker and hearer
only accept the propositions expressed by a particular discourse as long
as they are engaging in it. For instance, as soon as I stop reading The Lord
of the Rings and hence stop entertaining the propositions expressed by it, I
stop accepting the propositions of the discourse. Hence the content of the
workspace evaporates and it stops to exist. Thus we can speak of one single
workspace coming into existence and disappearing again (or, alternatively,
becoming active/accessible and non-active/inaccessible again) rather than
speaking of several independent unofficial common grounds for different
fictions.
Assertions and fictional statements are defined as proposals to update
the workspace and stable common ground in a three-step algorithm where,
conform Matravers’ theory, the first two steps are uniform for fiction and
non-fiction. The first step is opening a temporary workspace alongside the
stable common ground at the start of the discourse. The second step is
updating this workspace with the content of the (fictional or non-fictional)
discourse. The workspace that came into existence with the first update (i.e.,
with the first proposition we are entertaining) remains accessible and in
existence during subsequent updates caused by the same, possibly multi-
sentence, discourse. In other words, when entertaining propositions from
some narrative (e.g., The Lord of the Rings or The Duty of Genius), a workspace
is created with the first update and we continue to further update this
workspace with subsequent assertions or fictional statements. When speaker
and hearer stop entertaining propositions from this discourse (i.e., as I
stop reading or listening), the workspace loses its content and evaporates.
As I subsequently engage in a new discourse (e.g., I start chatting to my
neighbour or start reading the Harry Potter series), I again update, and
thereby activate, a new workspace (with possibly different interlocutors).
In the third and final step of the algorithm the difference between asser-
tions and fictional statements becomes apparent. The difference consists in
how, as soon as the discourse ends, the quarantined content in the workspace
is brought back to update on the stable common ground. I propose two
distinct closure operations on workspaces; what differentiates assertions
from fictional statements is whether the relevant speech act is a proposal to,
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at the end of the possibly multi-sentence discourse, perform ‘assertive‘ or
‘fictive closure’.
If we were to simply transfer Matravers’ theory to a Stalnakerian frame-
work this would entail that in the case of assertive closure the content of
the workspace is believed – and hence added to the stable common ground
– and in the case of fictive closure it is not. However, to do justice to the
intuition that fictional content does not simply evaporate after engaging in
fictional discourse, the workspace account includes a parafictional update
at fictive closure. The entertained propositions are retained as being true ‘in
the fiction’. More specifically, after engaging with a story s, the content of
the workspace φ is added to the stable common ground under the relevant
Lewisian fiction operator, i.e., as parafictional information of the form ‘In
story s, φ’.6 So, even though after reading The Lord of the Rings, you do not
believe that Frodo was born in the Shire (and this does not become common
ground between you and Tolkien), you do believe the embedded statement
that in The Lord of the Rings, Frodo was born in the Shire and this becomes
common ground between you and Tolkien.7
Placing the content of the workspace under Lewis’s Analysis 2 fiction
operator at fictive closure fits neatly with the assumption that a new un-
updated workspace is a copy of the current stable common ground.8 The
propositions that are true in worlds where some fiction s is told as known
fact that are most similar to the community of origin’s overt conception of
the actual world coincide with the propositions that are part of the stable
common ground between an author and his readers that is updated with
propositions expressed by s.9 For instance, it is part of the workspace while
reading the Sherlock Holmes novels that water is H2O. This information was
stable common ground between Doyle and myself (and his other readers)
6Interestingly, in their cognitive approach to pretend play Nichols and Stich (2000) come
to a similar conclusion. Their account involves a belief update of the form ‘if pretence
premise p were true, then q’, where q is the content in the possible world box. They use
this update to explain how people come to exhibit pretend behaviour.
7The proposed account of the common ground updates caused by fictional discourse
resonates with some elements of Nichols’ and Stich’ (2000) account of the cognitive
structures required for pretend play (see footnotes 6 and 3). See Semeijn (2019) for a
Matraversian account of pretend play and its role in Theory of Mind development.
8See also Zucchi (forthcoming) who combines the notion of a Stalnakerian common
ground with the Lewisian fiction operator for a similar purpose.
9I thus abstract away from ‘hearers’ that do not share the overt beliefs of the relevant
community of origin.
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and is hence copied into the workspace at the first fictional update. Likewise,
it is part of the workspace while reading the Sherlock Holmes stories that
Holmes smoked a pipe since this is part of the propositions expressed by the
fiction and hence the workspace is updated with this information. Last but
not least, it is not part of the workspace while reading the Sherlock Holmes
novels that Trump won the election in 2016. This information was never
stable common ground between Doyle and myself (and his other readers),
nor was it part of the fictional narrative and hence it does not enter the
workspace.
In sum, assertions are defined as proposals to open and update a workspace
and as a result of that trigger assertive closure. Fictional statements are de-
fined as proposals to open and update a workspace and as a result of that
trigger fictive closure. In other words, whether we are engaging in fictional
or non-fictional discourse, the propositions expressed are temporarily com-
mon ground (i.e., part of the workspace) while engaging in the discourse. At
the end of the discourse this temporarily accepted content becomes stable
common ground. In the case of non-fiction it is added to the common ground
directly. In the case of fiction it is added to the common ground embedded
under the relevant fiction operator. Fictional content is thus effectively quar-
antined; firstly in the temporary workspace and secondly embedded under
a fiction operator.
4.4 Formalisation
I will now provide two formalisations of the three step algorithm involved in
assertions and fictional statements. First, by representing common grounds
as sets of propositions (section 4.4.1) and second by representing common
grounds in DRS’s (section 4.4.2).
4.4.1 Sets of propositions
Opening up a workspace
The first step when engaging in a new discourse is opening up or bringing to
existence a new workspace. This step is uniform for fiction and non-fiction.
Both the first assertion of a non-fictional discourse and the first fictional
statement of a fictional discourse will trigger this. I model this step as an
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operation on an ordered pair consisting of a stable common ground (C)
and the empty set, resulting in an ordered pair of the same stable common
ground and a new workspace that is active and accessible for updating:
〈C, ∅〉+ p = 〈C, C〉+ p
As in the unofficial common ground accounts (see previous chapter), I
assume that what is common ground between a speaker and his hearers at
the onset of a new fictional discourse is a copy of the current stable (official)
common ground. Hence, the new unupdated workspace (created in the first
step of the algorithm) is a copy of the current stable common ground (C).
Updating the workspace
Once we have our initial workspace (W) set up, we start updating with the
incoming information in the second step of the algorithm. This step is also
uniform for fiction and non-fiction: fictional statements and assertions alike
update the workspace with the propositions that they express:10
〈C, W〉+ p = 〈C, W ∗ p〉
The workspace that came into existence with the first statement of a partic-
ular discourse is subsequently updated by the statements that follow and
that are part of the same discourse.
Assertive and fictive closure
As discussed, what differentiates assertions from fictional statements is
how, at the end of the discourse, they update the stable common ground.
Assertions trigger assertive closure, fictional statements trigger fictive clo-
sure. In the representations below, both closure operations take an ordered
pair 〈C, W〉 containing a stable common ground and an updated, active
workspace, and return an ordered pair with a new stable common ground
and the empty set.
In the case of assertive closure, the updated workspace is adopted as
the new stable common ground. Because a new workspace is a copy of
10As in the formalisation of the unofficial common ground accounts (see section 3.3.1), we
assume that the ∗ operator unionizes sets if they are consistent and otherwise resolves
the inconsistency appropriately.
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the current common ground, asserting a proposition p thus boils down
to updating the stable common ground C to C ∗ p (as in the traditional
Stalnakerian framework):
Assertive closure: 〈C, W〉 → 〈W, ∅〉
Fictive closure returns an ordered pair in which the updated workspace
is added to the original stable common ground as parafictional information,
i.e., under the relevant fiction operator. In the formalisation below I assume
that we are keeping track of n fictions (1, ..., n). The ‘In fiction i’-operator (i)
takes as its argument the proposition ∩W, which is the intersection of the
propositions in W (i.e., the information that corresponds to how we have
interpreted the story) and it gives the set of worlds in which it is true that
worlds compatible with i are those in ∩W. Note that the fiction operator
i is thus taken semantically in this context, i.e., as a function from sets of
possible worlds to sets of possible worlds:
Fictivei closure: 〈C, W〉 → 〈C ∪ {i(∩W)}, ∅〉
So after engaging with some fictional discourse i, the stable common ground
will contain parafictional information concerning i and the workspace evap-
orates. Because we normally engage in different fictional discourses (and
know other people to do so as well), a typical stable common ground be-
tween any group of people will contain (apart from information about the
actual world) parafictional information about several distinct fictions un-
der different ‘In fiction i’-operators. In this sense there are in fact multiple
different fictive closure operators related to different fictional works.
4.4.2 Discourse representation structures
Below, I illustrate the updates on workspaces and stable common grounds
triggered by assertion (1) and Tolkien’s fictional statement (25) taken from
The Lord of the Rings in the box notation of DRT:11
(1) C.S. Lewis was born in Belfast.
(25) Frodo had a very trying time that afternoon.
11See also Maier (2017) and Kamp (forthcoming) for modern semantic implementations of
the consensus view, in a rather different, purely mentalistic version of DRT.
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In order to do so we require a version of the Lewisian fiction operator that
operates on DRS’s:
For any DRS K and any story s, sK is a well-formed DRS condition




For example, a DRS may contain a DRS-condition of the form lotrK where
a sub-DRS K is embedded under the Lord of the Rings fiction operator. This
condition may then be verified in a model or not. For instance, if a main
DRS contains a sub-DRS that is embedded by the Lord of the Rings fiction
operator and that sub-DRS contains the information that Frodo was born in
the Shire, then the main DRS is verified if it is true in The Lord of the Rings
that Frodo was born in the Shire.
Assertions
First, a simplified representation of assertion (1) defined as a proposal to
open and update a workspace and, as a result of that, perform assertive
closure. First, a new workspace is opened which is a copy of the current
common ground (in this case it already contains, amongst other things, the
















This workspace is then updated with the proposition expressed by (1). I use














4 The workspace account
As soon as the non-fictional discourse ends, assertive closure is triggered,
i.e., the content of the common ground is replaced by the content of the
workspace, leaving us with a new common ground that contains the infor-









The net result of this algorithm is thus exactly the same as for standard DRT
updating on the common ground without opening and closing workspaces.
The payoff of adding a workspace update lies in the way it allows us to
model the essential similarities and dissimilarities between non-fiction and
fiction.
Fictional statements
Next, a simplified representation of fictional statement (25) defined as a
proposal to open and update a workspace and as a result of that perform
































As soon as the fictional discourse ends, fictive closure is triggered, i.e., the
content of the workspace is added to the common ground as parafictional
information under the relevant fiction operator. This leaves us with a new
common ground that contains the information that in The Lord of the Rings
the proposition expressed by (25) is true, and an evaporated workspace:
(33)











As we have seen, the parafictional update at fictive closure operates on the
stable common ground, i.e., a hedged or modalized proposition becomes
part of the stable common ground. Likewise, if we engage in a discussion on
the content of some fiction (e.g., The Lord of the Rings) and someone utters an
implicit or explicit parafictional statement such as (19) or (20), these update
the stable common ground with a hedged proposition:
(19) Bilbo is Frodo’s cousin.
(20) In The Lord of the Rings, Bilbo is Frodo’s cousin.
In line with the Currie/Zucchi/Ninan analysis of parafictional discourse,
parafictional statements are analysed as modalized assertions about actual
states of affairs (i.e., the content of particular novel) and hence are proposals
to update the workspace with a modalized proposition and trigger assertive
closure.
Concretely, any arbitrary parafictional proposition p consists of an ‘In
fiction i’-operator related to some fiction i (i), and some proposition (q):
p = iq. In the earlier set theoretic representation we can thus represent the
updates caused by parafictional statements by substituting p for iq in the
three-step algorithm for assertions. After opening up a new workspace we
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thus update that workspace with iq:
〈C, W〉+iq = 〈C, W ∗iq〉
At the end of the (possibly multi-sentence) parafictional discourse about the
content of fiction i, we perform regular assertive closure: 〈C, W〉 → 〈W, ∅〉.
The updated workspace is adopted as the new stable common ground
(which now also contains iq).
As an illustration we can represent the updates caused by (20) (or (19))
in DRT. After opening up a workspace (that is a copy of the current com-
mon ground), the hedged parafictional proposition updates the workspace
directly, i.e., it is temporarily common ground that in The Lord of the Rings,














At the end of the discourse assertive closure is triggered, i.e., the common
ground is replaced by the current workspace:
(35)









Hence the stable common ground now also contains the parafictional infor-
mation that in The Lord of the Rings, Bilbo is Frodo’s cousin.
There are thus basically two ways to update the common ground with
parafictional information. Either you engage in fictional discourse s (e.g.,
reading The Lord of the Rings) or you engage in parafictional discourse
about the content of s (e.g., engaging in a discussion about the content
of The Lord of the Rings). Either discourse results in updates of the stable
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common ground with parafictional information concerning s. The intuitive
difference between the two processes lies in what kind of propositions you
entertain (i.e., update your workspace with) during the discourse; whether
you entertain propositions such as “Bilbo is Frodo’s cousin" or propositions
such as “In The Lord of the Rings, Bilbo is Frodo’s cousin".
The analysis of parafictional discourse as hedged assertions allows me,
unlike Stokke (2013; 2018) and Eckardt (2014), to ascribe truth-values to
parafictional statements such as (19) and (20) just as we do with regular
assertions. Moreover, the workspace account avoids the difficulties with
unofficial common ground accounts that treat fictional and parafictional
discourse on a par. In the workspace account, after engaging in a fictional
narrative such as The Lord of the Rings, the fictional content of our workspace
evaporates; we accept propositions such as that wizards exist only temporar-
ily. However, this and other fictional content does not evaporate completely.
After the fictional discourse it becomes part of the stable common ground
as parafictional information. Thus, after engaging in The Lord of the Rings
it is stable common belief that (in The Lord of the Rings,) Bilbo is Frodo’s
cousin. This explains how we can, after engaging in a fiction, engage in
parafictional discourse. When engaging in parafictional discourse, we make
regular assertions that rely on, and update the common ground with, hedged
propositions and therefore no ‘permanent’ unofficial common ground or
workspace related to The Lord of the Rings is called for.
However, the workspace account does not yet explain how the parafic-
tional update of the stable common ground allows us to continue with some
fictional discourse after taking a break. I turn to this issue in the next section.
4.5 Fictive opening
4.5.1 Picking up where we left off
Up until this point I have presented a tabula rasa interpretation of fiction
where nothing is common ground between speaker and hearer about what
is true in the fiction before starting to engage with it (except that the fiction –
any fiction – conforms to the common ground based version of the Reality
Assumption). Obviously this isn’t always the case when engaging with fic-
tional narratives. Most importantly, people can take breaks while engaging
with fictional discourse. For instance, I may have read The Lord of the Rings
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yesterday, entertained some of its content, stopped engaging with it (and
hence performed fictive closure), bookmarked the page where I stopped
reading, engaged in all sorts of other non-fictional and fictional discourse,
and today pick up the book where I left off. In this case it is already common
ground between Tolkien and myself that some things (e.g., that there is a
hobbit named Frodo) are true in The Lord of the Rings before I start to engage
with it (again).12
A feature of the workspace account, as it is presented above, is that after
engaging in a fictional narrative and entertaining its content, all that we are
left with in our common ground is parafictional information. Hence, if we
would – when returning to our fictional discourse after a break – create a
new workspace by making a copy of the current stable common ground,
we would start ‘from scratch’. All previously introduced discourse referents
for fictional objects would become inaccessible because they are embedded
under a fiction operator in the common ground and hence also in the new
workspace. It thus becomes unclear how I could for instance interpret a
fictional statement such as (17) when getting back to The Lord of the Rings:
(17) Gollum [...] held aloft the ring.
What ring is Tolkien referring to? Who is Gollum? If the content of the
previous updates caused by the fictional discourse of The Lord of the Rings is
inaccessible, I cannot answer these questions. In order to account for such
anaphoric links, the new workspace will have to contain all the propositions
that were included in the original workspace just before fictive closure (e.g.,
a description of some unique ring). Hence the workspace account is in need
of some further mechanism to explain how we are able to retrieve the the
final state of the relevant earlier fiction workspace as our current active
workspace.13
12Conversely, while writing The Lord of the Rings, Tolkien most probably took numerous
breaks. Whenever he would return to the writing table and continue the fictional
discourse it would already be common ground between him and his readers that certain
things are true in The Lord of the Rings.
13This problem does not arise with breaks in non-fictional discourse because with assertive
closure we adopt the updated workspace as the new stable common ground. Hence,
when continuing in a non-fictional narrative, the new workspace will contain (at least)
all propositions that were included in the original workspace. Moreover, this problem




A possible solution is to claim that, apart from adding parafictional propo-
sitions to the stable common ground, fictive closure also involves retaining
a copy of the updated workspace (which is adopted as new workspace
when continuing in the same narrative). This results in a theory resembling
Stokke’s (2013; 2018) and Eckardt’s (2014) accounts (see chapter 3), involving
(something akin to) unofficial common grounds. However, this move invites
the problems concerning temporality associated with the unofficial common
ground accounts; if we maintain that readers of The Lord of the Rings hold
onto a The Lord of the Rings-workspace containing propositions such as that
wizards exist, we no longer account for the intuition that we accept such
fictional propositions only temporarily.
A more promising solution is to introduce a mechanism that explains
how we, when continuing in a familiar narrative, fill in our workspace
based on the available parafictional propositions in the common ground.
At first sight this seems like a straightforward task. In fictive closure you
copy the updated workspace in its entirety and add it to the stable common
ground under an ‘In fiction s’-operator. So, when you continue to engage
in a fictional narrative after taking a break, you simply reverse the fictive
closure, i.e., perform ‘fictive opening’: identify the relevant fiction-operator
and copy everything that is under this operator to the workspace.
The need for a fictive opening mechanism shows why the DRT box syntax
– which brings out the occasionally criticized ‘representational character’ of
DRT – is not only a visually efficient tool but also theoretically relevant. It is
not possible to define a fictive opening operation if we represent common
grounds as sets of propositions (which in turn are sets of possible worlds).
The difficulty with this formalism is that the individual propositions in the
common grounds are presented as having no structure. When we perform
fictive closure we update the stable common ground with parafictional
information and thus simply add a new set of possible worlds (e.g., we add
the set of worlds in which in the novel The Lord of the Rings, Frodo is a hobbit,
Frodo inherits the Rings, etc.). In other words, there is no ‘parafictional The
Lord of the Rings’ marker in the stable common ground and hence no straight-
forward mechanism to select the appropriate propositions to perform fictive
opening.
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We therefore need a framework that does place such a structure on the
information in the common ground. DRT does exactly this.14 Information
in the common ground is represented in DRS’s which are complex struc-
tures involving fiction operator conditions on DRS’s. These fiction operator
conditions can function as parafictional markers that allow us to select the
appropriate propositions to perform fictive opening. So, for instance, when
opening up a workspace after taking a break in reading The Lord of the Rings,
the content under the The Lord of the Rings fiction operator in the stable
common ground is adopted as new workspace:
(36)















14An alternative framework that also places the necessary structure on propositions and
hence allows for parafictional markers, is the so-called ‘structured propositions’ frame-
work (see for instance Soames (1985) and Cresswell (1985)). Propositions are not sets
of possible worlds, but complex entities with a structure similar to the sentences that
expresses them and with constituents that carry the semantic values of expressions
occurring in these sentences. For example, in Soames’ neo-Russellian approach the
sentence “Scott does not run” expresses the following proposition:
< NEG,<< s >, R >>
Here, s is Scott, R is the property of running and NEG is the truth function for negation.
Thus, the negation operator is a distinct constituent of the proposition expressed. We
can analyse the ‘In fiction i’-operator in parafictional statements in a similar fashion. The
following is a simplified representation of the proposition expressed by parafictional
statement (20):
< lotr,<< b, f >, C >>
Here, b is Bilbo, f is Frodo, C is the property of being someone’s cousin and lotr is the
‘In The Lord of the Rings’-operator. In this way we place structure on propositions that
allows for parafictional markers and hence enables us to perform fictive opening.
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Hence we can re-create the last known state of the workspace, K, from a
parafictional condition of the form sK, generated in the stable common
ground after fictive closure.
4.5.2 Genre conventions
Another way the common ground can contain parafictional information
before engaging with a fictional narrative is through what Lewis calls ‘inter-
fictional carry-over’ of fictional truth. Additional fictional truths may derive
from prior knowledge about what is true in other fictional stories. This
can for instance happen because the narrative is part of a larger canon
that deals with the same fictional world (e.g., the Harry Potter book series,
the Star Wars Expanded Universe), though, arguably, such narratives can
also be construed as simply a continuation of the same fictional discourse.
However, more general genre conventions can add fictional truths as well:15
In a typical fairy tale about a knight going on a quest to slay a dragon, we
may anticipate that the dragon breathes fire, even if that has not (yet) been
stated explicitly. The question is how the information that dragons breathe
fire enters the workspace since it is neither stated explicitly in the text, nor
part of the stable common ground (assuming that it is common ground that
there are no dragons).
I propose that genre conventions are imported in a way similar to fictional
truths derived from previous engagement with a fiction, i.e., through fictive
opening. As mentioned above, when I continue reading a fictional narrative
after a break that triggered fictive closure, I re-create the last known state
of the workspace, K, from a parafictional condition of the form sK in the
stable common ground. Genre expectations may be stored in the common
ground in terms of parafictional conditions as well.16 Consider the unknown
fairy tale from before. I pick up the book, and on the basis of the cover
picture and first few lines (“Once upon a time in a faraway land there lived
a knight. . . ”) I decide that I’m dealing with a fairy tale. At the same time, it’s
15Genre conventions may also influence whether fictional statements are judged reliable
and how they update the workspace (see chapter 8).
16Here I only consider conventions related to different genres of fiction. Non-fiction ‘genre
conventions’ (e.g., In a news report, a family taking tea at their dining-room table
means that the family is ‘normal’) are analysed as unprefixed stereotypic knowledge
in the common ground. See Matravers (2014) and Zucchi (forthcoming) for a uniform
treatment of fiction and non-fiction genre conventions.
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common ground that ‘in fairytales, dragons breathe fire’ or, in other words,













The workspace that we open to represent the story at hand should be a copy
of the common ground, as usual, but also contain the information that holds
in stories of this type, as stored in quantified parafictional statements like in
(37). We can define the fictive opening mechanism to take care of continued
reading and genre assumptions uniformly: when starting to interpret a story
s, make a copy of the stable common ground and merge that with all K such
that sK is part of (or can be inferred on the basis of, as in (37)) the stable
common ground.
4.6 Possible extensions
Now that I have presented the basics of the workspace account I will end this
chapter with a brief discussion of two potential extensions of the account:
a de re version of the account (section 4.6.1) and an analysis of export as
analogical reasoning (section 4.6.2).
4.6.1 Fiction about non-fictional objects
What the DRT formalisation makes apparent is that, as it is formalised above,
the workspace account is ‘descriptivist’, i.e., all content in the workspace
(discourse referents and conditions) is placed under a fiction operator at
fictive closure. The account thus adheres to a ‘fictional substitute’ analysis
of fiction, i.e., fictions that make reference to non-fictional objects (e.g.,
historical fiction) are analysed as not being de re about a real life person or
thing but rather about a fictional substitute of it. Consider Tolstoy’s fiction
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novel War and Peace that features Napoleon as one of its characters. War and
Peace contains fictional statement (38):
(38) Napoleon [...] sat on his small gray Arab horse a little in front of his
marshals.
Assuming it is already stable common ground between Tolstoy and his
audience before engaging in the fictional discourse who Napoleon was, there
is a discourse referent for the real world Napoleon in the stable common
ground. Alongside the rest of the common ground, this discourse referent is














Hence a new discourse referent is added to the workspace that is separate
from the discourse referent for Napoleon in the stable common ground.
The workspace is then updated with the proposition expressed by fictional
statement (38). At fictive closure this workspace is added to the stable
















In this stable common ground there is a discourse referent x in the main DRS
for the real world Napoleon and the conditions in the main DRS express that
x was an emperor etc. There is also a discourse referent x’ for the fictional
substitute Napoleon in the embedded DRS. The conditions in the embedded
DRS express that the fictional substitute of Napoleon was an emperor but
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also that he sat on his small gray Arab horse a little in front of his marshals.
So, after reading War and Peace it is stable common ground that in War
and Peace, there is an entity that is called Napoleon, was an emperor, etc.
Thus, strictly speaking, War and Peace is not really de re about the real world
Napoleon but about a fictional substitute (i.e., something with a lot of the
same properties as Napoleon – but also some fictional ones – that exists in a
fictional world). The idea that fictions that make reference to non-fictional
objects are strictly speaking about their fictional substitutes is in line with
for instance Wieland’s (forthcoming) proposal but against the dominant
view that such fictions are literally de re about the real world objects they
make reference to (e.g., Friend (2011b) and Maier (2017)).17
The workspace account can, however, be made compatible with the intu-
ition that historical fictions are literally de re about the relevant real world
objects. We can add an additional mechanism that links or anchors (cf. Maier
(2017)) discourse referents that are copied to the workspace to their real













At fictive closure all discourse referents in the workspace that have substitute
discourse referents in the main DRS are then replaced by these non-fictional
substitutes when the content of the workspace is added to the common
ground embedded under the relevant fiction operator. Hence the common
ground after fictive closure triggered by statement (38) will look as follows:
17As far as we consider adherence to a non-dominant view a problem, it is one that is
shared by the unofficial common ground accounts. Unofficial common grounds are
separated from the official common grounds and are independently updated. In order
to appropriately engage with a fiction that makes reference to a non-fictional object, the
relevant unofficial common ground needs to copy discourse referents and conditions
on them from the official common ground. For instance, to properly interpret a fictional
statement such as (38) we copy a separate discourse referent for the fictional substitute
of Napoleon into the War and Peace unofficial common ground. See also Semeijn and
Zalta (2021) who argue that explicit parafictional statements are ambiguous between a

















Here there is only one discourse referent for the real world Napoleon. It
is common ground that he is called Napoleon and that he is an emperor.
Moreover, it is common ground that in War and Peace, he (the real world
Napoleon) was called Napoleon, was an emperor and sat on his small gray
Arab horse a little in front of his marshals. Such an approach seems intuitive
but does raise familiar questions concerning ‘quantifying in’ (see e.g., Quine
(1956); Kaplan (1968)), e.g., can War and Peace ‘know’ or represent Napoleon
under multiple different guises (through different acquaintance relations)
and hence express contradictory de re information about him?
In the following chapters I will assume the basic descriptivist version
of the workspace account. This choice will not play a role in subsequent
discussions with the notable exceptions of chapter 6 and 8. In chapter 6 we
will return to the issue of fiction about non-fictional objects and see that
one of the central strategies to deal with ‘metafictional’ discourse seems to
force a move away from a simple descriptivist account anyway. In chapter
8 we assume there is at least some kind of linking or anchoring between
discourse referents for real life entities and their fictional counterparts.
4.6.2 Export of fictional truth as analogical reasoning
As has been discussed, a Matraversian characterization of fictional and non-
fictional statements cannot straightforwardly be extended to definitions of
narratives. According to such a definition, we have a disposition to believe
the content of non-fictional narratives and we have a disposition not to
believe the content of fictional narratives. However, fictional narratives
sometimes express content towards which we have a disposition to believe.
Take the following quote from Fleming’s Thunderball:
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(43) New Providence, the island containing Nassau, the capital of the
Bahamas, is a drab sandy slab of land fringed with some of the most
beautiful beaches in the world. (Example taken from Friend (2008))
Although it is part of a fictional narrative, we can learn empirical facts about
the real world through statements such as (43) in a process that Gendler
(2000) calls ‘narrative as clearinghouse’. After reading Thunderball, I really
do believe that Nassau is on the island New Providence. Hence we ‘export’
this truth from the fiction. To account for such dispositions we may opt
for a so-called ‘patchwork theory of fiction’ (e.g., Currie (1990)): a fictional
narrative can consist of both fictional and non-fictional statements.18
An alternative strategy is to go for a ‘knitwork theory of narratives’:
whereas fictional narratives consist of fictional statements, non-fictional
narratives consist of non-fictional statements. We can opt for such an account
(on a Matraversian or on the consensus view) if we adopt the (by now)
familiar idea that after engaging with a fiction, we update with parafictional
beliefs about its content. According to such a definition, although we may
not have a disposition to believe the content of a fictional narrative, we do
have a disposition to believe parafictional information based on its content.
In the following I will suggest that from a subset of these parafictional beliefs
we can derive unprefixed beliefs through analogical inferencing. Hence
people can have an indirect disposition to believe some of the propositions
expressed by fictional statements.
The two-dimensional approach
This account is inspired by the fact that people talk about import and export
principles of fictional truth as being based on assumed or perceived similar-
ities between fictional worlds and the actual world; if a fictional story s is
supposed to be realistic with respect to a certain cluster of facts and p is in
this cluster, we can derive p from s p and vice versa (cf. Ichino and Currie
(2017)). We can capture this intuitive idea in terms of analogical reasoning.
To clarify the concept of analogical reasoning I adopt the terminology
and schematization of Hesse’s (1966) and Bartha’s (2010) two-dimensional
approach in which an analogical inference is justified if [1] a ‘source’ and ‘tar-
18See Friend (2011a) and Stock (2011) who identify several issues with such patchwork
theories. See also García-Carpintero (2013) who avoids patchwork problems by defining
fictional and non-fictional narratives in normative terms.
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get system’ exhibit a ‘positive analogy’ (i.e., similarities) and [2] the source
system exhibits a ‘vertical relation’ of correlation19 between properties in
and outside the positive analogy that can be extended to the target system,
given that [3] there is no ‘negative analogy’ (i.e., dissimilarities) that is also
relevantly correlated to the positive analogy and hence prohibits this. We
can for instance represent (part of) Reid’s (1785) analogical argument about
the heavens as follows:
Source Target
P P* [positive analogy]
A ¬A* [negative analogy]
Q
Q*
P: Earth orbits the sun P*: Mars orbits the sun
A: Earth’s radius is 6,371 km A*: Mars’ radius is 6,371 km
Q: Earth can sustain life Q*: Mars can sustain life
So, Reid was justified in inferring that Mars could sustain life (Q*) because
Earth and Mars exhibit the positive analogy of both orbiting the sun (P ∧
P*), Earth’s orbiting the sun was taken to be correlated to Earth sustaining
life (P is correlated to Q) and the negative analogy exhibited by Earth and
Mars (A ∧ ¬A* i.e., Mars being smaller than Earth) was not taken to be
relevantly correlated to the positive analogy.
Analogical reasoning with parafictional beliefs
We can also provide a justification for reasoning about what is true about
the real world (or at least about what the author thinks is true about the
real world), based on what is true in a fictional world if we put export in
terms of analogical inference. Suppose I have read Thunderball and have ob-
tained the parafictional beliefs that ‘In Thunderball, there exists a rebreather
(a small device that allows you to breathe underwater)’, ‘In Thunderball, the
Bahamas start East of the coast of Florida’ and ‘In Thunderball, Nassau is on
New Providence’ because these things are stated in the narrative. Suppose I
already knew that ‘(Actually) the Bahamas start East of the coast of Florida’.
19Theorists differ in the requirements they put on these vertical relations (e.g., causal,
predictive, mere correlation etc.). For the purpose of this dissertation I assume that
vertical relations may consist in mere correlation.
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P: In Thunderball, the Bahamas start East P*: The Bahamas start East
of the coast of Florida of the coast of Florida
A: In Thunderball, there exists a rebreather A*: There exists a rebreather
Q: In Thunderball, Nassau is on Q*: Nassau is on New Providence
New Providence
Because the Thunderball worlds and the real world exhibit the positive
analogy P and P* (i.e., the fiction is realistic with respect to this geographical
fact), properties P and Q are related (i.e., belong to the same cluster of
geographical facts) and there is no relevant negative analogy (e.g., A is not
in the same cluster of facts as P and Q), we are licensed to extend the vertical
relation to the real world and hence infer B* (i.e., that ‘(Actually) Nassau is
on New Providence’). In a similar way, we are licensed to infer that New
Providence, the island containing Nassau, the capital of the Bahamas, is a
drab sandy slab of land fringed with some of the most beautiful beaches
in the world from reading (43) in Thunderball because we perceive that
Thunderball is realistic with respect to geographical facts (i.e., Bond does
not visit made up places). We can infer this despite the fact that we have
perceived Thunderball to not be realistic with respect to facts concerning
technological possibilities and advances in the 1960s, i.e., we know the
author took the liberty of make up fancy but unrealistic gadgets such as the
rebreather.
Horizontal relations of similarity between the fictional and the real world
concerning certain clusters of facts can be strengthened by perceived simi-
larities (as in the example above) or by genre conventions (see Ryan (1991)).
For instance, even before reading a Jane Austen novel (and hence before
perceiving any similarities in clusters of facts), I already expect the novel to
not be realistic with respect to geographical facts (I know Austen’s novels
sometimes contain made up villages or estates), but I do expect the novel to
be realistic with respect to facts concerning etiquette and social practices in
19th century British upper class.
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An important caveat here is that these inferences (as are analogical infer-
ences in general) are of course not deductive but always subject to uncer-
tainty. I can only infer that probably, Nassau is actually on New Providence
from reading this in Thunderball. Moreover, it is difficult to systematically de-
termine what facts belong to a particular cluster of facts (cf. Norton (2021)).
For instance, Austen’s novels are not necessarily realistic with respect to
small and unknown geographical facts, but are realistic with respect to facts
concerning well-known, larger cities and countries (e.g., in Austen’s novels,
London is in the south of England and is its capital). I leave further explo-
ration of an analogical reasoning account of export to future research. An
advantage of the envisioned account, as opposed to patchwork theories, is
that it is easily extendable to other media. We don’t have to posit that the
composer, painter or filmmaker has somehow ‘asserted’ certain things in
order to account for the fact that we can learn facts about the real world from
their creations. Moreover, the account is easily extendable to what Gendler
(2000) calls ‘narrative as factory’ (i.e., learning general implicit truths such
as ‘long exposure to excessive power can corrupt even the humblest person’
from engaging with a fiction such as The Lord of the Rings), and easily extend-
able to export of presuppositional content of fictional statements (e.g., from
reading “Bond rode to the airport” in Thunderball I can infer that there was
an airport on New Providence in the 1960s). Unlike a patchwork theorist,
the knitwork theorist does not have to posit that these general truths or the
presuppositions in fictional statements were somehow ‘asserted’. We only
have to establish that they were made true in the fiction and were viable for
export.
4.7 Conclusions
This chapter has introduced the key components of the workspace account.
Rather than using different update rules for fictional statements and asser-
tions (as in the unofficial common ground accounts), I propose a uniform
workspace update along with distinct assertive and fictive closure opera-
tions. Assertions are defined as proposals to (open and) update a temporary
acceptance-based workspace and as a result of that trigger assertive closure,
i.e., the workspace is adopted as the new stable common ground. Fictional
statements are defined as proposals to (open and) update a workspace and
as a result of that trigger fictive closure, i.e., the workspace is added to the
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stable common ground under the relevant fiction operator. A new unup-
dated workspace is a copy of the current stable common ground that is
merged with all information embedded under the relevant fiction operators
in the stable common ground. The account thus effectively quarantines
fictional content (i.e., first in a temporary workspace and then embedded
under a fiction operator). I have argued that the account can account for the
intuition that fictional truths are only accepted temporarily (i.e., as informa-
tion in the workspace) and for the intuition that we do retain information
about fictional truths even after fictional discourse (i.e., as parafictional
beliefs stored in the stable common ground).
The workspace account is the basic framework that is used in this dis-
sertation and will be applied to several puzzles present in the semantics
and philosophy of fiction literature. Chapters 5, 6 and 8 present possible
applications and/or embellishments of the basic account.
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parafictional updates
This chapter is a rewritten version of the unpublished paper ‘Bald-faced
lies and parafictional updates’ which has been presented at several
international conferences.
5.1 Introduction
Now that I have presented the basic framework for modelling assertions
and fictional statements in terms of common ground updates, let’s see how
related speech acts fit into this framework. In this chapter I consider lies and
so-called ‘bald-faced lies’. Suppose Brian invites Alice to his birthday party
but Alice does not want to attend and hence says (44) even though actually
she is feeling perfectly fine. Compare this to Tolkien’s fictional statement
(25):
(44) I have a cold.
(25) Frodo had a very trying time that afternoon.
Both Tolkien and Alice defied the Gricean maxim of quality; they said some-
thing they believed to be false. Yet, there is a strong intuitive difference
between these two speech acts. Whereas (44) is a lie, (25) is ‘merely’ a fic-
tional statement. A natural way of phrasing the difference is to say that lying,
contrary to fiction telling, involves an intention to deceive (e.g., Augustine
(395); Williams (2002)); whereas Alice had the intention to deceive Brian into
believing that she had fallen ill, Tolkien never meant to deceive anyone into
believing that some hobbit had a trying time on some afternoon.
I would like to thank Teresa Marques, the audience at the Speech acts and fiction seminar at
the University of Genoa and the audience at the DGfS workshop Post-truth: the semantics
and pragmatics of saying “what you believe to be false” at the University of Bremen for
valuable feedback and discussion.
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A well-known counterexample to such definitions of lying is what Sorensen
(2007) has dubbed the bald-faced lie, i.e., a statement that involves no in-
tention to deceive but that we do intuitively call a lie. For instance, Keiser
(2016) discusses an example found in The Godfather II where mafioso Pen-
tangeli is about to testify against Corleone (the Godfather) during a senate
hearing. Because of Pentangeli’s previous unofficial statements, it is com-
mon knowledge in the courtroom that Pentangeli knows Corleone and his
crimes. However, Corleone has Pentangeli’s brother attend the hearing in
order to remind Pentangeli of the fact that by testifying, he puts the safety
of his family in jeopardy. When asked whether he served the Godfather,
Pentangeli testifies:
(45) I never knew no Godfather.
Pentangeli thereby ensures that Corleone is not convicted and his own
family remains safe. Although (45) cannot involve an intention to deceive
anyone (everyone in the courtroom knows that Pentangeli did know the
Godfather, everyone knows that everyone knows this, etc.)1 we do call it a
(bald-faced) lie.
There are three main strategies that theorists have adopted to deal with
bald-faced lies. First, we can bite the bullet: Bald-faced lies are valid exam-
ples of lies so apparently lying does not necessarily involve an intention to
deceive. To make such an analysis tenable we need to provide a definition
of lying that does not involve intention to deceive but somehow still dis-
tinguishes lies from fictional statements and mistakes (e.g., Carson (2006);
Fallis (2009); Stokke (2013, 2018)). A second strategy is to deny the validity of
the counterexample by arguing that bald-faced lies like in the Godfather sce-
nario actually do involve an intention to be deceptive (Lackey (2013)). Third,
we can deny the validity of the counterexample by arguing that bald-faced
lies are not really lies (e.g., Meibauer (2014)), for instance because they are
only quasi-assertoric (e.g., Dynel (2011); Leland (2015); Keiser (2016); Maitra
(2018)).2 In this chapter I align myself with the latter group. I incorporate an
1Arguably, this is not the case for all speech acts that we may call ‘bald-faced lies’. In
general, I assume that a speaker who states some proposition p that is blatantly false to
only a part of their audience (e.g., a politician fabricating facts in some public statement)
performs two separate speech acts: A lie towards people with whom it is not common
knowledge that p is false and a ‘real’ bald-faced lie (cf. Maitra (2018); Keiser (2016))
towards people with whom this is common knowledge.
2Cf. Harris (forthcoming) who argues that because bald-faced lies are not assertions, not
all lies are assertions.
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analysis of lies and bald-faced lies into the workspace account according to
which bald-faced lies function like fictional statements. The obvious benefit
of this approach is that we can avoid the “unhappy divorce” (Lackey (2013);
see also Keiser (2016)) of definitions of lying and intention to deceive. One
of the central contributions of this chapter is to argue that the bald-faced
liar’s aim of ‘going on the record’ – sometimes taken to show that bald-faced
lies are assertions (by e.g., Sorensen (2007); Carson (2006); Stokke (2013)) –
can be used to the advantage of accounts of this type.
First, I briefly explore the challenges posed by modelling lying (section
5.2) in a Stalnakerian common ground framework. I then argue that in
both an unofficial common ground account and in the workspace account,
an analysis of bald-faced lies as lies does not adequately account for the
temporary acceptance of the proposition expressed by the bald-faced lie and
does not account for the fact that a bald-faced lie is only successful if it ‘goes
on the record’ (section 5.3.1). Next, I argue that an analysis of bald-faced
lies as fictional statements improves upon the analysis of bald-faced lies
as lies in both frameworks but that the workspace account has a definite
advantage because it accounts for the aspect of ‘going on the record’ by
analysing fictional statements as triggering parafictional updates of the form
‘In/According to story s, φ’ (section 5.3.2). Lastly, I briefly introduce and
counter five possible objections to my view (section 5.4).
5.2 Common ground and lying
Just as fictional discourse poses a challenge to the traditional common
ground framework that is based on cooperative information exchange (as
discussed in chapters 3 and 4), modelling lying poses yet another challenge.
If we follow consensus and analyse lies as a type of assertion, we can –
on either an unofficial common ground or workspace account – no longer
construe assertions as proposals to update a belief-based (official) common
ground; obviously when Alice said (44) she did not herself believe that she
had a cold (i.e., ¬Ba p) and hence did not propose that this became common
belief. Rather, after a successful deceptive lie, a correct description of the
speaker’s a and hearer’s b beliefs would be as follows:
95
5 Lies, bald-faced lies and parafictional updates
Bb p
BbBa p BaBb p
BaBbBa p BbBaBb p
...
...
Even though b does believe that p, and the fact that b believes that p is
common belief, a does not believe that p.
I argue that there are two potential fixes to the common ground definition
of assertion so that it can include lies: First, a switch to a doxastically neutral
(i.e., acceptance-based) conception of the common ground, and, second, a
moderate psychologistic turn (i.e., a switch to talking about the hearer’s
conception of common belief).
5.2.1 Acceptance-based common ground
Stokke (2013) opts for the first strategy and defines assertions as proposals
to update what is commonly accepted:
Aa p Ab p
BbAa p BaAb p
BaBbAa p BbBaAb p
...
...
In words, a’s assertion is a proposal for both a and b to accept that p, for
both to believe that the other accepts that p, etc. The above definition of
assertion includes deceptive lies because, by lying, Alice proposes that it
becomes commonly accepted that she has a cold; Alice herself accepts this
and proposes that Brian also accepts this (because he comes to believe it).
A potential problem with this move is that it obfuscates the difference
between official and unofficial common grounds or between the workspace
and the common ground. This problem is especially pressing for an Eckardt-
style unofficial common ground account (see chapter 3) where the content
of both official and unofficial common grounds is accepted persistently.
If unofficial and official common grounds are all acceptance-based, there
would essentially be no difference between fictional and non-fictional com-
mon grounds. In Stokke’s account and the workspace account, if everything
is acceptance-based, the only real difference between fictional and non-
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fictional discourse is whether you accept it temporarily or persistently.3
Also this doesn’t seem to be enough to model the difference between fiction
and non-fiction. As Keiser phrases it: “my carrying on a pretense with you
is not a function of the length of time that I want us to accept what is being
said, but rather what kind of attitude we take to what is being said” (Keiser,
2016, p.476).
5.2.2 The hearer’s conception of common belief
Opting for the second strategy would entail defining assertions as proposals






In words, a’s assertion is a proposal to make b believe that p, believe that
a believes that p, etc. The iteration implies nothing, however, about a’s
own beliefs. This definition of assertion includes deceptive lies because, by
lying, Alice proposes that Brian believes the asserted content to be common
belief. In the case of truthful assertion (where the speaker already believed
the asserted content, i.e., Ba p) such a proposal boils down to a proposal to
update common belief (assuming that the speaker also believes the assertion
to be successful, i.e., BaBb p, BaBbBa p, etc.).
A potential issue with this strategy is that it involves a move away from
the traditional Stalnakerian framework – where speech acts are defined
as proposals to update a common ground – towards a psychologistic or
Gricean framework – where speech acts are defined as proposals to update
an agent’s mental states (i.e., the hearer’s beliefs about what is common
ground). In the context of this dissertation this is undesirable because our
starting point was to model fictional statements and related speech acts in
terms of common ground updates. The move is ‘moderate’ because this
framework still makes use of the concept of common ground.
3Here and in the rest of this chapter I am assuming a version of Stokke’s account where
unofficial common grounds are truly temporary (see the discussion in section 3.4).
4Cf. the discussion in van Ditmarsch et al. (2020).
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5.2.3 Comparing the acceptance-based and psychologistic
strategies
A potential motivation to go for the acceptance-based definition of common
ground is that it seems to be in line with Stalnaker’s original conception
of common ground. Stalnaker argues that common ground should be con-
strued in terms of common acceptance rather than common belief. This is
because sometimes people “at least temporarily, and perhaps in a limited
context” (Stalnaker, 2002, p.176) ignore the possibility that some proposition
is false in order to enable smooth conversation. This for instance happens
when one conversational participant is aware of a defective context (i.e.,
notices a divergence in the conversational participants’ beliefs about what
is common ground) and responds by accommodating for the defect by
temporarily accepting something that she believes to be false as common
ground. For instance, a hearer may interpret the speaker as making a mis-
take; a father holding his baby girl may respond to a colleague’s question
“How old is he?” by saying “16 months”. Stalnaker’s analysis of this situa-
tion is that the hearer chooses not to address the perceived defective context
but to resolve it by accepting – for the purpose of the conversation – the
information “my baby is a boy’. Deceptive lies such as (44) are the mirror
image of this situation; here the speaker (i.e., Alice) is the one that is in the
know of the defect in context and the one that decides not to address it but
to accept the asserted content (i.e., that Alice has a cold) as true to make the
context non-defective.
Stalnaker offers a fair description of the mistake and liar case (i.e., I agree
that the content expressed by a lie (or mistake) is at least accepted temporar-
ily for the purpose and duration of the conversation). However, in both
the workspace account and in Stokke’s version of the unofficial common
ground account, a distinction is made between things that are accepted only
temporarily (for the purpose and duration of some fictional conversation)
and things that are accepted more persistently. In the workspace account,
this is the distinction between information that was temporarily accepted
(as part of the workspace) also updating the stable common ground or not
(only in an embedded form). In Stokke’s account, this is the distinction be-
tween information being part of a temporary unofficial common ground or
information being part of the stable official common ground. Stalnaker does
not distinguish between temporary and stable common grounds and only
establishes that the notion of common ground in general cannot be in terms
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of common belief. However, once we introduce this distinction, it becomes
clear that establishing that a lie (or mistake) involves acceptance that is
temporary (and “perhaps in a limited context”) of the expressed content is
really only an argument for why workspaces or unofficial common grounds
should be acceptance-based. It does not establish that the stable (official)
common ground must be construed as acceptance-based. Lies and mistakes
could just involve updating some kind of unofficial common ground or
workspace that is only there for the duration of the conversation.5 It is an
open question whether lies or mistakes also involve updating the stable
official common ground.
One way to think about this question is by trying to establish what a
successful deceptive lie is (so as to establish what it is that the liar proposes).
Suppose Alice was successful in her lie to Brian that she had a cold. Is it then,
after the conversation has ended, stable common ground between Alice and
Brian that she had a cold (because they both permanently accept this)? Or
is it, after the lie, not really common ground that Alice had a cold but now
Brian falsely believes that this is stable common ground (i.e., because the
hearer did and the speaker did not update their conception of the official
common ground with this information)? Or, in case someone interprets
the speaker as making a mistake, is it after the conversation between the
parent and the colleague stable common ground between them that the
baby is a boy? Or is it not really common ground, but the colleague now
thinks that it is (i.e., because the speaker did and the hearer did not update
their conception of the official common ground with this information)? The
answer to these questions will ultimately depend on how we want to use the
concept of (official) common ground; whether we allow that someone can,
after engaging in conversation, be aware of a stably defective context (and
not do anything about it but pretend that it isn’t defective in the relevant
conversations), or whether we think defective contexts must always be
resolved by stable acceptance, i.e., a permanent pretence on the part of the
accommodator. In other words, whether we want to use the concept of
common ground solely to explain linguistic behaviour or whether we also
think there is a notion of ‘real’ common ground between two interlocutors
that is dependent on their actual persistent beliefs.
5In fact, Stalnaker’s comment that accommodation involves “at least temporary” ac-
ceptance hints in this direction; Alice and the father are only temporarily accepting
something as common ground.
99
5 Lies, bald-faced lies and parafictional updates
Both strategies discussed are possible in an unofficial common ground ac-
count as well as in a workspace account. Stokke opts for an acceptance-based
official common ground. As will become clear below, this is a necessary
move in his framework because of his analysis of bald-faced lies as lies.
Since I prefer an analysis of bald-faced lies as fictional statements I am not
forced towards either of the two strategies. When discussing my analysis
of bald-faced lies in this chapter, I opt for a moderate psychologistic turn
(although the arguments in the succeeding sections in favour of an analysis
of bald-faced lies as fictional statements also work for acceptance-based
variants of the theories). I opt for this strategy because it allows us to model
what is interesting about the deceptive lie and how it differs from regular
assertions. Namely, that successful lies create an asymmetry in the beliefs of
the speaker and hearer (i.e., a defective context emerges that is not resolved).
5.3 Bald-faced lies
Now that we have an overview of the different possible accounts in place to
model fiction and lying in common ground terms, I turn to bald-faced lies. I
argue that an analysis of bald-faced lies as lies misdescribes the temporary
acceptance of the expressed content and misdescribes the success conditions
of the speech act (section 5.3.1). Next, I propose that an analysis of bald-faced
lies as fictional statements improves upon an analysis of bald-faced lies as
lies and can, in the workspace account specifically, adequately account for
the success conditions of the speech act (section 5.3.2).
Consider another example of a bald-faced lie: Carson’s (2006) cheating
student scenario. A student accused of plagiarism is called to the dean’s
office. The student knows he plagiarized, the dean knows he did, the student
knows that the dean knows, etc. However, it is also well known that the
dean will not punish anyone who explicitly denies their guilt. When asked
the student therefore says:
(9) I didn’t cheat on the exam.
Similarly to the Pentangeli case, the speech act cannot involve an intention
to deceive the hearer (i.e., it is common belief that the student did cheat
just like it was common belief that Pentangeli knew the Godfather). Yet, the
student is (bald-faced) lying.
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5.3.1 Bald-faced lies as lies
In this section I argue that an analysis of bald-faced lies as lies is inadequate.
Stokke (2013; 2018) adopts this approach in his unofficial common ground
account. This means bald-faced lies are analysed as proposals to update









Alternatively, in the workspace account, an analysis of bald-faced lies as lies























This analysis forces a switch to an acceptance-based notion of the (official)
common ground (i.e., Pentangeli’s speech act cannot be a proposal to update
the hearer’s conception of what is common belief since it is already common
belief that Pentangeli knew the Godfather). Pentangeli thus does not propose
that anyone believes that he knew no Godfather (he does not intend to deceive
6Here I obviously gloss over the fact that (45) is a fictional example.
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anyone) but instead proposes that it becomes persistently commonly accepted
that he knew no Godfather. Similarly, the student proposes that he and the
dean persistently accept that he did not cheat (and that they both believe
that the other accepts this, etc.)
Temporary acceptance
The resulting characterization of the bald-faced lie is unsatisfactory because
it does not adequately model the temporary acceptance of the proposition
expressed by the bald-faced lie. In the above versions of the workspace and
unofficial common ground accounts, the (official) common ground is con-
strued as involving persistent acceptance. However, bald-faced lie scenarios
seem to be characterized by temporary acceptance.7 If a bald-faced lie is a
lie, the proposition p expressed by it is accepted persistently (also after the
conversation has ended). This would mean that p would be common ground
in subsequent non-fictional discourse between the same interlocutors. How-
ever, suppose that after the courtroom meeting one of the senators came up
to Pentangeli in the hallway and asked him: “Hey, now that we’re off the
record, you did actually serve under Corleone, right?”. Their conversation
will continue as it did before the hearing (when it also was common ground
that he knew the Godfather) and Pentangeli can be expected to answer
something like: “Well, yes of course! We all know that. But I couldn’t say
that during the hearing!”. Similarly, the dean may run into the student at a
bar later that week and ask a similar question: “So, tell me, off the record,
how exactly did you manage to cheat on that exam?” to which the student
may reply: “Really? Off the record? Well, what I did is...”. An analysis of
bald-faced lies as proposals to persistently accept the expressed content
would have to predict that such discourse cannot take place (or is fictional).
It seems that in this sense the bald-faced lie scenarios are better described
as involving a kind of temporary acceptance for the purpose and duration
of the relevant conversation, i.e., while the conversation is ‘being recorded’
(similar to the temporary acceptance involved in workspaces or Stokke’s
unofficial common grounds). In other words, Pentangeli and the student are
only temporarily in ‘warranting contexts’ (cf. Carson (2006); Fallis (2009);
Saul (2012)) where they have an obligation to justify the truth of what they
7A similar point has recently been made by Keiser (forthcoming).
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say when challenged.8 Surely, in the courtroom or in the dean’s office, Pen-
tangeli and the student will need to defend what they said if challenged, but
once they are off the record they can admit that what they said was false.
Going on the record
A second problem with an analysis of bald-faced lies as lies is that it miscon-
strues the success conditions of the speech act. The purpose of bald-faced
lies is often described as that Pentangeli and other bald-faced liars want
to ‘go on the record’ with what they said. The desire to ‘go on the record’
is referred to by for instance Stokke (2013), Sorensen (2007) and Carson
(2006) to argue that bald-faced lies must be assertions and hence lies; the
bald-faced liar wants her speech act to be ‘recorded’ and this supposedly
only happens through assertion and not through fiction because fiction
involves only temporary acceptance. However, there is little consensus on
what ‘going on the record’ means exactly. I take some agent a putting some
statement p ‘on the record’ as meaning that a ensures that it becomes stable
common ground that p was part of a certain conversation or discourse d.
This means that the bald-faced liar who says p does not actually propose a
stable common ground update with p (as in the case of assertion), but with
something of the form ‘In/According to conversation d, p’. In other words,
Pentangeli does not propose that anyone actually persistently accepts or
believes that he knew no Godfather – and that this becomes stable common
ground. This is irrelevant for Pentangeli and the Godfather.9 Rather, what’s
important for the success of his bald-faced lie is that it becomes common
ground that he said the right things during the hearing.10 Specifically, he
needs the Godfather (one of Pentangeli’s hearers in the courtroom) to be-
lieve this. Such an update of the common ground will actually ensure that
Corleone is not convicted (and hence save Pentangeli’s family). Pentangeli’s
bald-faced lie is thus successful if something like the following hedged or
modalized proposition becomes stable common ground: ‘According to the
courtroom proceedings, Pentangeli did not know the Godfather’. Similarly,
8See section 5.4.3 on disagreement with a bald-faced liar.
9Pentangeli only cares about people temporarily accepting that he knew no Godfather in
so far as that what happens in the courtroom conversation determines what becomes
part of proceedings. In other words, he needs people to ‘play along’ in court but nobody
needs to persistently accept what he said as part of the (official) common ground.
10Cf. Leland (2015); Dynel (2011); Harris (forthcoming).
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the student’s speech act is successful if it becomes stable common ground
between him and the dean that he did not confess but rather explicitly de-
nied having cheated, i.e., that ‘According to the conversation in the dean’s
office, the student did not cheat on the exam’.
5.3.2 Bald-faced lies as fictional statements
I propose, contra Stokke, to analyse bald-faced lies as fictional statements.11
An analysis of bald-faced lies as fictional statements allows us an inde-
pendent choice of strategy in dealing with lies in the common ground
framework, i.e., the moderate psychologistic turn is still available.
For a psychologistic version of the unofficial common ground accounts,
an analysis of bald-faced lies as fictional statements would entail that Pen-
tangeli’s speech act (being a fictional statement) is analysed as a proposal to
update (or create) the hearer’s conception of the unofficial common ground
of the courtroom conversation (and assertions and lies as proposals to up-
date the hearer’s conception of the belief-based official common ground).
Assuming it was already official common ground who Pentangeli and the













In a psychologistic version of the workspace account an analysis of bald-
faced lies as fictional statements entails that, whereas assertions and lies
trigger assertive closure, fictional statements and bald-faced lies trigger
fictive closure. In other words, the content of the hearer’s conception of
the workspace (e.g., that Frodo had a very trying time that afternoon or
that Pentangeli knew no Godfather) is not added directly to the hearer’s
11This understanding of bald-faced lies comes closest to Maitra’s (2018) who discusses
similarities between bald-faced lies and the utterances of an actor on stage. However,
Maitra has a different understanding of ‘going on the record’ that is deemed irrelevant
to what the actor and bald-faced liar do. Moreover, I prefer to stick with the term
‘fictional statement’ so as to not exclude the possibility of written bald-faced lies.
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conception of what is common belief. Rather, it is added to the hearer’s con-
ception of what is common belief as modalized, parafictional information,
i.e., respectively under the ‘In/According to The Lord of the Rings’-operator






























An advantage of an analysis of bald-faced lies as fictional statements is
that it enables us to make sense of the fact that the propositions expressed
by bald-faced lies are only accepted temporarily.12 If we adopt an analy-
sis of bald-faced lies as fictional statements in Stokke’s unofficial common
ground account, bald-faced lies and fictional statements update a temporary
unofficial common ground, i.e., the interlocutors temporarily accept that
Pentangeli knew no Godfather or that Frodo had a trying time some after-
noon. At the end of the discourse – as the hearing ends or as we stop reading
The Lord of the Rings – the unofficial common ground evaporates. Hence
the content expressed by the bald-faced lie is only accepted temporarily.
12On an Eckardt-style version of the account (see chapter 3), unofficial common grounds
are non-temporary so this aspect of bald-faced lies remains unaccounted for.
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In the workspace account, bald-faced lies and fictional statements update
a temporary workspace during the discourse. At the end of the discourse,
fictive closure is triggered and the expressed propositions – that Pentangeli
knew no Godfather or that Frodo had a trying time some afternoon – are no
longer accepted in their unembedded form (but a prefixed version is added
to the hearer’s conception of the stable common ground). Hence, as in the
unofficial common ground account, the content expressed by the bald-faced
lie is only accepted temporarily.
Going on the record
Another advantage of the analysis of bald-faced lies as fictional statements
is that in the workspace account it allows us to account for the fact that
bald-faced lies are successful if they ‘go on the record’. I have argued that
Pentangeli’s and the student’s bald-faced lies are proposals to make it stable
common ground that ‘According to the courtroom proceedings, he knew
no Godfather’ and ‘According to the conversation in the dean’s office, the
student did not cheat on the exam’. Crucially, these are parafictional state-
ments of the form ‘In/According to story s, φ’ (i.e., sφ). In the workspace
account, a bald-faced lie p (or a fictional statement p) is analysed as ulti-
mately a proposal to make the hearer’s conception of what is common belief
include s p. Hence the workspace account can model how the bald-faced
liar succeeds at ‘going on the record’ with their speech act, i.e., making s p
stable common ground (assuming that the bald-faced liar also believes that
their speech act was successful). In the unofficial common ground accounts
there are no parafictional updates of the official common ground at the
end of fictional discourse and hence this aspect of bald-faced lies remains
unaccounted for.13
5.4 Possible objections
Now that I have made my case why, in terms of common ground updates,
the bald-faced lie is much more akin to a fictional statement than to a lie, I
will introduce five possible objections to this analysis and offer replies.
13As discussed in chapter 3, we could model parafictional information as ‘stored’ in the




5.4.1 Non-fictional parafictional updates
A possible objection to the analysis outlined above is that updates of the
form ‘According to the courtroom proceedings, he knew no Godfather’
are also possible in non-fictional discourse. For instance, Stalnaker (2002)
maintains that, since speech acts are so-called ‘manifest events’, as a side
effect of a asserting p, it will also become common ground that a said p in
some conversation or discourse d. Arguably, if it is also common ground that
a’s assertion was accepted, this will imply that it was common ground in d
that p (or d p). So can ‘going on the record’ not also be achieved through
regular assertions or lies?
Although I agree that people can also ‘go on the record’ with non-fictional
discourse, this does not establish that bald-faced lies could just as well
be analysed as regular assertions. The crucial difference between fictional
statements and assertions is that this ‘parafictional update’ in the case of
non-fiction is a non-essential update (as it is for Stalnaker) whereas it is an
essential update in the case of fiction. In other words, when a asserts p, a
proposes to make p common ground (through the workspace), not to make
p and d p common ground. On the other hand, when a fictionally states p,
a proposes to make d p common ground (through the workspace). Hence
an assertion is also successful if the parafictional update does not take place
but a fictional statement is not (e.g., Tolkien’s fictional statement (25) is not
successful if, after reading The Lord of the Rings, it is not common ground that
in The Lord of the Rings, Frodo had a very trying time). This is why bald-faced
lies are like fictional statements; a bald-faced lie p is only successful if we
temporarily accept p and as a result of that the common ground is updated
with d p.
Moreover, even if we would (contra Stalnaker) construe assertions as
involving a parafictional update as part of their essential updates (i.e., define
assertions as proposals to update the common ground with p and d p
and fictional statements as proposals to update the common ground with
d p), bald-faced lies would still be more like fictional statements precisely
because (like fictional statements) their success does not depend on whether
the common ground is updated with the content they express but only on
whether it is updated with the relevant parafictional update.
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5.4.2 Commitments in bald-faced lie scenarios
Another possible objection to the current proposal is that conversations in
institutional settings, such as in a courtroom or in the dean’s office, seem to
be eminent models of conversations where what people commit themselves
to (i.e., what ‘goes on the record’) is essential for determining subsequent
actions and sanctions in the real world. Bald-faced lies such as Pentangeli’s
and the student’s take place in such contexts and hence it is counterintuitive
to analyse them as akin to fictional statements. Fictional statements do
not impose commitments on speakers like assertions do, so how can they
determine possible sanctions? In response to this, I suggest that in fact the
whole conversation in a bald-faced lie scenario can be understood as a
pretend-conversation. To make this intuitive, suppose that Pentangeli had
in fact wanted to harm the Godfather and testified against him in court (or
that the student, for some reason, wanted to be punished and confessed in
the dean’s office):
(52) Yes, I knew the Godfather.
In this scenario it still does not matter to Pentangeli whether anyone some-
how comes to accept or believe that he knew the Godfather. Actually, ev-
eryone already believes this and Pentangeli is aware of this. So, again, his
utterance of p is not aimed at making p persistent common ground.14 To re-
ally hurt the Godfather, Pentangeli needs it to become common ground that
‘According to the courtroom proceedings, Pentangeli knew the Godfather’.
Again, the speech act is aimed at a parafictional update that results from
fictive closure:
14Harris (forthcoming) makes the similar point that a witness who already admitted
everything on the courthouse steps, with everyone present who is also in the courtroom,



















So not only bald-faced lies but also other utterances that could be made
in bald-faced lie scenarios (e.g., (52)) should be understood as fictional
statements.15
Likewise, the whole conversation in the courtroom or in the dean’s office
can be understood as a kind of pretend-conversation, i.e., as consisting of
fictional statements.16 Even if everyone present in court already knows that
someone is in fact guilty, still the parties involved will speak as if they do
not yet know this and are trying to establish what happened based on the
available testimonies and evidence. As Keiser (2016) helpfully suggests,
the courtroom conversation is much like a proof; you may not assume its
conclusion even if you already know it to be true. What determines potential
sanctions is what we eventually have been able to ‘prove’ or establish as
‘true according to the courtroom conversation’. For instance, even though
it may be common ground that someone is guilty, if we cannot ‘prove’
this in an institutional setting, they are considered legally innocent. Hence,
even though the conversations in court or in the dean’s office are pretend-
conversations, the commitments made within these conversations are pivotal
for determining subsequent action; the way the pretend-conversation pro-
gresses will determine the relevant parafictional data and this data in turn
has ‘real world’ legal consequences.
15Not all possible utterances in bald-faced lie scenarios constitute continuations of the
shared pretence. See footnote 18.
16In this respect the analysis is similar to Keiser’s (2016) account according to which bald-
faced lies are moves in language games; Pentangeli makes a move in the courtroom
game by which he avoids scoring points against the Godfather. In the workspace
account these language games are understood as pretend-conversations and ‘scoring
points’ is analysed as ensuring that the desired parafictional updates take place.
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Additionally, this analysis explains why Pentangeli and the student are
being asked questions in the first place that are somehow ‘insincere’ be-
cause the person asking already knows the answer to them; in the pretend-
conversation the questions asked are sincere because it is part of the pretence
that the questioner does not yet know the answer to them. Moreover, the
analysis accounts for a special feature of courtroom talk of being able to
‘scratch’ or undo statements. A similar ‘scratching’ is possible in pretend
play where you can stop and rewind pretend scenarios to revise what will
eventually be true in the fiction.17 By contrast, taking back something you
have asserted requires retraction of something that was said; you cannot
simply replay the discourse and make it true that you never said it.
5.4.3 Disagreement with a bald-faced liar
In line with the previous concern, Marques (2020) has recently argued that
the fact that we can (and often do) disagree with bald-faced liars shows that
bald-faced lies cannot be fictional statements. People contradict bald-faced
lies because it is important for them to ‘set the record straight’. We don’t feel
compelled to (and shouldn’t) contradict fictional discourse. For instance,
you wouldn’t interrupt an actor on stage because you believe that they
uttered a falsity.
The analysis of bald-faced lie conversations as pretend-conversations
explains why people can (and often will) disagree with a bald-faced liar
in institutional settings. The disagreement takes place within the pretend-
conversation and is crucial for determining what eventually is parafictional
truth. Although I agree with Marques that we shouldn’t disagree with
an actor on a stage, this is because, as an audience member, you cannot
influence fictional truth. However, scripted performances are not the only
kind of fictional discourse. Courtroom conversations are probably more akin
to unscripted pretend-discourse (e.g., ‘improv’ or role-playing games) which
can involve disagreement. Consider the following pretend-conversation:
17This seems to be what the senator questioning Pentangeli initially attempts in reply to the
bald-faced lie: “Mr. Pentangeli, you – you are contradicting a sworn statement you’ve
previously made to me and signed. I ask you again, sir, here and now under oath: Were
you at any time a member of a crime organization headed by Michael Corleone?”
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(54) Tineke: Help! A dragon is approaching. Flee!
John: Don’t worry, it is actually a unicorn.
Tineke: Eh, no... It really is a dragon and now it’s spitting fire on you!
Here two ‘actors’ engaged in a pretend-conversation are both equally li-
censed to determine what is fictionally common ground and hence what is
true in their game of pretence. There is no real disagreement between Tineke
and John whether there is a dragon approaching (it is stable common ground
that dragons do not exist) but there is a temporary pretend-disagreement.
Their pretend-disagreement over what kind of creature they are facing influ-
ences whether, after the pretend play, the parafictional information that “In
the pretend play, a dragon approached John and Tineke” is stable common
ground or not.
Similarly, the senator questioning Pentangeli or the dean questioning the
student can disagree with the bald-faced liar and push their interlocutor on
what they said within the pretend-discourse. Although the questioners them-
selves would probably not be allowed to respond with “That’s not true/a
lie”,18 they can report on someone having directly contradicted the bald
faced liar. The bald-faced liar, or another party in the pretend-conversation
that wants the content expressed by the bald-faced lie to become parafic-
tional truth, will then respond by defending the bald-faced lie. Hence we
can expect, as Marques also notes, that bald-faced liars will often accuse the
party that contradicts them of being the liars. For instance, the courtroom
discourse in The Godfather II continues as follows:
(55) Senator: We have a sworn affidavit – we have it – your sworn affidavit
that you murdered on the orders of Michael Corleone. [...]
Pentangeli: Look, the FBI guys, they promised me a deal. So, so I
18 Since it is part of the institutionalized pretend play that the conversation is a cooperative
information exchange where the questioner is trying to find out what happened, the
dean’s or senator’s utterance of “That’s a lie/false” would be inadmissible. In these
contexts such a statement would not serve its ordinary function of signalling that an
attempt to deceive has failed. Rather, it functions like a notification that the questioner is
refusing to play along with the bald-faced liar and terminates the pretend-discourse. In
some bald-faced lie scenarios (e.g., the cheating husband or chicken thief scenarios de-
scribed in section 5.4.4) such a refusal would be an admissible move but in institutional
settings, officials such as the dean and the senator are not allowed to ‘break character’
in this way. Arguably, another witness could potentially accuse the bald-faced liar of
lying without breaking character in the pretend scenario).
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made up a lot of stuff about Michael Corleone ‘cause that’s what
they wanted. But – But it was all lies. Uh... everything!
Again, there is no real disagreement between the senator and Pentangeli
over whether Pentangeli knew the Godfather; it is stable common ground
that he did. There is, however, a temporary pretend-disagreement between
the interlocutors, through which both the senator and Pentangeli attempt to
fix the record (i.e., influence the parafictional information that eventually
becomes stable common ground).
5.4.4 The point of fiction and bald-faced lies
An additional possible concern with my view is that bald-faced lies and
fictional statements seem to differ essentially in the point of the speech acts.
Both Pentangeli’s and Tolkien’s speech acts can be construed as proposals
to update the workspace and trigger fictive closure, but only for Pentangeli
does the parafictional update really seem to be the point of the speech act;
the point of Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings is to make its readers imagine its
content (which involves updating the workspace) and enjoy that experience,
not to stock up on parafictional beliefs.
First, it is important to note that it is unclear whether a difference in the
point of bald-faced lies and fictional statements is relevant for deciding
what kind of speech acts bald-faced lies are; why people are performing
some speech act (e.g., telling a fictional story) seems to be an essentially
different question from whether people are performing this speech act. Still,
it is interesting to see whether and why the motivation behind performing
these two types of speech acts may diverge.
Second, it is not obvious that this difference in motivation generalizes to
all stereotypical fictional statements. Suppose the CEO of a firm calls in an
employee, Mike, after Mike disagreed with him during a meeting. The CEO
tells the following story:
(56) Listen, Mike. Once upon a time there was an annoying little midget
that pissed on a giant’s cake. Do you want to know what the giant
did to the midget? He ate him, Mike.
Is the point of this fictional story to make Mike temporarily imagine a story
about giants and midgets or is the point of this story to make Mike believe
that ‘In the CEO’s story, the giant eats the midget that bothered him’ and
draw the ‘appropriate’ lessons from that?
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Third, even if the point of fiction is generally to make its audience en-
tertain its content, sometimes this is the point of a bald-faced lie as well.
Pentangeli’s statement in court and the student’s statement in the dean’s
office are examples of bald-faced lies in rule-bound institutional settings.
However, bald-faced lies can also be more spontaneous. Meibauer (2014)
discusses the case of a cheating husband who tells his wife that he has
spent the night in his office while it is common knowledge that he was with
his lover. Or consider Cargile’s (1970) bald-faced lie scenario in which a
man catches his son-in-law in his chicken coop at 5 AM holding two dead
chickens. The son in law then says:
(57) My coming by must have frightened the thief away.
Arguably, the aim of these bald-faced lies is to make the people involved
entertain or uphold a favourable narrative about their marriage or family
relations (not to obtain parafictional beliefs about such a narrative). Such
bald-faced lies are thus in this sense even more like stereotypical pretend-
discourse than Pentangeli’s speech act. This suggests that, if there is a
difference in the point of bald-faced lies and fictional statements, it is a
gradual difference where bald-faced lies and fictional statements lie on a
continuum; they are similar in the sense that both result in parafictional
updates but bald-faced lies can be more or less like stereotypical fictional
statements depending on whether the point of the speech act is also to
obtain this result.
5.4.5 Blameworthiness
The last potential worry with the analysis outlined above is that bald-faced
lies and fictional statements seem to differ essentially with respect to blame-
worthiness; whereas the bald-faced liar is blameworthy for saying some-
thing false (e.g., Pentangeli can be convicted of perjury), someone who tells
a stereotypical fictional story (e.g., Tolkien) is not blameworthy – rather, they
are praiseworthy – for stating something false. If Pentangeli is just telling a
fictional story, why should he be any more blameworthy than Tolkien?
First, although we can deem some bald-faced liars (e.g., the student)
blameworthy (contra Sorensen (2007)), blameworthiness does not extend to
all bald-faced lie scenarios.19 Can we really blame the couple in the cheating
19It is not even clear that blameworthiness extends to all lies. Is the white liar blameworthy?
Or the liar that saves innocent people with their lie?
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husband scenario or the father and son-in-law in the chicken thief scenario
for pretending their relation is better than it is? Moreover, many examples of
bald-faced lies in institutional settings (e.g., the case of Pentangeli) involve
some kind of coercion into making a particular statement. The Godfather
was non-verbally threatening to hurt Pentangeli’s family if he would testify
against him. Can we really blame Pentangeli for working the system to
protect his family?
Second, in cases where the bald-faced liar does seem to be blameworthy
(to some extent) I follow Maitra (2018) who argues that this is because of
an implicit or explicit ‘honor code’ that requires the bald-faced liar to not
just ‘tell some story’ but be truthful in the relevant context. The parafictional
updates that result from their speech acts should reflect what we know is
really the case.20 For instance, the student is blameworthy for (by telling a
fictional story) creating an unfair academic advantage for himself compared
to the other students. Likewise, Pentangeli is to some extent blameworthy for
creating an unfair trial. Such honor codes are not in place when people tell
stereotypical fictional stories or in the described cases of spontaneous bald-
faced lying. Moreover, given that there is an implicit or explicit expectation
for the courtroom (or conversation with the dean) proceedings to track
the truth, bald-faced liars can also be construed as being blameworthy for
(indirectly) deceiving an potential third party that is not aware of the falsity
of the bald-faced liar’s statement and would read the proceedings expecting
them to be truthful.
5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter I have explicated different possible strategies to model lies
in Stalnaker’s common ground framework; we can either switch to an
acceptance-based conception of the stable (official) common ground or we
can take a moderate psychologistic turn and define speech acts as proposals
to update the hearer’s belief-based presuppositions. I have argued that an
analysis of bald-faced lies as fictional statements is superior to an analysis of
bald-faced lies as lies. The analysis of bald-faced lies as fictional statements
20In other words, certain content expressed in the courtroom conversation must be viable
for export (see section 4.6.2). Similarly, authors of fiction can be blameworthy if they
intentionally include falsities in a novel that is expected to be realistic with respect to a
certain cluster of facts.
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allows us to account for the temporary acceptance of the content expressed
by the bald-faced lie. In a workspace account it also allows us to adequately
model the success condition of the bald-faced lie of ‘going on the record’ as
consisting in a parafictional update. In response to possible objections I have
argued that even if non-fictional statements also involve a ‘parafictional’
update, this does not constitute an essential update of the speech act as
it does in the case of bald-faced lies and fictional statements. Second, the
analysis of bald-faced lies as fictional statements can be extended to the
entire conversation in bald-faced lie scenarios. This allows us to explain
(amongst other things) why, even when p is common ground, testifying p
is just as relevant as testifying ¬p and why people can disagree with bald-
faced liars. Last, I have aimed to defuse some worries about supposedly
essential differences between bald-faced lies and fictional statements such
as the point of the speech act and blameworthiness.
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6 The challenge of metafictional
anaphora
This chapter is a rewritten version of ‘The Challenge of Metafictional
Anaphora’ in At the Intersection of Language, Logic, and Information (itself
a rewritten version of the paper ‘Metafictional anaphora: A comparison
of different accounts’ in Proceedings of the 2018 ESSLLI Student Session).
Parts of section 6.4.3 are adapted from ‘Revisiting the ‘wrong kind of
object’ problem’ which is a co-authored paper with Prof. Dr. Edward
N. Zalta in Organon F. The most substantial differences between this
chapter and the volume contribution are: First, a removal of the intro-
duction to the basics of the workspace account. Second, the addition
of the suggestion to design more uniform fictive closure* and fictive
closure** operations by combining them with a de re version of the
workspace account (see especially 6.4.3). Third, the incorporation of
insights from the co-authored paper with Prof. Dr. Edward N. Zalta
‘Revisiting the ‘wrong kind of object’ problem’, i.e., the specification
of the desideratum posed by mixed discourse (see section 6.2.2) and
details on how object theory may deal with the seeming reoccurrence
of the problem of the wrong kind of object for explicit parafictional
statements (see section 6.4.3).
6.1 Introduction
Up until this point in developing the workspace account (as a framework
to model regular assertions, lies, fictional statements and parafictional dis-
course) I have assumed a simple ‘descriptivist’ analysis of parafictional
updates (see section 4.6.1). Consider fictional statement (25) and parafic-
tional statement (58):
(25) Frodo had a very trying time that afternoon.
I would like to thank Edward Zalta for a very enjoyable and fruitful collaboration
and would like to thank four anonymous ESSLLI Student Session reviewers for their
valuable feedback.
117
6 The challenge of metafictional anaphora
(58) In The Lord of the Rings, Frodo was born in the Shire.
When engaging with a fictional statements such as (25), the workspace is
(temporarily) updated with the content that there is an entity called ‘Frodo’
and that this entity had a trying time on some afternoon. At fictive clo-
sure, this entire workspace (including discourse referents and conditions) is
copied into the common ground under a The Lord of the Rings fiction operator.
Similarly, a parafictional statement such as (58) updates the common ground
with the modalized information that in The Lord of the Rings, there is an entity
named ‘Frodo’ who was born in the Shire. On the basic descriptivist version
of the workspace account a common ground updated with (25) and (58)
thus looks as follows:
(59)










The current chapter introduces a new type of discourse that will compli-
cate this basic picture: ‘metafictional discourse’. Metafictional statements are
statements about fictional entities as fictional entities. Consider for instance
the following statements:
(6) Frodo was invented by Tolkien.
(60) Frodo is a fictional character.
(61) Elijah Wood has portrayed Frodo.
Sentences (6), (60) and (61) tell us something about Frodo, not as a flesh and
blood individual, but as a fictional character. Although they feature fictional
names, metafictional statements are a type of assertion; (6), (60) and (61) are
not just fictionally true but really true. Moreover, as Lewis (1978) argued,
they cannot be reduced to implicit parafictional discourse by analysing them
as covertly prefixed by a fiction operator; it is not true that in The Lord of the
Rings, Frodo is a fictional character that was invented by Tolkien and that
has been portrayed by Elijah Wood. Rather, the above statements seem to be
simply true statements about some abstract object called ‘Frodo’.
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In this chapter I first specify the exact challenge posed by metafictional
discourse using a recent insight due to Semeijn and Zalta (2021) (section
6.2). We have argued that the possibility of anaphoric dependencies and
co-predication across different types of statements featuring fictional names
establishes a need for a uniform semantic treatment of fictional names across
metafictional and parafictional discourse (but not fictional discourse) that
avoids the so-called ‘problem of the wrong kind of object’ (e.g., we want
to avoid an analysis that implies that a flesh and blood individual was
invented by someone or that an abstract object was born in a certain region).
Second, I argue that in answering this challenge the workspace account runs
into an accessibility problem that is best illustrated by looking at pronominal
anaphora across mixed parafictional/metafictional discourse (henceforth
‘metafictional anaphora’) (section 6.3). This issue generalizes to other cur-
rent dynamic semantic approaches to fiction such as the unofficial common
ground accounts (section 6.3.2). I explore and evaluate four different possi-
ble solutions based on a descriptivist analysis of pronouns (Section 6.4.1),
Maier’s (2017) psychologistic DRT (Section 6.4.2), Zalta’s (1983, 1988) theory
of abstract objects (Section 6.4.3) and Recanati’s (2018) dot-object analysis of
fictional characters (Section 6.4.4).
6.2 The desideratum posed by metafictional
discourse
6.2.1 The problem of the wrong kind of object
The basic puzzle that is posed by metafictional discourse is to provide
a coherent semantic analysis of fictional, parafictional and metafictional
discourse that avoids the problem of the wrong kind of object.1 Prima
facie, we would like to remain ‘semantically innocent’ and assume that
fictional names such as ‘Frodo’ refer uniformly to the same thing in different
contexts. Such a uniformity approach can take two basic forms; an ‘anti-
realist’ approach and a ‘realist’ approach. Both run into variations of the
wrong kind of object problem.
1This term was originally coined by Klauk (2014) for what I call the realist variant of the
problem of the wrong kind of object.
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First, we may adopt an anti-realist analysis of fictional names (e.g., Lewis
(1978); Walton (1990); Maier (2017)) and assume that the name ‘Frodo’ refers
uniformly to a flesh and blood hobbit. Obviously, this hobbit does not exists
in the real world but only exists in the The Lord of the Rings worlds. Hence
we call this the ‘anti-realist’ approach to fictional names. However, such an
approach runs into difficulties with metafictional statements. Surely, a flesh
and blood hobbit (that had a trying time and was born in the Shire) is not
the right kind of object to also be a fictional character (that was invented by
Tolkien and portrayed by Elijah Wood). This is the anti-realist variant of the
problem of the wrong kind of object.
Alternatively, we may adopt a realist analysis of fictional names (e.g.,
Zalta (1983, 1988); van Inwagen (1977)) and assume that the name ‘Frodo’
refers uniformly to an abstract object. Insofar as abstract objects exist, they
exist in the real world. Hence we call this approach the ‘realist’ approach:
fictional names (e.g., ‘Frodo’) refer to things that actually exist (i.e., an
abstract object). A realist approach to fictional names runs into difficulties
with the interpretation of fictional statements such as (25) and parafictional
statements such as (58). Surely, abstract objects (e.g., fictional characters) are
not the right kind of objects to be having trying times or to be born in the
Shire. This is the realist variant of the problem of the wrong kind of object.
6.2.2 Mixed discourse
A prima facie attractive response to the problem of the wrong kind of
object is to give up semantic innocence (e.g., Kripke (2011); Currie (1990)).
Apparently fictional names, unlike regular proper names, are ambiguous.
A name such as ‘Frodo’ refers to a flesh and blood hobbit in fictional and
parafictional statements, and to an abstract object in metafictional statements.
This approach avoids both variants of the problem of the wrong kind of
object.
Although we will see that there is a grain of truth in an analysis that posits
some kind of ambiguity in fictional names, the simple approach sketched
above will not do. A widely discussed problem with this strategy is the om-
nipresence and naturalness of anaphoric dependencies and co-predication
across discourse that mixes parafictional and metafictional statements. For
instance, consider the following statements:
(62) Bond is a killer but remains as popular as ever. (Collins, 2019, p.1)
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(63) Morris Zapp, David Lodge’s most colorful character, is a reader-
response theorist modeled on Stanley Fish. (Everett, 2013, p.166)
(64) Sherlock Holmesi is a fictional character created by Conan Doyle.
In Conan Doyle’s stories, hei is a private detective who investigates
cases for a variety of clients, including Scotland Yard. (Adapted from
Recanati, 2018, p.37)
Sentences (62) and (63) are examples of co-predication of metafictional prop-
erties and (implicit) parafictional properties that apply to the same fictional
name. Sentence (63) expresses that Morris Zapp is a reader-response theorist
(implicit parafictional information) but also that Moris Zapp is modeled
on Stanley Fish (metafictional information). Similarly, (62) expresses that
Bond is a killer (implicit parafictional information) and that he remains
as popular as ever (metafictional information: Bond does not remain “as
popular as ever” in the fiction). Prima facie, the fact that a metafictional and
an implicit parafictional predicate can simultaneously predicate over the
same fictional name suggests that names such as ‘Morris Zapp’ cannot be
ambiguous (i.e., refer to different things in parafictional and metafictional
discourse). In a similar vein, (64) is an example of anaphoric dependency
across a metafictional and subsequent explicit parafictional statement. The
parafictional statement contains a pronoun ‘he’ that is anaphorically de-
pendent on the name ‘Frodo’ introduced in the preceding metafictional
statement. Standardly, we take this to mean that the two terms (i.e., ‘Sher-
lock Holmes’ in the metafictional statement and ‘he’ in the parafictional
statement) co-refer. Again we have a prima facie reason to forgo an analysis
that posits an ambiguity between fictional terms used in metafictional as
oppposed to parafictional contexts.
Based on the perceived admissability and naturalness of co-predication
and anaphoric dependencies in such mixed discourses, we might conclude
that there is a strong argument for general semantic innocence, i.e., the
debate on mixed discourse establishes the need for a uniform semantic
treatment of fictional names across the different statements that may feature
them. However, as Semeijn and Zalta (2021) have argued, this conclusion
may be too quick. In fact, the existing literature only offers examples of co-
predication and anaphoric dependencies across (implicit or explicit) parafic-
tional and metafictional discourse. Attempts at anaphoric dependencies
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across parafictional and fictional, or metafictional and fictional discourse
are decidedly less natural. Consider the following examples:2
(65) In the story I made up yesterday, a wizard called Briani falls in love
with a cauldron. Let me tell it to you: One day, hei was alone in hisi
study trying out a new love-potion recipe... (Semeijn and Zalta, 2021,
p. 6)
(66) In order to capture the witch, Maryi travelled to the woods and
disguised herself as a potato.* In the woods shei encountered many
perils...
*I know this is weird but I invented heri while eating chips. (Semeijn and
Zalta, 2021, p. 6-7)
Although (65) and (66) are interpretable, they sound very awkward. In or-
der to construe example discourses that clearly mix fictional discourse with
parafictional or metafictional discourse (rather than implicit parafictional
discourse with explicit parafictional or metafictional discourse), the begin-
ning or interruption of the fictional discourse has to be clearly marked in
the language (e.g., By “Let me tell it to you" in (65) or by inserting a footnote
in (66)). This is why it is extremely challenging to come up with examples of
co-predication across mixed fictional and meta- or parafictional discourse.
Moreover, these clearly marked ‘boundaries’ of the fictional discourse make
anaphoric dependencies across them as in (65) and (66) sound very unnatu-
ral. (65) would become more natural if we repeated the name ‘Brian’ at the
start of the fictional discourse (or even better “Once upon a time there was
a wizard named Brian who...”). Similarly, (66) would become more natural
if we repeated the name ‘Mary’ in the metafictional footnote (or even better
“this character”).
In other words, although the literature on mixed discourse does estab-
lish a desideratum that the semantic treatment of fictional names across
parafictional and metafictional discourse is uniform, an ambiguity analysis
with respect to fictional names in fictional discourse (versus fictional names
in parafictional and metafictional discourse) is still a viable option. The
act of story-telling seems to be importantly distinct from parafictional and
metafictional discourse.
2See the appendix for (attempts at) anaphoric dependencies across all possible types of
mixed discourse with fictional, parafictional and metafictional statements.
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The current challenge for semanticists of fiction is thus to offer a uniform
semantic account of parafictional and metafictional statements (so as to
account for the admissibility of co-predication and anaphoric dependencies
across parafictional and metafictional mixed discourse rather than only
being able to account for these statements in isolation) that avoids the
problem of the wrong kind of object in its different variants. In the dynamic
framework of DRT this desideratum entails that we require parafictional
and metafictional discourse to update on the same discourse referents. It
seems that we are back at the two basic strategies described in section 6.2.1:
assuming an analysis of parafictional discourse as embedded assertions (see
chapter 4), we can adopt a realist approach where discourse referents for
fictional entities are available in the main DRS (e.g., It is common ground
that there is an abstract object named Frodo) or an anti-realist (descriptivist)
approach where these discourse referents are embedded under the relevant
fiction operator (e.g., It is common ground that in The Lord of the Rings there
is flesh and blood hobbit named Frodo):
Realist approach Anti-realist (descriptivist) approach
x
Frodo(x)




In the current descriptivist version of the workspace account, parafictional
discourse operates on discourse referents that are embedded under fiction
operators. Hence the workspace account is anti-realist: Frodo only exists in
the The Lord of the Rings worlds where he is a flesh and blood hobbit. In this
section I will show that this version of the workspace account runs into a
specific technical problem of accessibility when dealing with metafictional
discourse.
Here it is helpful to consider that the current challenge to give correct
interpretations of all admissible forms of co-predication and anaphoric
dependencies across parafictional and metafictional discourse subdivides
into three challenges: First, account for discourse where a fictional name
is introduced in a parafictional statement and a metafictional statement
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contains a pronoun anaphorically dependent on that, i.e., ‘metafictional
anaphora’ (e.g., (67)); second, account for discourse where a fictional name
is introduced in a metafictional statement and a parafictional statement
contains a pronoun anaphorically dependent on that, i.e., ‘parafictional
anaphora’ (e.g., (68)); and third, account for cases of co-predication involving
both parafictional and metafictional predicates (e.g., (69)):
(67) In The Lord of the Rings, Frodoi goes through an immense mental
struggle to save hisi friends. Ah yes, hei is an intriguing fictional
character!
(68) Frodoi is an intriguing fictional character. In The Lord of the Rings, hei
goes through an immense mental struggle to save hisi friends.
(69) Frodo is an intriguing fictional character that goes through an im-
mense mental struggle to save his friends.
In the following I mainly focus on the challenge posed by metafictional
anaphora (Section 6.3.1) because this type of discourse gives rise to accessi-
bility issues in the workspace account. Before turning to possible solutions
in section 6.4, I will also show how accessibility issues generalize to other
anti-realist dynamic approaches that also embed discourse referents for
fictional entities (Section 6.3.2).
6.3.1 Metafictional anaphora in the workspace account
Consider how our central example of metafictional anaphora (67) updates
the common ground in the workspace account. Both sentences in (67) (a
parafictional statement about The Lord of the Rings and a metafictional state-
ment about Frodo) are assertions and hence trigger assertive closure on a
workspace updated with (67). First, we open up a workspace and update it











Next, we update the workspace with the metafictional statement in (67). As
noted in the introduction, metafictional statements are not covertly embed-
ded under ‘In fiction s’-operators. In other words, there is no implicit ‘In
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The pronoun ‘he’ in the metafictional statement in (67) triggers a presup-
position that there is a masculine entity (denoted by the dashed box) and
we update with the information that this masculine entity is an intriguing
fictional character. The pronoun ‘he’ is anaphoric on the name ‘Frodo’ in-
troduced in the preceding parafictional statement. Normally, we represent
this by equating their discourse referents (i.e., resolving the presupposi-
tion and replacing all occurrences of y with x) so that the resulting update
of the metafictional statement in (67) is ‘intriguing(x)’. However, follow-
ing standard DRT-rules, x is not accessible outside of the ‘In The Lord of
the Rings’-operator and hence the presupposition remains unresolved. The
workspace account thus predicts that we cannot update the workspace with
(and thus interpret) discourse involving metafictional anaphora such as
in (67). Obviously, we can interpret (67) and hence we need to adjust our
theory.
Related issues may arise with some cases of co-predication with mixed
metafictional and parafictional discourse, i.e., when a fictional name is intro-
duced in metafictional and parafictional discourse ‘simultaneously’. In gen-
eral terms, discourse referents introduced by parafictional or metafictional
discourse have to be accessible to subsequent parafictional and metafictional
statements to account for all admissible anaphoric dependencies. The DRT
formalism thus shows that a dynamic approach that involves quarantining
of fictional content under a fiction operator quickly runs into difficulties
with discourse that involves anaphoric dependencies across metafictional
discourse since metafictional statements are unembedded assertions. Al-
though different solutions to this general issue are possible, we will see that
the workspace account is pushed into the direction of a realist approach
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where all discourse referents for fictional entities are moved to the main box
to ensure they are always accessible.
6.3.2 Metafictional anaphora in the unofficial common
ground accounts
The problem of accessibility introduced by metafictional anaphora general-
izes to other current dynamic approaches to fiction that involve some type
of embedding or separation of the content and discourse referents of the
fictional narrative.3 For instance, in Stokke’s (2013; 2018) and in an Eckardt-
style (2014) unofficial common ground account (see chapter 3), fictional
and parafictional statements update a separated unofficial common ground
related to the relevant fiction whereas metafictional statements, being a type
of assertion, update the official common ground related to actual states of













Although it is in principle formally possible to make the discourse referents
of fictional entities accessible outside of the unofficial common grounds
where they were introduced, this is inconsistent with the motivation for
having separate unofficial common grounds for fiction. Namely, that the
content of fictional narratives is somehow quarantined from information
about actual states of affairs. Moreover, in Stokke’s framework unofficial
common grounds are – unlike the official common ground – temporary (i.e.,
they exist for the purpose and duration of the (para)fictional discourse).
Making these temporary discourse referents accessible outside of the unoffi-
cial common grounds would lead to even more difficulties. Hence, in the
unofficial common ground accounts, the presupposition triggered by the
metafictional anaphora in (67) cannot straightforwardly be resolved because
the discourse referent for ‘Frodo’ is not accessible outside of the unofficial
common ground.
3With the possible exception of Maier’s cognitive framework (see section 6.4.2).
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In the rest of this chapter I describe and evaluate four different strategies to
meet the described challenge of metafictional anaphora in the workspace
account.4 First, one can adopt a descriptivist approach and account for
metafictional anaphora in non-dynamic terms (section 6.4.1). Alternatively,
staying in the dynamic semantic framework, one can either stick to a
descriptivist/anti-realist approach and adjust the accessibility relations
(section 6.4.2) or accommodate a new discourse referent that is accessible
through standard accessibility relations. Such a discourse referent can be
understood as an abstract object in a realist framework (section 6.4.3) or
as a dot-object (section 6.4.4). The proposed solutions are evaluated with
respect to whether they can also be extended to account for parafictional
anaphora or co-predication, and whether the solutions avoid the problem
of the wrong kind of object in its different variants.
6.4.1 A descriptivist approach: A description of Frodo
D-type accounts
A possible solution to the described challenge in a traditional semantics
framework is a descriptivist approach to anaphora (e.g., Evans (1977); El-
bourne (2005); Heim (1990)). This analysis was originally proposed as a
solution to the accessibility problem posed by donkey anaphora. Consider
the following donkey sentence:
(73) If Sarah owns a donkey, she beats it.
Intuitively, the pronoun ‘it’ does not refer to a particular individual donkey
but is bounded by ‘a donkey’. However, it is outside of the syntactic scope of
‘a donkey’ and hence inaccessible. On a descriptivist analysis, the anaphoric
pronoun ‘it’ functions like, or ‘goes proxy for’, the definite description ‘the
donkey’ retrieved from the preceding clause. In Elbourne’s D-type account,
this is because NPs at the level of syntax undergo phonetic deletion (are not
pronounced at the surface level) when in the environment of an identical NP
4Prima facie, the discussed solutions can be extended to address the challenge in other
dynamic approaches such as the unofficial common ground accounts. I leave exploration
and evaluation of these parallel solutions to future research.
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(e.g., ‘My shirt is the same as his (shirt)’). Similarly, (73) is in fact equivalent
to (74):
(74) If Sarah owns a donkey, she beats the donkey.
This analysis evades the problem of the unbindable pronoun by replacing it
with a definite description.
Addressing the challenge
When we apply this strategy to our central example of metafictional anaphora
(67), the pronoun ‘he’ is also analysed as going proxy for a definite descrip-
tion retrieved from the previous clause. However, (67) cannot be the result
of simple phonetic deletion of an identical NP. If it were, (67) would be
equivalent to something like (75):
(75) In The Lord of the Rings, Frodo goes through an immense mental
struggle to save his friends. Ah yes, the person named Frodo in The
Lord of the Rings that goes through an immense mental struggle to
save his friends, is an intriguing fictional character!
This gives us an incorrect analysis of (67): A flesh and blood person cannot
be a fictional character. In other words, through simple phonetic deletion
we retrieve the ‘wrong kind of definite description’ from the parafictional
statement and hence run into the anti-realist variant of the problem of the
wrong kind of object.
To get the correct interpretation, what is required is a metafictional descrip-
tion such as ‘the character named Frodo in The Lord of the Rings’ so that (67)
becomes equivalent to (76):
(76) In The Lord of the Rings, Frodo goes through an immense mental
struggle to save his friends. Ah yes, the fictional character named
Frodo in The Lord of the Rings is an intriguing fictional character!
Although (76) gives an acceptable analysis of what is expressed by (67),
it is unclear how to compositionally obtain such a meta-description of
Frodo from the preceding clause. Moreover, even if we assume that we can
accommodate such a definite description for metafictional anaphora, this
solution does not extend to parafictional anaphora such as (68). In such cases
both simple phonetic deletion and accommodation of a meta-description of
Frodo lead to the same incorrect interpretation:
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(77) Frodo is an intriguing fictional character. In The Lord of the Rings, the
fictional character named Frodo goes through an immense mental
struggle to save his friends.
Here we run into the realist variant of the problem of the wrong kind of
object: a fictional character, being an abstract object, cannot go through an
immense mental struggle to save his friends. Deriving the correct interpre-
tation of (68) would thus require accommodation of yet another type of
definite description, i.e., a parafictional description.
Last but not least, it is unclear how an account of phonetic deletion of
NPs can be extended to cases of co-predication in mixed parafictional and
metafictional discourse. For instance, in (69) there is no anaphoric pronoun
that can be analysed as going proxy for a definite description.
Hence, a descriptivist approach does not (as yet) adequately solve the
accessibility issues involved in mixed metafictional and parafictional dis-
course; simple phonetic deletion provides the wrong kind of definite descrip-
tions in the case of metafictional anaphora and hence we need an account of
how to accommodate the right kind of definite descriptions. This fix can, in
turn, not be extended to parafictional anaphora or cases of co-predication.
6.4.2 Psychologistic DRT: Adjusting accessibility
Another possible solution to the problem of metafictional anaphora (that
sticks to a dynamic approach of language and an anti-realist approach
to fictional names) is to adjust the DRS accessibility relations so that the
discourse referent for ‘Frodo’ is accessible.
Psychologistic DRT
Maier (2017) adopts this strategy in his psychologistic DRT framework in
which the context that is updated by statements is an agent’s mental state.
The agent’s mental state is represented as a set of DRS’s that are linked
to cognitive attitudes such as belief (BEL) and imagination (IMG). In line
with the consensus view of fiction interpretation (e.g., Walton (1990); Currie
(1990)), fictional discourse updates the imagination-box and non-fictional
discourse updates the belief-box. Hence, assuming that the agent updates
with (67) after having engaged with The Lord of the Rings – and thus having
previously imagined Frodo – the agent’s mental state after updating with
(67), but before pronoun resolution, looks as follows:
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The parafictional and metafictional statement function similarly in that both,
being assertions, update the belief-box and trigger presuppositions that
need to take as their discourse referent x for ‘Frodo’.5
Although this dynamic semantic framework – like the workspace account
and the unofficial common ground accounts – involves separating the dis-
course referents of fictional entities, there is no accessibility problem because
Maier assumes, contra usual practice, that attitudes can be referentially de-
pendent on attitudes other than belief.6 He gives the example of someone
who wants to buy a new smartphone in a few years and imagines it to
have a flexible transparent screen. This is a desire dependent imagination.
Similarly, doxastic attitudes can be referentially dependent on imagination.
When engaging in The Lord of the Rings I imagine the existence of an entity
named Frodo and when engaging in parafictional or metafictional discourse
such as (67) I believe that in The Lord of the Rings this entity went through
a mental struggle and that this entity is an intriguing fictional character.7
Hence the presuppositions triggered by the metafictional anaphora in (67)
can be resolved; the content of the imagination-box is accessible:
5Here I follow Geurts (1997) in analysing proper names as triggering presuppositions.
6Maier does allow that there may turn out to be some structural constraints on specific
cross-attitudinal dependencies.
7Maier thus offers a uniform anti-realist semantic treatment of fictional names across
parafictional, metafictional and fictional discourse. All different types of discourse
operate on the same discourse referents.
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Extending this strategy to the workspace account would amount to changing
the accessibility relations relative to the content embedded under the ‘In
fiction s’-operator so that the presupposition triggered by the pronoun ‘he’











We can thus stick to the basic anti-realist version of the workspace account:
The name ‘Frodo’ refers in both parafictional and metafictional discourse
to a flesh and blood entity that only exists in The Lord of the Rings worlds.
Such a move would solve the accessibility issues involved in metafictional
anaphora. The solution can also be extended to account for parafictional
anaphora and co-predication in mixed parafictional and metafictional dis-
course. Discourse referents for fictional entities are always embedded under
fiction operators in the common ground. But since such discourse referents
are accessible outside of the embedded DRS, presuppositions that are trig-
gered by subsequent or simultaneous metafictional discourse can always be
resolved.
However, although there may be independent reasons to make the content
in the imagination-box accessible in Maier’s cognitive framework, there are
none for doing this with the ‘In fiction s’-operator, making this an ad hoc
move. More importantly, there are already substantial theoretical costs in
Maier’s cognitive framework to making the content of the imagination-box
accessible (i.e., a highly complex semantic system) but such a move with
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the ‘In fiction s’-operator would amount to a drastic change of the basic
semantics of DRT (in which any type of embedding entails inaccessibility).
Such a radical departure of standard DRT semantics is undesirable.
In fact, the accessibility problem of metafictional anaphora may reappear
in the psychologistic DRT framework as well. Because Maier assumes that
parafictional and metafictional statements are referentially dependent on
existential imagination (induced by fictional statements), he only considers
discourse in which the interpretation of parafictional and metafictional
statements comes after the interpretation of fictional statements. However,
fictional names can also be introduced in parafictional or metafictional
statements. Suppose (67) featured the first occurrence of the name ‘Frodo’. In
this case the fictional name ‘Frodo’ introduced in the parafictional statement
cannot be referentially dependent on a previous act of imagination. In
Maier’s framework, interpretation of such discourse would have to involve
either accommodation of a kind of contentless or minimal imagination
during the parafictional discourse (e.g., imagining that there is a person
named Frodo) or involve local accommodation of a discourse referent in the
belief-box. The latter strategy would result in the following representation













Here the discourse referent for ‘Frodo’ is embedded in the ‘In The Lord of
the Rings’-operator rather than the imagination-box. Making this discourse
referent accessible will lead to the aforementioned problems of changing
the accessibility relations relative to the ‘In fiction s’-operator.
In any case, a solution based on changing the accessibility relations plainly
runs into the anti-realist variant of the problem of the wrong kind of object.
The imagined entity (in terms of the psychologistic DRT framework) or
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the entity that exists in the The Lord of the Rings worlds (in terms of the
workspace account) is a flesh and blood hobbit. If we make the discourse
referent for this object accessible to the metafictional statement in (67), the
metafictional statement will be about this flesh and blood individual. How-
ever, a flesh and blood hobbit cannot be an intriguing fictional character.
Hence, a solution based on Maier’s psychologistic DRT does not ade-
quately solve the problem of metafictional anaphora. It cannot straightfor-
wardly be extended to a workspace account and runs into the anti-realist
version of the problem of the wrong kind of object.
6.4.3 Object theory: Frodo the abstract object
An alternative strategy to address the challenge of metafictional anaphora
is to claim that fictional names in parafictional and metafictional statements











The above DRS formally resembles a DRS you would expect on a de re
version of the workspace account (see section 4.6.1) where fictions that are
about non-fictional entities (e.g., Napoleon in War and Peace) are analysed
as being de re about these entities (rather than about their fictional substi-
tutes). Parafictional discourse about such fictions (e.g., ‘In War and Peace,
Napoleon examines the Pratzen Heights’) thus takes the discourse referent
of an actually existing individual from the main box. However, contrary
to Napoleon, Frodo never really existed. One way to account for this is to
follow Zalta’s application of his logic of abstract objects – ‘object theory’
(Zalta (1983, 1988)) – to fiction and claim that parafictional and metafictional
statements are about abstract objects (e.g., Frodo the fictional character) that
really exist.8
8For details on the object theoretic treatment of fiction see especially Zalta’s (1983) chapter
IV, (1988) chapter 7 and Zalta (2000; 1987]).
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Object theory
Prima facie, this strategy seems to run head first into the realist version of the
problem of the wrong kind of object: both the parafictional and metafictional
statements in (67) operate on a discourse referent for an abstract object, but
surely an abstract object cannot go through an immense mental struggle!
To avoid this problem Zalta distinguishes between two types of objects and
two modes of predication.9 x is an ‘ordinary object’ (‘O!(x)’) if it is, or could
have been, concrete (e.g., Mount Everest). x is an ‘abstract object’ (‘A!(x)’)
just in case it isn’t and could not have been concrete (e.g., the empty set).
An ordinary object like Mount Everest can ‘exemplify’ being 8,848 meters
tall, i.e., it has the property of being 8,848 meters tall in the standard sense.
Zalta denotes this as it would be denoted in standard predicate logic, i.e.,
with the argument to the right of the predicate. Hence, a natural language
statement such as (83) is translated into the formal language of object theory
as follows:
(83) Mount Everest is 8,848 meters tall.
(84) 8,848m-tall(m)10
In contrast, an abstract object can ‘encode’ a property which means it has
this property as one of its constitutive characteristics. What properties an
abstract object encodes are the properties that define the abstract object. For
instance, the empty set encodes the property of having no members. This
is denoted with the argument to the left of the predicate. Hence, a natural
language statement such as (85) is translated as follows:
(85) The empty set has no members.
(86) (∅)memberless
Ordinary objects cannot encode properties but abstract objects can exemplify
properties. For instance, the empty set exemplifies (but does not encode)
being widely discussed; it has this property but it is not a property that is
constitutive of its essence. A statement such as (87) is thus translated as
follows:
(87) The empty set is widely discussed.
9This distinction originally comes from Mally (1912). See also van Inwagen (2000).
10In fact, Zalta uses standard predicate logic notation (i.e., (83) is translated as ‘Tm’). The
current notation is compatible with the standard notation for DRS conditions.
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(88) widely-disc(∅)
Two types of abstract objects are relevant for the object theoretic analysis of
fictional, parafictional and metafictional statements: ‘stories’ and ‘fictional
characters’. A story (e.g., The Lord of the Rings) is an abstract object that
encodes the content of a narrative. It encodes ‘vacuous’ or ‘propositional’
properties of the form ‘being such that φ is true’, where φ is a proposition
that is true in the story. A fictional character is an abstract object that is native
to a story (e.g., Frodo or the One Ring, but not Napoleon).
The abstract object theoretic analysis of parafictional discourse differs
substantially from the Lewisian analysis. Contrary to common practice,
Zalta draws a strong distinction between the analysis of explicit parafictional
statements such as (58) and implicit parafictional statements such as (89):
(89) Frodo was born in the Shire.
This is because Zalta is a realist about fictional characters (i.e., they exist as
abstract objects) and hence we can talk about them as we do about ordinary
objects (i.e., without an ‘In fiction s’-operator or some type of pretence). A
statement such as (89) is thus actually not ‘implicit’ in the sense that it is
covertly embedded. Rather, it is a plain statement about what properties a
certain abstract object encodes:
(90) ( f )born.in.Shire
Explicit parafictional statements (e.g., (58)) on the other hand do contain
an ‘In fiction s’-operator (i.e., Σs). However, this is not a classical Lewisian
fiction operator (i.e., s). Explicit parafictional statements are statements
about specific encoding and exemplifying relations between stories and
characters. For instance, (58) expresses that The Lord of the Rings encodes the
vacuous property of being such that Frodo exemplifies living in the Shire:
(91) Σlotrborn.in.Shire( f )
Zalta proves a theorem in his theory:
(92) ∀x∀s(Native(x, s)→ ∀F(xF ≡ ΣsFx))
according to which, if some character x is native to some story s, implicit
and explicit parafictional statements about x (in s) (e.g., (58) and (89)) are
equivalent.
Metafictional statements are statements about what properties fictional
characters exemplify. For instance, the metafictional statement in (67) ex-
135
6 The challenge of metafictional anaphora
presses that Frodo exemplifies the property of being an intriguing fictional
character:
(93) intriguing( f )
In line with the desideratum formulated in section 6.2, object theory does
not extend the uniform semantic treatment of fictional names across fictional
discourse. Fictional statements do not involve reference to abstract objects
but rather constitute the practice of story telling that determines – through
an extended ‘naming baptism’ – what abstract objects the fictional names
in parafictional and metafictional statements refer to (see Zalta (2000, 1987);
Semeijn and Zalta (2021)). For instance, through Tolkien’s act of writing The
Lord of the Rings, the unique abstract object that the name ‘Frodo’ refers to (in
parafictional and metafictional discourse) is determined. Similar accounts
of reference to fictional characters supervening on fictional discourse can be
found in Kripke (1973), Schiffer (2003) and Searle (1975) (but see also Hunter
(1981) for a contrary view).
Fictive closure*
If we incorporate Zalta’s analysis of fictional names into the workspace
account, we need to replace our Lewisian analysis of parafictional updates
of the common ground by the object theoretical analysis. This entails a
different analysis of parafictional discourse but also entails a modification
of the fictive closure operation (which also involves a parafictional update).
First and foremost, we replace the Lewisian operator (s) with the object
theoretic fiction operator (Σy). Second, because of the strong distinction
drawn between implicit and explicit parafictional statements, fictive closure
can in theory involve two different kinds of updates of the common ground:
an update with explicit parafictional information and, if the relevant fictional
characters are native to the relevant story, also with implicit parafictional
information.11 The following is a representation of fictive closure* of (25)
that includes updates of the common ground with both types of statements.
First, a workspace is updated with content of the fictional statement, i.e., it
is temporarily commonly accepted that there is an entity called Frodo that
had a very trying time some afternoon:
11If we also incorporate theorem (92) we can simplify the representation of the common
ground with respect to statements about native fictional characters.
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At fictive closure*, as soon as we stop engaging in the fictional discourse,
we update the common ground with discourse referents for the newly
introduced abstract objects (e.g., the story The Lord of the Rings and the
fictional character Frodo) and with (explicit and implicit) parafictional infor-
















Importantly, not all propositional content of the workspace is updated as
parafictional information simpliciter: proper name conditions (e.g., ‘Frodo(x)’)
are doubled and placed in the main box. This represents the fact that the
abstract object Frodo also exemplifies being named ‘Frodo’ outside of The
Lord of the Rings.
This move comes at a significant theoretical cost since it greatly compli-
cates fictive closure (and opening). The name-predicate ‘Frodo’ now occurs
three times in the DRS, which is counterintuitive. More importantly, some
discourse referents for ordinary objects in the workspace (e.g., Frodo, Moria,
the One Ring) are replaced with discourse referents for abstract objects in the
main box (and vice versa for fictive opening). However, discourse referents
for ordinary things in the workspace that have non-fictional substitutes in
the common ground (e.g., Napoleon, Paris, the British crown jewels) stay
embedded under the fiction operator. The analysis is, however, in line with
Zalta’s analysis of fictional discourse (i.e., updating a workspace and per-
forming fictive closure) as an extended naming baptism that reference to
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really existing fictional characters (i.e., entities that are represented in the
main DRS) supervenes on.
In fact, we can design a more uniform fictive closure* operation if we
combine the object theoretic approach to fictional names with a de re version
of the workspace account (see section 4.6.1) where fiction about non-fictional
entities (e.g., Napoleon in War and Peace) is de re about these entities. On such
an account, all discourse referents for non-fictional entities in the common
ground are anchored to their copies in the workspace. These copies ‘move
out’ of the DRS that is embedded under a fiction operator at fictive closure
and are replaced by the ‘original’ discourse referents for these non-fictional
entities. Combining the object theoretic account of fictional names and a
de re account of fiction about non-fictional entities results in a uniform
fictive closure operation where all discourse referents (whether for non-
fictional entities or fictional entities) ‘move out’ of the embedded DRS.
Those that are anchored to already existing discourse referents in the main
DRS (i.e., discourse referents for non-fictional entities or discourse referents
for previously introduced fictional characters ) are replaced by those, those
that are not (i.e., discourse referents newly introduced in the workspace)
give rise to new abstract objects. Consider for instance fictive closure after
reading about Napoleon and the fictional character Pierre in War and Peace.
Suppose that it was already common ground that Napoleon was a French
emperor and that the workspace has been updated with (amongst other
things) the information that Napoleon sat on an small gray Arab horse in


















At fictive closure all discourse referents now move out of the embedded
DRS:
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I leave further exploration into the merits of combining fictive closure* with
a de re analysis to future research.12 The rest of this section deals with the
object theoretic solution to metafictional anaphora which is compatible with
a de re version of the workspace account and a version that is (apart from
its treatment of fictional names) descriptivist.
Addressing the challenge
If we adopt the object theoretic strategy we add an abstract object to the
shared ontology for any fictional entity that is introduced and is native to the
relevant story. This means that we incorporate Zalta’s metaphysical assump-
tions that entail the existence of abstract objects in the actual world. It also
means that after a parafictional update (e.g., after engaging in parafictional
or fictional discourse) the discourse referent for (the abstract object) ‘Frodo’
12Arguably, the described account also offers a natural analysis of anaphoric dependencies
across parafictional statements and ‘regular’ assertions about non-fictional entities.
Consider:
(iii) In War and Peace, Napoleoni is a hero. But actually, hei was an overconfident
opportunist.
Anaphoric dependencies as in (iii) may lead to comparable accessibility issues as
metafictional anaphora on a simple descriptivist version of the workspace account (in
this case there is in fact a discourse referent for Napoleon accessible in the main DRS but
it is not the same as the one that is referred to in the parafictional statement). However,
for these cases there is no additional problem of the wrong kind of object looming in
the background. I leave exploration of these issues to further research.
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is accessible outside of the ‘In The Lord of the Rings’-operator. To see how
this solves the challenge posed by metafictional anaphora, we first have to
recognize that because Zalta draws a strong distinction between implicit
and explicit parafictional statements, the challenge splits up in two sub-
challenges: One of pronominal anaphora across mixed explicit parafictional
and metafictional discourse and one of pronominal anaphora across mixed
implicit parafictional and metafictional discourse. The central example up
to this point, (67), is an example of the first kind. I represent the workspace
updated with (67) as follows:
(67) In The Lord of the Rings, Frodoi goes through an immense mental

















Next, we can make a variation of (67) so that it is an example of pronominal
anaphora across mixed implicit parafictional/metafictional discourse:
(99) Frodoi goes through an immense mental struggle to save hisi friends.
Ah yes, hei is an intriguing fictional character!
I represent the workspace updated with (99) as follows:
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As the formulas show, in both cases the discourse referent x for ‘Frodo’
is accessible outside of the ‘In The Lord of the Rings’-operator. Hence the
presupposition triggered by the pronoun ‘he’ in the metafictional statement
in (67) and (99) (an assertion about what properties the abstract object Frodo
exemplifies) can be resolved.13
This approach easily extends to parafictional anaphora and cases of co-
predication in mixed metafictional and parafictional discourse. In general,
metafictional, explicit parafictional and implicit parafictional discourse all
operates on the same globally accessible discourse referents for fictional
characters and hence any kind of mixed discourse will be interpretable.
Revisiting the problem of the wrong kind of object
Although this analysis seems to straightforwardly solve the problem of
metafictional anaphora while avoiding the problem of the wrong kind
of object for implicit parafictional statements (i.e., abstract objects are the
‘right kind of objects’ to encode properties such as living in the Shire) and
metafictional statements (i.e., abstract objects are the ‘right kind of objects’
to exemplify properties such as being an intriguing fictional character), the
problem seems to reappear for the object theoretic treatment of explicit
parafictional statements. Recently, Klauk (2014) has argued along these lines.
The worry is that because fictional names like ‘Frodo’ refer uniformly to
abstract objects in metafictional and parafictional discourse, we would be
13In (98) and (100) I assume the standard analysis of the pronoun ‘he’ as triggering a
presupposition that there is a masculine entity. However, although abstract objects such
as Frodo may encode masculinity, they cannot exemplify this property; abstract objects
have no gender. To make the object theoretic solution work we have to assume that the
pronoun ‘he’ triggers the presupposition of the existence of an object that is masculine
in an underspecified way.
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able to infer something like (101) from an explicit parafictional statement
such as (58):
(58) In The Lord of the Rings, Frodo was born in the Shire.
(101) In The Lord of the Rings, an abstract object was born in the Shire.
(101) is obviously problematic because it leads to a reoccurrence of the
realist variant of the problem of the wrong kind of object: The Lord of the
Rings is a story about flesh and blood hobbits, not about what properties
abstract objects exemplify. Moreover, although we may be able to imagine
that an abstract object exemplifies living in the Shire, this amounts to imagin-
ing a category mistake (i.e., abstracts object cannot live in certain regions)
which should be unusual and remarkable and cannot comprise our common
practice of engaging in the content of a fictional work.
Semeijn and Zalta (2021) offer a formalisation of Klauk’s objection and
divide it into three sub-challenges which they address separately. Below I
briefly discuss the first and third sub-challenge they discuss.
First, the fact that f in (91) (and hence the name ‘Frodo’ in the explicit
parafictional statement (58)) refers to an abstract object may raise the fol-
lowing worry: (91) expresses that The Lord of the Rings (an abstract object)
encodes the vacuous property of being such that Frodo (another abstract
object) exemplifies living in the Shire. In object theory, what’s encoded by
a fictional story is supposedly what is true in the fiction. Moreover, what’s
true in a fiction is what we are mandated to imagine when we engage
with the fiction. But then object theory would imply that we are mandated
to imagine something about an abstract object! In fact, this reasoning is
flawed. In the object theoretic version of the workspace account, reference
to abstract objects in explicit parafictional statements does not imply that
we are mandated to imagine anything about abstract objects. Insofar as a
fiction’s ‘mandate to imagine’ plays a role in the workspace account (or in
object theory), it is something that is triggered by fictional discourse and
not by parafictional discourse. What we are ‘mandated to imagine when
engaging in a fiction’ is what we temporarily accept or entertain while
updating the workspace with the relevant fictional discourse. In the case
of The Lord of the Rings, the workspace is updated with information about
flesh and blood hobbits and their adventures. As fictive closure* shows,
once we stop engaging with the fiction (and hence stop imagining), this
previously imagined information gets converted into parafictional updates
of the common ground that make reference to abstract objects. Parafictional
142
6.4 A comparison of different solutions
discourse, being non-fictional statements, operate on this information di-
rectly through assertive closure. In other words, even though parafictional
statements do track or ‘echo’ the fictional discourse (and hence are reports
on what is true in fiction), parafictional discourse itself is non-fictional dis-
course about abstract objects. This does not mean, however, that updates
of the workspace triggered by fictional discourse also make reference to
abstract objects. When engaging in The Lord of the Rings, we temporarily
imagine things about Frodo the flesh and blood hobbit. Afterwards, we
permanently believe things about the abstract object Frodo.
Even if reference to abstract objects in explicit parafictional statements
such as (58) is not problematic, a further worry is whether – given that f in
(91) refers to an abstract object – we can derive problematic statements (e.g.,
something like (101)) in object theory, as Klauk seems to think. One way this
worry may be developed is by looking at the identification conditions of
the abstract object called ‘Frodo’. Given that Frodo is native to The Lord of
the Rings, and given theorem (92), we can derive that Frodo is the abstract
object that encodes all properties that Frodo exemplifies in The Lord of the
Rings:
(102) f = ιx(A!(x) ∧ ∀F((x)F ≡ ΣlotrF( f )))
Given that the formal language of object theory is completely extensional or
‘denotational’ (i.e., substitution of co-referring expressions is licensed in any
context), we are licensed to substitute the definite description in (102) for f
in (91). We can thus derive:
(103) Σlotrborn.in.Shire(
ιx(A!(x) ∧ ∀F((x)F ≡ ΣlotrF( f ))))
Reading (103) back into natural language would give us the following
parafictional discourse:
(104) In The Lord of the Rings, the abstract object that encodes exactly those
properties that Frodo exemplifies in The Lord of the Rings, was born
in the Shire.
Surely, our theory should not predict that an utterance of (104) is licensed
in a parafictional discussion on The Lord of the Rings because (104) ascribes
inappropriate content to The Lord of the Rings. In fact, object theory does
not predict this. Although (103) is a theoretical consequence of the theory,
it cannot be read back into the language of the parafictional data. (104)
includes technical terms such as ‘encoding’ and ‘exemplifying’ which were
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introduced in object theory to disambiguate the two modes of predication
that natural language conflates. In other words, although (104) may be
correctly used by an object theorist engaged in a theoretical discussion on
the abstract objects The Lord of the Rings and Frodo, the technical machinery
of object theory used in (104) cannot simply be read back into natural
language, i.e., the data we are trying to explain.14
Lastly, we can develop the worry one step further as follows: even if (103)
can’t be read back into natural language as (104) – unless as a part of an
object theoretic discussion – we can potentially derive something even more
problematic from it. Object theory includes the principle Descriptions (1988,
p. 90), which is a version of Russell’s (1905) Theory of Descriptions:
(105) (a) P ιx(Qx) ≡ ∃!yQy ∧ ∃y(Qy ∧ Py)
(b) ιx(Qx)P ≡ ∃!yQy ∧ ∃y(Qy ∧ yP)
In words, a formula of the form ‘the Q exemplifies/encodes property P’
is equivalent to ‘there is a unique y that exemplifies Q and there is a y
that exemplifies Q and that also exemplifies/encodes P. If we could apply
Descriptions to the formula embedded under the Σlotr operator in (103), we
would be able to derive the following:
(106) Σlotr∃!y(A!y ∧ ∀F(yF ≡ ΣlotrF f )) ∧
∃y(A!y ∧ ∀F(yF ≡ ΣlotrF f ) ∧ Sy)
Formula (106) says (amongst other things) that The Lord of the Rings encodes
that there is an abstract object that was born in the Shire. Surely, even some-
one engaged in an object theoretic discussion should not be licensed to say
that. The abstract object The Lord of the Rings does not encode any existence
claims about abstract objects. In fact, this inference is not licensed because,
although the encoding environment created by the fiction operator may be
denotational, it is also hyperintensional, i.e., it does not allow for substitution
14The second sub-challenge discussed by Semeijn and Zalta (2021) relates to substitutions of
definite descriptions in the formal language that can be read back into natural language.
Consider for instance:
(iv) In The Lord of the Rings, the character portrayed by Elijah Wood was born in the
Shire.
Object theory predicts that (iv) is part of the parafictional data in natural language.
Semeijn and Zalta suggest that this is not problematic because explicit parafictional
statements are subject to a de re/ de dicto ambiguity and (iv) is in fact true on a de re
reading.
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of necessary equivalents salva veritate. This is possible because, in object
theory, necessary equivalence does not entail identity (cf. Myhill (1963)) (e.g.,
the property of ‘being a brown and colourless dog’ is necessary equivalent
to the property of ‘being a barber that shaves all and only those that don’t
shave themselves’ but these are distinct properties). Hence the inference
from our application of Descriptions to the formula embedded under Σlotr in
(103), to (106) is not licensed; we cannot substitute the equivalent formulas
within the hyperintensional environment.
Outlook
Although we can incorporate the object theoretic analysis of metafictional
and parafictional discourse into the workspace account (and adjust our fic-
tive closure operation accordingly) and hence arrive at a consistent account
of the different anaphoric dependencies that are possible across mixed
discourse (that avoids the problem of the wrong kind of object), it does
come at some theoretical costs. The main issue in combining object theory
with the workspace account is that we are forced to give up the Lewisian
analysis of the fiction operator in favour of the object theoretic analysis
of the fiction operator. First, on the earlier adopted Lewisian analysis of
parafictional discourse, implicit parafictional discourse is covertly prefixed
by a fiction operator. This is inconsistent with the object theoretic analysis
of implicit parafictional statements as unprefixed statements about what
properties fictional characters encode. Second, even if we wanted to maintain
the Lewisian analysis only for explicit parafictional statements, reference to
abstract objects in explicit parafictional statements then does become prob-
lematic. Assuming that ‘being abstract’ is an essential property in Kripke’s
(1980) sense (i.e., a property that cannot change across possible worlds)
and given that Frodo is an abstract object in the real world, Frodo will be
an abstract object in all possible worlds including the The Lord of the Rings
worlds. Arguably, we would thus be able to derive that in The Lord of the
Rings, an abstract object was born in the Shire.
Having to give up the Lewisian analysis of parafictional discourse is
somewhat disappointing. First, we lose the benefit of the very natural tie
between the common ground framework and the Lewisian analysis that
defines fictional truth in terms of overt beliefs in the community of origin.
Second, the object theoretic analysis of parafictional discourse applies to
both statements of the form ‘In s, φ’ and ‘According to s, φ’. We thus lose
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any explanatory value of the two offered semantic analyses of ‘In’ and ‘Ac-
cording to’ concerning the diverging linguistic behaviour of these operators
(see chapter 7).
Hence, although an abstract object account adequately addresses the chal-
lenge of metafictional anaphora while avoiding the problem of the wrong
kind of object, the account only works properly if we give up the Lewisian
analysis of parafictional discourse. If we want to hold on to the Lewisian
analysis, fictional names in parafictional discourse will somehow need to
refer to flesh and blood individuals rather than abstract objects. Hence, in
order to account for anaphoric dependencies across mixed metafictional and
parafictional discourse while still avoiding the problem of the wrong kind
of object in its different variants, it seems we will need to posit some kind of
ambiguity in fictional names. The next section explores such an account.
6.4.4 Dot-object theory: The different facets of Frodo
An alternative solution to the problem of metafictional anaphora that is
formally similar to the object theoretic solution but that incorporates an
ambiguity analysis of fictional names, is to follow Recanati (2018) and claim
that fictional names in parafictional and metafictional statements refer to
so-called ‘dot-objects’ that are accessible in the main box.
Dot-object theory
Recanati goes back to Kripke’s and Currie’s intuition that fictional names are
ambiguous. In parafictional statements ‘Frodo’ refers to a flesh and blood
individual and in metafictional statements ‘Frodo’ refers to an abstract
object. Such an approach to our central example of metafictional anaphora













However, as has been explained in section 6.2.2, an ambiguity analysis seems
to conflict with the anaphoric link in (67). In other words, it is incompatible
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with what Recanati dubs the ‘Anaphora-Coreference Principle’ (i.e., if a
pronoun is anaphoric on an antecedent name, the two terms co-refer (if
they refer at all)) that is presupposed by previously discussed accounts
of metafictional anaphora. However, Recanati argues, there are apparent
counterexamples to this principle. Take the following sentence:
(108) Lunchi was delicious, but iti took forever. (Adapted from Asher 2011,
p.11)
The pronoun ‘it’ is anaphoric on the noun ‘lunch’ of the preceding clause.
However, ‘lunch’ and ‘it’ do not co-refer; ‘lunch’ refers to food (which was
delicious) and ‘it’ refers to a social event (which took forever). Recanati
argues that we can save the Anaphora-Coreference Principle by appealing
to the notion of a dot-object (see e.g., Pustejovsky (1995); Luo (2012); Asher
(2011)), i.e., “a complex entity involving several ‘facets”’ (Recanati, 2018,
p.15). For instance, the noun ‘lunch’ is polysemous (i.e., it can refer to two
(closely related) things: lunch qua food or lunch qua social event) and hence
denotes a dot-object (represented as food • social event) involving several
facets (i.e., a food facet and a social event facet). Thus, in (108) ‘lunch’ and
‘it’ do actually co-refer (i.e to the dot-object ‘lunch’ or food • social event),
but the predicates ‘being delicious’ and ‘taking forever’ apply to different
facets of the object (i.e., respectively to the food facet and to the social event
facet). A workspace updated with (108) will thus look as follows, where the
dot-object lunch (x) is predicated over through its food facet (represented














According to Recanati, fictional names are also polysemous (i.e., they can
refer to flesh and blood individuals or to abstract objects) and denote dot-
objects (e.g., ‘Frodo’ denotes the dot-object flesh and blood individual •
abstract object). In metafictional statements ‘Frodo’ refers to this dot-object
through its abstract object facet. In (explicit and implicit) parafictional state-
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ments, ‘Frodo’ refers to this dot-object through its flesh and blood individual
facet.
Recanati incorporates Zalta’s distinction between encoding and exempli-
fying properties. The abstract object facet of Frodo both exemplifies prop-
erties such as being invented by Tolkien and encodes properties such as
being a hobbit. Hence, the duality that is reflected in the two aspects of
the dot-object Frodo, is also internal to the abstract object facet. Recanati
agrees with Zalta that what properties the abstract object (facet) encodes is
determined by our parafictional knowledge. However, whereas for Zalta the
name ‘Frodo’ in parafictional discourse refers simply to an abstract object,
for Recanati, it refers to a complex dot-object through its flesh and blood facet.
Recanati can thus maintain that parafictional discourse that mentions Frodo
is primarily about the flesh and blood hobbit.
Fictive closure**
Applying Recanati’s analysis to the workspace account suggests an adjust-
ment of the fictive closure operation. I present a (simplified) representation
of fictive closure** of fictional statement (25). First, we update the workspace










At fictive closure** we update the common ground with discourse referents
for dot-objects for any newly introduced fictional character and with parafic-
tional information based on the content of the workspace. Dot-objects can
be referred to as dot-objects (x), through their flesh and blood facet (x|1) (as
is done in the parafictional condition) or through their abstract object facet
(x|2). As in fictive closure* (see section 6.4.3), proper name conditions are
doubled and also placed in the main box.
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As with fictive closure*, fictive closure** greatly complicates the basic (de-
scriptivist) fictive closure operation by moving discourse referents for fic-
tional entities outside of the DRS embedded under the fiction operator.
Similar to fictive closure*, fictive closure** can be made into a more uniform
mechanism if we combine a dot-object approach to fictional names with a
de re version of the workspace account.
Addressing the challenge
A dot-object analysis of fictional characters solves the challenge posed by
metafictional anaphora as in (67). A workspace updated with (67) looks as















As the DRS shows, the discourse referent x for the dot-object Frodo is
accessible outside of the ‘In The Lord of the Rings’-operator.15 This dot-object
15Here I assume that it is common ground that there is a dot-object Frodo after the parafic-
tional update in (67). This is not obvious. Arguably, in the case of (108), as long as we
talk about lunch as food and there is no mention of lunch as a social event, we are really
just talking about lunch as food. Only at the introduction of the zeugmatic discourse
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can be predicated over through its abstract object facet by the metafictional
condition, i.e., ‘intriguing(x|2)’. Hence we can equate the discourse referents













Although the solution is formally very similar to the solution offered by an
abstract object account, it avoids a reoccurrence of the realist variant of the
problem of the wrong kind of object while maintaining the Lewisian analysis
of parafictional statements: the name ‘Frodo’ refers to the dot-object Frodo
through its flesh and blood facet rather than to an abstract object in parafictional
discourse. Moreover, like the object theoretic solution, a dot-object solution
can easily be extended to account for parafictional anaphora and cases of
co-predication across mixed metafictional and parafictional discourse. In
general, dot-objects for fictional characters are always globally accessible in
the main DRS (whether they have been introduced by fictional, parafictional
or metafictional discourse). They can be predicated over through their flesh
and blood facets in parafictional discourse and their abstract object facets
in metafictional discourse. Whether the metafictional predication follows
the parafictional predication, precedes it or occurs in the same statement is
irrelevant.
Outlook
Although a fictive closure** variant of the workspace account that incor-
porates dot-objects seems to be a promising alternative to the simple de-
scriptivist version of the workspace account (while still being consistent
does it become common ground that there is a dot-object (food • social event) that
we refer to. The same could be true about (67). However, as Recanati suggests, the
(overt or covert) ‘In fiction s’-prefix in parafictional discourse forces a ‘metafictional
perspective’; it makes us aware of the fictionality of the fictional characters and hence
it is directly common ground at the parafictional update that we are referring to a
dot-object including an abstract object facet.
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with adhering to the Lewisian analysis of parafictional discourse), some
of the details still need to be worked out. First, as Recanati himself also
notes (2018, p. 43), the metaphysical status of dot-objects is controversial:
is a dot-object simply an ordered tuple of its facets, e.g., x = 〈x|1, x|2〉 (cf.
Cooper (2007); Gotham (2017))? Must all facets of a dot-object exist in order
for the dot-object to exist? These questions are especially pressing in the
case of fiction where one of the facets of the dot-object (i.e., the flesh and
blood individual facet) does not actually exist.
If the facets do all need to exist (in the actual world), this would mean
that in order to engage in metafictional and parafictional discourse we
have to assume the existence of both an abstract object and the existence
of a flesh and blood creature. Arguably, this would make the dot-object
x globally accessible through both facets. Such a strategy would entail
adopting some kind of pretence analysis of parafictional discourse (cf. Evans
(1982); Recanati (2018)) since we talk about fictional entities as if they really
existed. In contrast, if we allow for facets to either really exist or (merely)
exist in some fiction, we would only have to assume the existence of an
abstract object and the existence in some fictional worlds of a flesh and blood
creature in order to engage in metafictional and parafictional discourse.
Arguably, this would imply that, although the discourse referent for the
dot-object x is still always globally accessible through its abstract object
facet, it is only accessible through its flesh and blood facet under the relevant
fiction operator. This outcome fits neatly with an analysis of parafictional
discourse as embedded assertions. Such a strategy would still amount to
assuming some kind of realist/anti-realist ambiguity in fictional names,
but would effectively stick to a descriptivist analysis of fictional names in
parafictional discourse.
Alternatively, in order to avoid metaphysical assumptions about the exis-
tence of multifaceted dot-objects, Recanati suggests that the correct objects
of study are in fact dot-concepts (i.e., concepts of dot-objects) or mental files
(see Recanati (2012)) of dot-objects, rather than dot-objects.16 Similarly, in
the DRS’s above, the discourse referents for dot-objects and their associated
conditions can be understood as representing concepts rather than objects.
16Cf. Ninan’s (2017) analysis of fictional names as referring to possibilia, (i.e., entities that
exist at other possible worlds that the actual world) and Stokke’s (forthcoming-a) recent
proposal that fictional names refer to individual concepts.
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6.5 Conclusions and further research
One of the central aims of this chapter has been to draw attention to the
general challenge posed by metafictional discourse and especially the cur-
rent desideratum for a theory of fictional names to account for anaphoric
dependencies across parafictional and metafictional discourse while avoid-
ing the problem of the wrong kind of object in its different variants. I have
argued that the basic descriptivist version of the workspace account runs
into difficulties with metafictional anaphora because the discourse referent
for the fictional name introduced in the parafictional statement is not ac-
cessible outside of the ‘In fiction s’-operator. This problem generalizes to
other current dynamic approaches that involve separation of the content
and discourse referents of the fictional narrative. I have evaluated four dif-
ferent accounts of metafictional anaphora: a descriptivist approach (that
requires an additional account of how to accommodate the right kind of
definite descriptions and cannot easily be extended to account for parafic-
tional anaphora or co-predication across mixed metafictional/parafictional
discourse), an approach based on changing the accessibility relations (that
cannot straightforwardly be extended to a workspace account and runs into
the anti-realist variant of the problem of the wrong kind of object), an ab-
stract object account (that can give a consistent explanation of all anaphoric
dependencies but forces us to give up the Lewisian analysis of parafic-
tional discourse) and a dot-object account (that avoids the aforementioned
problem but remains unclear on some crucial parts).
As mentioned in the introduction, any semantic account of fictional names
will have to account for the use of pronominal anaphora across all accept-
able types of mixed discourse. More specifically, it would be interesting to
extend the described accounts of metafictional anaphora to other, potentially
problematic, cases. For instance, an interesting type of discourse is what
Bjurman Pautz (2008) dubs ‘reports on fictional co-reference’, i.e., anaphoric
dependencies across belief reports on different people’s parafictional beliefs
as in (114). A related kind of discourse involves anaphoric dependencies
across parafictional statements about different, inconsistent, fictional narra-
tives. For instance, I can compare the location of Watson’s war wound in
two novels of the Sherlock Holmes series that are inconsistent in this respect
as in (115). Or, suppose that apart from The Lord of the Rings Tolkien also
wrote an alternative story (The Lord of the Schmings) in which the character
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Gimli (a dwarf in The Lord of the Rings) is an elf. I could then felicitously say
(116):
(114) Bridget believes that Sherlock Holmesi is smart and Caroline believes
that hei is smart. (Adapted from Bjurman Pautz, 2008)
(115) In A Study in Scarlet, Watson’s war woundi is on his shoulder but in
The Sign of Four, iti is on his leg.
(116) In The Lord of the Rings, Gimlii is a dwarf but in The Lord of the
Schmings, hei is an elf.
Both types of discourse pose a challenge to a descriptivist version of the
workspace account: discourse referents for Sherlock, Watson and Gimli are
not accessible in the main box because they are embedded under a fiction
operator (and in the case of (114) also embedded under a belief operator).
Sentences (115) and (116) have the additional complication that, although
the pronouns ‘it’ and ‘he’ are anaphoric on respectively ‘Watson’s war
wound’ and ‘Gimli’, it is not clear that these terms do in fact refer to the
same fictional entity since they are ascribed inconsistent (individual-level)
predicates in different narratives.
Discourses involving fictional co-reference or anaphoric dependencies
across parafictional statements about distinct (inconsistent) narratives are
reminiscent of both the phenomenon of counterfictional imagination (see
e.g., Friend (2011b)) and Geach’s Hob-Nob puzzle:
(117) Hob thinks a witchi blighted Bob’s mare, and Nob thinks shei killed
Cob’s sow. (Adapted from Geach, 1967)
Here the pronominal anaphora occur across two different propositional
attitude reports and although the pronoun ‘she’ is anaphoric on ‘a witch’,
there need not be one particular witch that is the object of thought of both
Hob and Nob. Future research will have to determine how to account for
discourses such as (114), (115) and (116) and specify their relation to other
puzzles.
As Bjurman Pautz notes, a possible strategy to deal with fictional co-
reference as in (114) is to adopt an object theoretic approach so that the
terms ‘Sherlock Holmes’ and ‘he’ in (114) refer to a globally accessible
abstract object. Arguably, a dot-object approach would function similarly.
Moreover, both strategies can be extended to account for discourse such
as (115) and (116). Concerning the ascription of inconsistent properties to
the same fictional character we can maintain, in an object theoretic account,
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that ‘Gimli’ and ‘he’ in (116) refer to the same consistent fictional character
that only encodes being a dwarf (because Gimli is native to The Lord of the
Rings). In cases where there is no clearly authoritative narrative (e.g., in
(115)), we can analyse ‘Watson’s war wound’ and ‘it’ as referring to the same
fictional character that encodes inconsistent properties (assuming a theory of
fictional truth that allows for inconsistent explicit parafictional statements
to be both true). On a dot-object approach, we can – assuming we do not
allow for inconsistent ‘flesh and blood facets’ – analyse the terms ‘Watson’s
war wound’ and ‘it’ in (115) and ‘Gimli’ and ‘he’ in (116) as referring to
the same dot-objects but through different ‘flesh and blood facets’. We thus
require dot-objects with three or four different facets: In the case of (116)
a ‘flesh and blood dwarf’ facet, a ‘flesh and blood elf’ facet, and one or
two abstract object facets (depending on whether we allow for inconsistent
abstract objects).
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Appendix
Examples of all six possible types of mixed discourse with fictional, parafic-






Hansi and Gretelj approached the skyscraper. “Maybe
you should have a look inside, Gretel. They might have
candy”, whispered Hansi.* Gretelj moved closer...
*In this story, shej is the hero that saves the day. Hei is
the villain. (Semeijn and Zalta, 2021, p.7)
fictional/
metafictional
In order to capture the witch, Maryi travelled to the
woods and disguised herself as a potato.* In the woods
shei encountered many perils...
*I know this is weird but I invented heri while eating
chips. (Semeijn and Zalta, 2021, p.6-7).
parafictional/
fictional
In the story I made up yesterday, a wizard called Briani
falls in love with a cauldron. Let me tell it to you: One
day, hei was alone in hisi study trying out a new love-
potion recipe... (Semeijn and Zalta, 2021, p.6)
parafictional/
metafictional
In The Lord of the Rings, Frodoi goes through an immense




Freyi is a fictional character I made up and is the protag-
onist of my newest story. Here it is: One day shei was
walking through the woods near her home... (Semeijn
and Zalta, 2021, p.6)
metafictional/
parafictional
Sherlock Holmesi is a fictional character created by Co-
nan Doyle. In Conan Doyle’s stories, hei is a private
detective who investigates cases for a variety of clients,




7 The ‘In’ and ‘According to’
operators
This chapter is a rewritten version of ‘The ‘In’ and ‘According to’ op-
erators’ in Proceedings of the ESSLLI & WeSSLLI Student Session 2020.
The most substantial differences between this chapter and the proceed-
ings paper include: First, a removal of the discussion on the Lewisian
analysis of “In s, φ”. Second, the addition of a further research section
7.4.2 which includes a brief discussion of how the proposed analysis of
“According to s, φ” relates to the previous discussion of fictive closure
and bald-faced lies.
7.1 Introduction
In chapter 3 I analysed parafictional discourse (i.e., discourse about the content
of some fiction) as being covertly or overtly of the form ‘In/According to s, φ’. In
other words, parafictional statements contain either an ‘In s’ operator (henceforth
abbreviated as In) or an ‘According to s’ operator (henceforth abbreviated as Acc):
(118) a. In The Hobbit, Bilbo travels to the Lonely Mountain.
b. According to The Hobbit, Bilbo travels to the Lonely Mountain.
Following common practice, I have so far largely ignored any semantic difference
between the operators In and Acc. However, the astute reader may have noticed
that the Lewisian analysis of parafictional discourse that I adopt has been formu-
lated (following Lewis) for statements of the form ‘In s, φ’ rather than ‘In/According
to s, φ’ (see section 4.2.2). The reason for this is that in the current chapter I suggest,
contra common practice, that there is in fact a relevant semantic difference between
In and Acc and suggest that In is the primary fiction operator.
In providing analyses of parafictional discourse almost1 all philosophers (e.g.,
Zucchi (forthcoming); Recanati (2018); Zalta (1983)) and semanticists (e.g., von
I would like to thank Natasha Korotkova and four anonymous ESSLLI/WeSSLLI Student
Session reviewers for valuable comments and discussions. Also, many thanks to Sofia
Bimpikou for a fruitful collaboration on experiments concerning parafictional tense.
1Notable exceptions are Sainsbury (2014) and Voltolini (2019) who argue that In involves
a more ‘distanced’ stance towards the fiction than Acc. However, the authors do not
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Fintel and Heim (2011)) treat In and Acc on a par, i.e., (118a) and (118b) receive
the same truth conditions. One of the main objectives of this chapter is to establish
that there are in fact interesting semantic differences between In and Acc. These
differences have probably remained largely unrecognized or glossed over because
semanticists of fiction traditionally focus on providing analyses for reports on the
content of fictional media (i.e., parafictional statements) only; since In and Acc both
seem acceptable in such statements (e.g., in (118a) and (118b)), a uniform semantic
analysis seems justified. To tease apart In and Acc I adopt a broader perspective
in this chapter and consider reports on the content of media whether fictional or
non-fictional, i.e., so-called ‘contensive’ (Ross, 2012) or ‘paratextual’ (Zucchi, 2001)
statements. For instance, apart from parafictional statements (118a) and (118b), the
following report on the content of Monk’s biography Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty
of Genius is also a contensive statement:
(119) According to Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius, Wittgenstein worked
as a hospital porter during WWII and advised patients not to take the drugs
they were prescribed.
Moreover, the observations and analyses concerning the use of In and Acc in
contensive statements that are discussed in this chapter apply not only to contensive
statements about written or spoken narratives (e.g., The Lord of the Rings and Ludwig
Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius) but also to contensive statements about non-verbal
media such as movies and pictures. The current discussion thus extends to for
instance statements about the content of the Star Wars saga:
(120) a. In the Star Wars saga, Darth Vader is a Sith Lord.
b. According to the Star Wars saga, Darth Vader is a Sith Lord.
Hence this chapter also adopts a broader perspective compared to the rest of the
dissertation (where I focus on verbal narratives) in this respect.
connect their semantic accounts of the operators to existing linguistic work on Acc
as is done in this chapter. Nor do they discuss the linguistic observations concerning
the diverging behaviour of In and Acc introduced in this chapter. Rather, part of their
debate is on whether the following minimal pair illustrates the semantic difference
between In and Acc:
(v) In War and Peace, there are both fictional and real characters.
(vi) According to War and Peace, there are both fictional and real characters. (Sains-
bury, 2014, p.278)
Whereas Sainsbury takes (v) to be true and (vi) false, Voltolini takes both to be false. I
do not further discuss these types of statements in this chapter since my focus lies on
the use of In and Acc in parafictional statements and both (v) and (vi) seem to have
a distinct metafictional flavour, i.e., talk about fictional entities as fictional entities. See
chapter 6 for a more elaborate discussion of metafictional discourse.
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As discussed in chapter 4, I assume the widely adopted Lewisian (1978) possible
world analysis for In. Roughly: “In s, φ” is true iff in worlds compatible with s, φ.
In what follows I will first discuss the proposed analysis of Acc (section 7.2). In line
with Krawczyk’s (2012) analysis of ‘According to s’, contensive statements with Acc
are analysed as indirect speech reports. Roughly: “Acc s, φ” is true iff s asserts that φ.
Second, I will explore three clusters of novel observations concerning the divergent
linguistic behaviour of In and Acc that a uniform treatment of the operators cannot
but that the proposed semantic analyses can explain. These observations add to
existing observations in recent linguistic literature that show that there is a crucial
difference between Acc and other intensional operators (e.g., Krawczyk (2012);
Kaufmann and Kaufmann (2020); Bary and Maier (2020)). The novel observations
relate to the fictionality of the medium that is reported on (section 7.3.1), reporting
explicit and implicit content (section 7.3.2) and tense use in contensive statements
(section 7.3.3).
7.2 Semantic analysis of the ‘According to
s’-operator
Contensive statements that feature the operator Acc are analysed as a type of
indirect speech report, i.e., reports on what a medium asserts or asserted (but not
on what it ‘will assert’2):
“According to s, φ” is true iff s asserts/asserted that φ
This analysis of contensive statements with Acc is in line with Krawczyk’s (2012)
and Kaufmann and Kaufmann’s (2020) analysis of the general (i.e., also outside
of contensive statements) use of the phrase ‘According to s’. These semanticists
treat Acc not as a simple intensional operator (cf. von Fintel and Heim (2011)) but
rather treat statements with this phrase as indirect speech reports. Indeed, such an
analysis fits the use that Acc, unlike In, has outside of contensive statements; Acc
2Although the speech verb in speech reports can be future tensed when reporting on (or
predicting) future speech events, it seems that Acc only has interpretations where it is
used to report on either past or ongoing speech events. If I know Joe doesn’t like seagulls
(because he always angrily throws stones at them) and I know that he is going to assert
that seagulls are the worst (because he raised his hand at a ‘seagull-lovers’-seminar) but
I have never actually heard John assert that seagulls are the worst, I can felicitously say
(ix) but not (x):
(ix) Joe will assert that seagulls are the worst.
(x) # According to Joe, seagulls are the worst.
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can be used to report not only on the content of a medium but also on what some
person asserted:
(121) a. According to Joe, seagulls are the worst.
b. # In Joe, seagulls are the worst.
As Anand and Korotkova (2019) note, such reports behave like regular indirect
speech reports. For instance, whereas belief reports can be followed by a denial of
the embedded content having been said, speech reports cannot:
(122) a. Joe thinks that seagulls are the worst. He never said that, though.
b. # Joe asserted that seagulls are the worst. He never said that, though.
Likewise, it seems that (121a) cannot be followed by a denial of the embedded
content having been said:
(123) ? According to Joe, seagulls are the worst. He never said that, though.
Reports with Acc behave like indirect speech reports in that the report does not
have to repeat the exact phrasing of the reported speech. Suppose Joe’s exact words
were: “I hate seagulls! There is no animal that is worse”. As in indirect speech
report report (124b) (and unlike in direct speech report (124a)), we can report on
this speech act by combining Acc with the paraphrase “seagulls are the worst”:
(124) a. # Joe said: “Seagulls are the worst”.
b. Joe said that seagulls are the worst.
c. According to Joe, seagulls are the worst.
Anand and Korotkova (2019) argue that this analysis of Acc can not only apply to
reports on what some speaker has said but also to reports on what some inanimate
object has ‘said’ as long as the object is a repository of propositional information
(or ‘ROI subject’, see Anand and Hacquard (2014)) such as books, theories, films or
lecture notes. In other words, we can report on the content of a medium by talking
about the medium as the ‘agent’ of a communicative act. For instance, we can talk
about what a book ‘tells us’.3 Hence Acc can feature in contensive statements which
as a result are interpreted as reports on what some medium (e.g., The Lord of the
Rings or a news report) asserts – rather than reports on what the author of the
medium asserts.4
3I assume that nonverbal media (e.g., the Star Wars saga) are also ROI subjects and hence
we also report on those as ‘telling us’ things. In case the reader thinks nonverbal media
don’t assert in this way, they may read ‘the Star Wars saga’ as ‘the script of the Star Wars
saga’.
4This semantic analysis is akin to Zalta’s (1987) analysis of parafictional statements in
general (with In or Acc) as reporting on what a fictional narrative asserts. Such analyses
raise some questions concerning the notion of ‘assertion’ at play here. For instance, a
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Before moving on, it is instructive to highlight two features of the speech act of
assertion that will be relevant later. First, since assertions are non-fictional state-
ments, when a asserts φ this means that a states that φ is true in the actual world,
i.e., a communicates that the actual world is in the set of φ worlds. Likewise, when
some medium is reported on as making an assertion, this means that it is treated as
stating something about the actual world. In other words, it is reported on as if it is
non-fiction.5 It is possible to formulate the semantic analysis of Acc with speech
verbs that are similar in meaning such as “say” or “express”. I use “assert” because,
as will become clear later (section 7.3.1), I want to restrict the analysis to reports on
speech acts that are clearly commitment inducing. Possibly, “say” or “express” are
too generic (e.g., fictional or presuppositional contents may be said or expressed but
are not asserted).
Second, unlike simple intensional operators, indirect speech reports are generally
not closed under logical entailment (see e.g., von Stechow and Zimmermann (2005);
Sæbø (2013); Maier (2019)). Consider the following belief report:
(125) Anne believes that Chrissy is cool.
Under a simple modal analysis of belief (Cf. Hintikka (1962)), (125) is true iff Chrissy
is cool in all possible worlds that are compatible with Anne’s beliefs. Given that
Chrissy being cool implies (amongst other things) that there is at least one cool
person, it is also true in all possible worlds that are compatible with Anne’s beliefs
that there is at least one cool person. Hence, it follows from (125) that Anne also
believes that there is at least one cool person. Moreover, logical truths (e.g., that
bachelors are unmarried men) are necessary, i.e., they are true in all possible worlds.
Hence it is also true in all worlds compatible with Anne’s beliefs that bachelors are
unmarried men; Anne also believes this. In short, under an intensional analysis of
belief, any agent that forms beliefs is logically omniscient, i.e., believes all logical
truths and all logical consequences of their beliefs.
Although such an intensional analysis may be fine when we offer a description
of an idealized rational agent’s beliefs, it cannot straightforwardly be applied to
speech reporting. Consider the following variants of speech reports:
(126) Anne asserts/says/claims/yells/mutters/whispers that Chrissy is cool.
On a simple intensional analysis of asserts/says/claims/yells/mutters/whispers,
(126) is true iff Chrissy is in fact cool in all possible worlds that are compatible with
what Anne asserts/says/claims/yells/mutters/whispers. Like the intensional anal-
ysis of belief above, the intensional analysis here thus implies that (126) entails that
book cannot have any beliefs and hence a book’s assertion cannot be construed as a
proposal to update the common ground between speaker and hearer if it is construed
as common belief or common acceptance. I will ignore these issues for now.
5Cf. Murday (2010) who argues that use of fiction operators such as Acc in parafictional
statements relates the content of the fictional narrative to the actual world.
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Anne also asserts/says/claims/yells/mutters/whispers all logical consequences
of Chrissy being cool (e.g., that there is at least one cool person) and all logical
truths (e.g., that bachelors are unmarried men). But does it follow from (126) that
Anne asserts/says/claims/yells/mutters/whispers that there is at least one cool
person? Maier (2019) argues that for many so-called ‘descriptive communication
verbs’ (e.g., yells/mutters/whispers) the entailment is definitely off and hence the
intensional analysis cannot work. For less descriptive verbs (e.g., say/assert/claim)
the entailment will sometimes seem acceptable. For the latter type of verbs we
can follow von Stechow and Zimmerman’s (2005) suggestion to analyse indirect
speech reports with ‘say’ as ambiguous between a strict reading – where they are
not closed under entailment – and a non-strict reading – where they are closed
under entailment.
However, even on a non-strict reading of speech verbs such as ‘say’, ‘assert’ and
‘claim’, a simple intensional analysis will still not suffice: Although we may accept
that we can derive from (126) that Anne asserted that there is at least one cool
person, in any case it still does not follow that Anne asserted that bachelors are
unmarried men. Moreover, even on a non-strict reading, speech reports are only
closed under entailment to a certain extent, i.e., not all logical entailments of what
was stated are reportable with indirect discourse. For instance, it does not follow
from (126) that Anne asserted that Chrissy is cool or a murderous clown (even
though Chrissy being cool or a murderous clown does strictly speaking follow from
Chrissy being cool). In other words, even on a non-strict reading of ‘say’, ‘assert’
and ‘claim’, only a subset of the entailments of what was explicitly stated are also
actually ‘said’, ‘asserted’ and ‘claimed’.6
In the above semantic analysis of Acc “asserts” is to be read non-strictly, i.e., s
asserts that φ iff s explicitly states φ or φ is properly entailed by what s explicitly
states.
7.3 The diverging behaviour of ‘In’ and ‘According
to’
Now that I have presented my semantic analyses of In and Acc, I turn to three
linguistic observations concerning the diverging linguistic behaviour of In and Acc
(and some qualifications to them). Current analyses of contensive statements do
not distinguish In from Acc and therefore do not explain these observations. I will
argue that the Lewisian analysis of In and the above analysis of Acc can account
for them.
6See e.g., Brasoveanu and Farkas (2007); Sæbø (2013); Bary and Maier (2020);
Abreu Zavaleta (2019) for some further discussion on this topic.
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7.3.1 Fiction/non-fiction
Observations
A central observation concerning In and Acc is that whereas contensive state-
ments about fiction can be formulated with both In and Acc, contensive statements
about non-fiction with In rather than Acc are typically unacceptable. Consider the
following minimal pairs of statements:
(120) a. In the Star Wars saga, Darth Vader is a Sith Lord.
b. ? According to the Star Wars saga, Darth Vader is a Sith Lord.
(127) a. # In Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius, Wittgenstein worked as
a hospital porter during WWII and advised patients not to take the drugs
they were prescribed.
b. According to Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius, Wittgenstein
worked as a hospital porter during WWII and advised patients not to take
the drugs they were prescribed.
Whereas use of Acc seems appropriate to report on the content of fictional and
non-fictional media, use of In seems restricted to reports on the content of fictional
media. Even stronger, this fiction/non-fiction preference is also mirrored in our use
of Acc. As noted before, Acc can be (and is) used to report on the content of fictional
media. I therefore generally do not mark such uses of Acc as infelicitous. However,
use of In does typically sound more appropriate in parafictional statements than
use of Acc, e.g., (120a) and (120b) are both acceptable but (120a) is a more natural
way of talking about the content of the Star Wars films. Thus the general picture
that is sketched is that the canonical use of the operators links In to fiction and Acc
to non-fiction.
The observation made above can be qualified in several ways. First, use of Acc
in contensive statements about fiction is not always unnatural and sometimes is
even more appropriate than use of In. Contensive statements that report on the
content of a fictional medium that is viable for ‘export’7 (i.e., content that we may
take to be not only true in the fiction but also true about the actual world) display
such preferences. Such exported content can consist of empirical facts that were
explicitly stated in a medium. For instance, I may read the following in Fleming’s
novel Thunderball: “New Providence, the island containing Nassau, the capital of
the Bahamas, is a drab sandy slab of land fringed with some of the most beautiful
beaches in the world”, and learn from this that (actually) Nassau is the capital of
the Bahamas. Alternatively, we can export general truths that follow from what
was explicitly stated or shown in a fiction. For instance, I may learn that (actually) it
is never too late to redeem yourself from watching the Star Wars saga even though
7See section 4.6.2 for a more elaborate discussion of export of fictional truth.
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this is never stated explicitly in the medium. Especially in contensive statements
that report on general fictional truths that are viable for export we can observe an
increased acceptability of Acc. For instance, consider the following:
(128) a. In the Star Wars saga, it is never too late to redeem yourself.
b. According to the Star Wars saga, it is never too late to redeem yourself.
Use of Acc is decidedly more natural in (128b) than in contensive statements that
report on fictional content that is not viable for export such as (120b). Arguably
there is even a small preference for use of Acc as in (128b) over use of In as in (128a).
This latter intuition become even stronger when we consider ‘fictions’ whose point
is clearly to teach us something about the actual world. Consider the following
contensive statements about Searle’s Chinese room thought experiment:
(129) a. According to the Chinese room thought experiment, something that
manipulates symbols based on syntax alone, does not truly understand a
language.
b. ? In the Chinese room thought experiment, something that manipulates
symbols based on syntax alone, does not truly understand a language.
Here use of Acc to report on the fictional content that is viable for export in (129a)
is appropriate whereas use of In in (129b) is unnatural.
Second, use of In is not in fact unequivocally wrong for contensive statements
about non-fictional media. Zucchi provides the following example of a contensive
statement featuring In about Woodward’s biography Shadow:
(130) a. In Shadow, Clinton only cares about sex and golf. (Zucchi, 2001, p.350)
b. According to Shadow, Clinton only cares about sex and golf.
Not only use of Acc but also use of In is acceptable in this non-fiction contensive
statement. However, note that such use of In is restricted to reports on subjective
viewpoints or portrayals that are expressed by some medium rather than objective
facts. Use of In here seems to signal distancing from the reported content. Likewise,
a contensive statement with In that reports on an objective fact expressed by Shadow
sounds as odd as (127a):
(131) a. # In Shadow, Clinton was born in Arkansas.
b. According to Shadow, Clinton was born in Arkansas.
Analysis
The provided analyses account for the above observations. First, when we report
on the content of some non-fictional source s (e.g., a biography, news report or
encyclopedia entry), we will report on the medium as telling us (or asserting)
something about the actual world – not as some story that is compatible with some
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set of worlds that may or may not include the actual world. Hence we have a strong
preference for Acc in contensive statements about non-fiction. By contrast, when
talking about the content of a fictional medium s it is appropriate to consider what
is true in the set of s worlds without reporting on s as asserting anything about the
actual world. Hence In is appropriate whereas use of Acc (i.e., reporting on the
content of a fiction story as if it relates to the actual world) is less natural. Thus there
is a general preference to use In for reports on fiction and to use Acc for reports on
non-fiction.
As I have shown, however, although there may be a preference for In, Acc is
in fact generally acceptable for contensive statements about fiction (e.g., (118b),
(120b)). The semantic analysis of Acc suggests that this is because it is considered
generally admissible to report on the content of a fictional medium by talking
about it as something that asserts something about the actual world.8 Usually,
such use of Acc will sound unnatural because fictional media are standardly not
considered to be appropriate authorities or sources for claims about the actual
world. Hence a statement such as (120b), which means something like “The Star
Wars saga asserts that Darth Vader is a Sith Lord”, sounds awkward. In fact, it is
strictly speaking not even true!9 The Star Wars saga, being a work of fiction, does
not really assert anything about the history of the galaxy. We merely pretend that
it does when engaging with the fiction. Similarly, the analysis suggests that use
of Acc in parafictional discourse such as (118b) is proper when we report on the
content of fictions by engaging in an extension of this original pretence, i.e., talking
about the fictional medium as non-fictional (cf. Evans (1982); Recanati (2018)). On
the current analysis, parafictional statements with Acc such as (118b) are thus an
interesting hybrid type of discourse: They are parafictional because they are reports
on the content of a fictional medium s, but also constitute an unofficial extension
of the original fictional discourse of s (which makes them strictly speaking false).
8Hence the analysis provided seems to be in line with Friend’s (2017) claim that all fictional
narratives are essentially to be interpreted as being about the actual world, even when
the described events take place in an outlandish magical realm where for instance Earth
does not even exist.
9In case the reader finds this counterintuitive, we can opt for a semantic analysis of Acc in
terms of “expressing”:
“According to s, φ” is true iff s expresses/expressed that φ
Such an analysis would deem contensive statements such as (120b) true (cf. Voltolini
(2019); Murday (2010)); fictional media may not ‘assert’ (all) their content but they do
‘express’ it. However, the above analysis is unable to account for any of the observations
described in the current section concerning preferences for In and Acc to report on
fictional and non-fictional media. Hence I opt for an analysis of Acc that can account for
all three observations described in this chapter at the cost of making statements such as
(120b) strictly speaking false.
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Parafictional statements with In such as (120a), however, involve no such pretence
and can be really true.
The analysis also explains why contensive statements that report on content
viable for export constitute exceptions to the general awkwardness of the use
of Acc for fiction. Independently from what analysis we adopt of export10, it is
generally assumed that content viable for export is somehow licensed by the author
to be taken as actually true (in addition to fictionally true). We do in fact take the
medium to tell us something about the actual world. Hence the proposed analysis of
Acc predicts a higher acceptability rate for Acc when reporting on fictional content
that is viable for export. For instance, although the Star Wars saga does not tell us
anything about the history of the galaxy, we could take it to be a proper source of
(non-fictional) moral truths. Hence, although we take (120b) to be strictly speaking
false, we take (128b) to be true (i.e., that the Star Wars saga asserts that it is never too
late to redeem yourself). This higher acceptability may even trump the acceptability
of In when it obviously is the point of the fiction to tell us something about the
actual world (as is the case of thought experiments such as Searle’s Chinese room).
The analyses also account for the fact that sometimes In may be appropriate for
contensive statements about non-fiction as in (130a). According to our semantic
analysis of In, (130a) roughly means that in the worlds compatible with Shadow,
Clinton only cares about sex and golf. In other words, the medium is not presented
as telling us something about the actual world. Rather, because we are reporting on
subjective content it is acceptable to report on what the worlds compatible with the
medium are like (i.e., report on Shadow as if it is fiction). The perceived distancing
from the reported content by the speaker of the contensive statement seems to be
the result of pragmatic implication (i.e., given that the relevant medium is non-
fictional, why doesn’t the speaker report on its content as asserting something
about the actual world?)
7.3.2 Explicit/implicit content
Observations
The second observation about the difference between In and Acc relates to whether
the reported content is explicit or implicit in the medium. Semanticists of fiction
often assume some version of Lewis’ (1978) Reality Principle: we assume the
fictional worlds to be as much like the actual world as the story permits. In other
words, we can distinguish two types of fictional truths: ‘Explicit fictional truth’, i.e.,
propositions that are explicitly stated in a story (or follow directly from what was
explicitly stated) and ‘implicit fictional truth’, i.e., propositions that are assumed to
be fictionally true because we consider them to be actually true and the story has
10See section 4.6.2.
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not forced us to revoke them. For instance, it is explicitly fictionally true in The Lord
of the Rings that Frodo inherits Bag End because this follows directly from some of
the statements in the novels. On the other hand, it is implicitly fictionally true in
The Lord of the Rings that water is H2O because we believe this to be actually true
and nothing in the novels contradicts this information.
Semanticists of fiction generally allow for both implicit and explicit fictional
truths to feature in parafictional statements. This type of approach ignores impor-
tant differences in linguistic behaviour between In and Acc. In is appropriately
used to report on both implicit and explicit fictional truth. Consider the following
statements:
(132) In The Lord of the Rings, Frodo inherits Bag End.
(133) In The Lord of the Rings, water is H2O.
Acc displays different behaviour. To the extent that use of Acc to report on fictional
content is acceptable at all, Acc can only appropriately be used to report on explicit
fictional truth. Consider the following statements:
(134) According to The Lord of the Rings, Frodo inherited Bag End.
(135) # According to The Lord of the Rings, water is H2O.
Use of Acc is thus restricted to parafictional statements that report content that is
explicitly stated in the medium or follows directly from what was stated.
This observation generalizes to contensive statements about non-fiction. Con-
sider the following contensive statements about a news report that reports on a
drought (but does not state anything about the molecular structure of water):
(136) According to this news report, there was a terrible drought.
(137) # According to this news report, water is H2O.
Although the fact that water is H2O may be assumed to be true (by speaker and
hearer alike) when engaging with this news report, such ‘implicit truths’ cannot
feature in contensive statements with Acc. Again, Acc is only appropriate to report
on what was explicitly stated in the medium or what follows directly from this.
Analysis
The proposed analyses can account for the above observations concerning implicit
and expicit content. First, the Lewisian analysis of In was formulated so as to
include implicit fictional truths. The worlds compatible with s are the worlds where
s is told as known fact that are as similar as possible to our conception of the actual
world. In other words, everything that we believe to be actually true will be true
in the worlds compatible with s unless s contradicts it. So even though the fact
that water is H2O is never stated explicitly (nor follows from anything that was
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stated) in The Lord of the Rings, still it is true in the worlds compatible with The Lord
of the Rings because the worlds where The Lord of the Rings is told as known fact that
are closest to our conception of the actual world are worlds in which water is H2O.
Thus In can appropriately be used to report on such implicit content.
Second, the analysis of contensive statements with Acc as indirect speech reports
excludes reports on implicit content. Remember that under the non-strict reading
that we adopt of “asserts” in the semantic analysis of Acc, s asserts only those
things that are explicitly stated by s and some of the entailments of what s explicitly
stated. Information that is merely assumed by s but that is neither said nor even
entailed by what was said cannot feature in indirect speech reports (e.g., from the
fact that Anne asserts that Chrissy is cool we cannot derive that Anne asserts that
Chrissy plays basketball even though it may be common ground that she does).
Likewise, it is not appropriate to report on ‘content’ that was not stated explicitly
(or follows from what was stated) in some medium (e.g., The Lord of the Rings or a
news report on a drought) with Acc even though this information may arguably be
part of what is assumed to be true by the medium.11
7.3.3 Tense use
Observations
The third and last observation concerning In and Acc that I will discuss relates to
tense use preferences in contensive statements. As has been observed by Zucchi
(2001), parafictional statements with In display a preference for present tense use
while past tense, although often acceptable, sounds awkward and future tense
simply sounds wrong.12 Parafictional statements with In trigger this preference
for present tense independently from whether the embedded content includes an
eventive or stative verb. Consider for example the following contensive statements
about the Harry Potter novels:
(138) In the Harry Potter novels, there are/?were/#will be wizards in England.
(139) In the Harry Potter novels, Snape kills/?killed/#will kill Dumbledore.
Whereas (138) includes a stative verb and (139) contains an eventive verb, both
contensive statements trigger a preference for present tense.
11This semantic difference between In and Acc suggests that the proper parafictional test
case sentences (i.e., appropriate to check our intuitions against about fictional truth)
should be formulated with In rather than Acc.
12The prohibition against past and future tense in parafictional statements is not absolute.
Consider: “In Patrick O’Brian’s first novel, Jack Aubrey was a post captain, in his new
novel, he is a commodore, in the next novel he will be an admiral.” (Zucchi, 2001, p.334).
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Moreover, parafictional statements with In display a preference for present tense
independently from when the events described in the fiction supposedly take place.
Consider for example the following contensive statements about the Harry Potter
novels, the Star Wars saga and the Star Trek series for which the time of the relevant
fictional events and states described respectively overlap, precede and succeed the
fictional counterpart of the utterance time of the contensive statement:
(138) In the Harry Potter novels, there are/?were/#will be wizards in England.
(140) In the Star Wars saga, Luke destroys/?destroyed/#will destroy the Death
Star.
(141) In the Star Trek series, Earth colonizes/?colonized/#will colonize Mars in
the year 2103.
This preference for present tense does not generalize to parafictional statements
with Acc. Rather, to the extent that Acc is at all acceptable to report on fictional
content, preferences for tense use within these statements seems to depend on the
time of the events described in the narrative relative to the utterance time of the
contensive statement, i.e., whether, at the time of utterance, the relevant fictional
events took, take or will take place:
(142) According to the Harry Potter novels, there are/#were/#will be wizards in
England. (stative/overlap)
(143) According to the Star Wars saga, Luke #destroys/destroyed/#will destroy
the Death Star. (eventive/precede)
(144) According to the Star Trek series, Earth #colonizes/#colonized/will colonize
Mars in the year 2103. (eventive/succeed)
In fact, this is true for contensive statements with Acc in general, i.e., tense use in
contensive statements with Acc about non-fictional media also seems to depend
on the time of the events described in the medium relative to the utterance time
of the contensive statement. Consider tense use in the following statements about
the content of news reports that report on respectively protests going on at this
moment, a robbery last night and tomorrow’s weather:
(145) According to this news report, there are/#were/#will be protests in Amster-
dam.
(146) According to this news report, masked men #rob/robbed/#will rob the
Regio Bank in Erp.
(147) According to this weather forecast, it #is/#was/will be extremely dry.
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Analysis
The proposed semantic analyses of In and Acc can account for these observations.
First, the analysis of In predicts a preference for present tense in contensive state-
ments. To see why, let’s first consider tense use under other intensional operators
such as believe:
(148) Adeela believes that Sara was nervous.
Because this propositional attitude report is a report of a current belief (i.e., the
attitude verb is in present tense), the tense use in the embedded clause tells us
whether Adeela believes Sara to be nervous before, during or after the time of
utterance of (148).13 In the above example: if (148) is uttered at t1 then (148) is true
iff in worlds compatible with what Adeela believes at t1, Sara was nervous at t1 (i.e.,
is nervous at some t where t < t1).
In, although also an intensional operator, functions somewhat differently. Whereas
someone’s beliefs may change over time (e.g., Adeela might change her mind about
whether Sara is in fact nervous), the content of a story or medium (e.g., the Harry
Potter novels) consists in an abstract set of statements or system of axioms that is
timeless. The Harry Potter story today is not going to differ from the Harry Potter
story tomorrow; it is eternally the same abstract object. Hence, although we report
on what some agent’s beliefs are at a certain point in time in (148), in contensive
statements we do not report on what the Harry Potter novels are like at a certain
point in time. Reconsider the present tense version of (138):
(138) In the Harry Potter novels, there are wizards in England.
Even though (138) is uttered at a specific point in time t1, (138) does not mean that
in worlds compatible with the Harry Potter novels at t1, wizards are in England at
t1. Rather, (138) uttered at t1 is true iff in worlds compatible with the Harry Potter
novels (simpliciter), there are wizards in England (at some t). Hence, because it is
true that there are wizards in England at a specific point on the fictional timeline of
the Harry Potter novels, (138) is true. Indeed, given this fact, the past and future
tense versions of (138) (although they sound odd or infelicitous) are also strictly
speaking true on this analysis. It is true on some point in the timeline of the Harry
Potter worlds that there were wizards in England and similarly there is such a point
where there will be wizards in England. In other words, the Lewisian analysis of In
(since it does not designate a specific time of evaluation) strictly speaking permits
present, past and future tense use in contensive statements:14
13Reports with past or future tense attitude verbs (e.g., ‘Adeela believed/will believe
that Sara is nervous’) pose additional complications since tense in these reports can be
bound rather than indexical (see Abusch (1997); Toshyuki and Sharvit (2012)).
14In fact, Lewis (1978), uses both past tense and present tense in his examples of parafic-
tional truths.
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(149) In the Harry Potter novels, there ?were/#will be wizards in England.
I suggest that this fact licenses a gnomic or generic use of the present tense
(see e.g., Carlson (1982)) that is similar to that in scientific statements that express
timeless truths (e.g., the fact that whales are, were and will be mammals is most nat-
urally expressed as “Whales are mammals”). We thus get a preference for present
tense in parafictional statements with In.15 The same reasoning applies to con-
tensive statements with In that report on fictions about past or future events (e.g.,
it is true at some point on the fictional timeline of Star Wars that Luke destroys the
Death Star) and hence these will also display a preference for present tense.16
Second, the proposed analysis of Acc accounts for tense use in contensive state-
ments with this operator. Contensive statements with Acc are analysed as indirect
speech reports (i.e., reports on what a medium ‘asserts’). Hence tense use in such
contensive statements mirrors that of indirect speech reports. If an indirect speech
report reports on a ‘current’ speech event (i.e., the speech verb is in present tense),
then the tense use in the embedded clause mirrors that of the reported speech act.
The reported speaker’s tense use in turn depends on whether the time of the events
described coincides, precedes or succeeds the utterance time of her statement, i.e.,
whether she is telling us what things are, were or will be like. Hence, tense use in
indirect speech reports on current speech events shifts depending on whether the
time of the described events coincides, precedes or succeeds the utterance time of
the contensive statement. For instance, if Adeela says “Sara will be nervous” at t1,
a speech report at t1 will mirror her tense use:
(150) Adeela asserts that Sara will be nervous.
Sentence (150) uttered at t1 is true iff Adeela asserts at t1 that Sara is nervous at
some t such that t > t1.17
15See Zucchi (2001) for an alternative possible world analysis of In that accounts for this
present tense preference by switching the time of evaluation to the time of the described
events.
16In fact, the same reasoning also applies to contensive statements with In that report on
non-fiction (e.g., 130) which thus also display a preference for present tense (cf. Zucchi
(2001)):
(xi) In Shadow, Clinton only cares/? cared/# will care about sex and golf.
17I assume a simple analysis of “will” as a tense marker (see e.g., Prior’s (1967) ‘Ockhamist
semantics’ or Kissine (2008); Salkie (2010)). Under a modal analysis (e.g., Condoravdi
(2002); Enç (1996)) “will” still has a temporal dimension and hence a modal analysis
can also be incorporated into my analysis.
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A contensive statements with Acc is analysed as a report on what a medium
asserts. Hence it is a report on a current speech event.18 In other words, unlike
contensive statements with In, contensive statements with Acc are essentially time
bound; they report on what the medium asserts now.19 Likewise, tense use in
contensive statements with Acc shifts depending on whether the events described
by the medium overlap, precede or succeed the utterance time of the contensive
statement. For example, since the Star Wars saga is about events that supposedly
took place a long time ago (in a galaxy far, far away), we use past tense when we
report on its content using Acc. For example, on either an ‘extended pretence’ (i.e.,
where we pretend that Star Wars is a non-fictional report) or ‘export’ reading (which
are both hard to get here), we report that Star Wars asserts that Luke destroyed the
Death Star. Hence, to the extent that (143) is acceptable, it displays a preference for
past tense:
(143) According to the Star Wars saga, Luke destroyed the Death Star.
Sentence (143) uttered at t1 is true iff Star Wars asserts at t1 that Luke destroyed the
Death Star at t1 (i.e., destroys the Death Star at some t such that t < t1). Likewise,
since a medium like the news report on protests in Amsterdam in (145) reports
on events that are currently taking place and the Star Trek series is (amongst other
things) about events that supposedly will take place in the future, we report on the
content of these media using present and future tense respectively.
7.4 Outlook
7.4.1 Conclusions
In this chapter I have argued that the In and Acc operators require separate seman-
tic analyses to account for three linguistic observations. These concern preferences
for using In for contensive statements about fiction and Acc for non-fiction; the
18A complication for this comparison to indirect speech reports is that whereas the speech
report about Adeela’s assertion mirrors her tense use, tense use in contensive statements
does not necessarily mirror the tense use in the medium itself. For instance, although a
science fiction novel may be written from the point of view of the year 4020 and include
the past tense statement “Mars was inhabited in 3020”, it currently (in 2021) asserts that
Mars will be inhabited in 3020.
19Maybe some assertions made by media can (like a person’s assertions) also be past events,
i.e., maybe s can sometimes also be reported on as having asserted that p. For instance,
is it admissible on Wednesday to report on Monday’s weather forecast about Tuesday
with “According to Monday’s weather forecast, Tuesday was going to be a great day
for skiing” or should we say “According to Monday’s weather forecast, Tuesday was a
great day for skiing”? I leave this question to future research.
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unacceptability of using Acc to report on implicit content (whereas In is fine for
implicit and explicit content); and preferences for present tense in contensive state-
ments with In and tense use in contensive statements with Acc depending on
whether the events described by the medium overlap, precede or succeed the
utterance time of the contensive statement.
I have proposed to adopt the Lewisian possible world analysis of parafictional
statements for contensive statements with In: “In s, φ” is true iff in the worlds
compatible with s, φ. I have proposed to analyse contensive statements with Acc as
indirect speech reports: “Acc s, φ” is true iff s asserts/asserted that φ. Lastly, I have
explained how the proposed analyses account for the three described linguistic
observations.
7.4.2 Future research
‘According to’ and fictive closure
In the rest of this dissertation I have treated parafictional statements with In and
Acc on a par. An obvious direction for further research is to explore whether and
how we could incorporate the semantic analyses of In and Acc that have been
proposed in the current chapter into the workspace account. This subsection gives
a brief sketch of a proposal.
First of all, to model how information of the form ‘Acc s, φ’ enters the common
ground we would have to incorporate a mechanism that tags explicit content (i.e.,
all newly incoming information or what follows directly from that) as ‘said by
the source’ in the workspace. In other words, apart from a workspace update
with the asserted content p, we also represent the non-essential update ‘s said p’
(see Stalnaker (2002)) at every utterance. Given our analysis of Acc as an indirect
speech report, this amounts to an update with information of the form ‘Acc s,
φ’. Assertive and fictive closure will thus result in the following updates: After
reading a newspaper article it will be common ground that ‘It is raining’ and that
‘According to the newspaper article, it is raining’. After reading the Harry Potter
books, it will be common ground that ‘In the Harry Potter books, there are wizards
in England’ and that ‘In the Harry Potter books, according to the Harry Potter books,
there are wizards in England’. This fits the proposed analysis according to which
most contensive statements about fiction that are formulated with Acc are strictly
speaking false (see section 7.3.1). As has been discussed above, there do seem to
be some contensive statements about fiction formulated with Acc that we deem
true, i.e., those that report on content viable for export. In section 4.6.2 I suggested
that export is based on analogical reasoning with parafictional information. For
instance, from ‘In the Harry Potter books, love conquers all’ we may derive that
‘Love conquers all’. Here I suggest that such inferences, paired with the information
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that ‘Love conquers all’ follows from what was explicitly stated in the Harry Potter
books, would license an additional inference to ‘According to the Harry Potter
books, love conquers all’.
Secondly, one place where the proposed semantic analyses of In and Acc may
complicate the discussion is in the analysis of bald-faced lies (see chapter 5). I
leave detailed exploration of this to further research but will sketch some of the
issues that may arise. In chapter 5, I argued that bald-faced lies are (as a speech act)
more akin to fictional statements than to lies. However, contensive statements that
report on bald-faced lies in institutionalized, rule-bound settings are most naturally
formulated with Acc rather than with In:
(151) a. ? In the courtroom proceedings/records, Pentangeli knew no Godfather
b. According to the courtroom proceedings/records, Pentangeli knew no
Godfather
The worry is that such reports thus mirror the preference for Acc that reports on non-
fictional media display. However, the inappropriateness of In does not generalize
to all bald-faced lie scenarios. For instance, we can report on the bald-faced lie in
Meibauer’s (2014) cheating husband scenario with In:
(152) In this game that they have been playing for a few years now, he is faithful
to her.
Moreover, as has been discussed, the preference for In in reports on fiction is not
absolute, i.e., content licensed for export is fit to be reported on with Acc. Given
that there is a truth-tracking requirement on court conversations (see section 5.4.5),
the embedded content in (151b) seems apt for export.
A second, related, worry might be that updates with information of the form
‘Acc s, φ’ take place for fiction and non-fiction alike. I argued that bald-faced lies are
like fictional statements in part because they seem to involve a parafictional update
as part of their essential updates; a successful bald-faced lie has to go ‘on the record’
and hence, like a successful fictional statement, has to make a modalized statement
of the form ‘In/Acc s, φ’ common ground. However, as noted above, for bald-faced
lies in institutional settings (where the modalized update is really the point of
the bald-faced lie), these updates are most naturally formulated with Acc, rather
than with In. In light of the semantic analyses proposed in the current chapter, we
may take this to suggest that ‘going on the record’ is something different from the
Lewisian parafictional update involved in fictive closure. Rather, what is required is
the (non-essential) update with information of the form ‘Acc s, φ’ which may take
place in the case of fictional and non-fictional discourse. In other words, whether
you make an assertion or a fictional statement, you are always successful at ‘going
on the record’ in this sense. However, this still would not prove that bald-faced lies
in institutional settings could just as well be modelled as lies. This is because the
definition of assertion still incorporates an update of the common ground with the
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expressed content as essential update, i.e., a successful assertion of p updates the
common ground with p. The definition of fictional statements on the other hand,
does not incorporate such an update (it merely requires that the expressed content
does not ‘evaporate’, i.e., a common ground update with ‘In s, p’). Similarly, the
success of a bald-faced lie does not depend on whether the common ground is
updated with the content that it expresses, e.g., Pentangeli’s bald-faced lie was
successful even though he did not update the stable common ground with the
information that he did not know the Godfather (cf. section 5.4.1).
Pilot experiment on tense use
Another obvious direction of future research is to subject the proposed semantic
analyses of In and Acc to empirical scrutiny. More specifically, the general picture
of the use of In and Acc in contensive statements that has been presented in this
chapter naturally invites experimental conformation. It would be interesting to
see whether the three clusters of linguistic observations concerning preferences for
fiction/non-fiction, implicit/explicit content and tense use in contensive statements
with In and Acc can be experimentally verified.
To this end I have collaborated with Bimpikou on a pilot experiment that inves-
tigated tense use in parafictional statements with In (see Semeijn and Bimpikou
(2019)). We empirically tested three variants of the Lewisian analysis of In that
(unlike the original Lewisian analysis) specify a time of evaluation and thus make
predictions about tense use. The time of evaluation in the three different analyses
were respectively [1] the time of the described events (cf. Zucchi (2001)), [2] the
time of fictional narration and [3] the utterance time of the contensive statement
(cf. this chapter’s analysis of Acc). To tease apart the three analyses we distin-
guished between individual-level predicates (e.g., ‘be a detective’, ‘be a hobbit’)
and stage-level predicates (e.g., ‘light a pipe’, ‘climb Mount Doom’). Second, we
distinguished ‘homodiegetic’ narratives about past events in which the time of
narration roughly coincides with the time of the events described in the novel (e.g.,
the Holmes stories, which supposedly are narrated by Holmes’ friend Watson)
from ‘heterodiegetic’ narratives about past events in which the time of narration
is obviously long after the time of the described events (e.g., The Lord of the Rings,
which supposedly are records of events in a distant past). Intuitively, at Watson’s
time of narration, Holmes is a detective and lit his pipe but at the time of narration
of the narrator of The Lord of the Rings, Frodo was a hobbit and climbed Mount Doom.
By contrast, at the time of the described events, Holmes is a detective and lights his
pipe and Frodo is a hobbit and climbs Mount Doom. Lastly, at the utterance time of
the contensive statement – assuming a uniform cross-world timeline – Holmes was
a detective and lit his pipe and Frodo was a hobbit and climbed Mount Doom.
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We conducted a questionnaire on Amazon Mechanical Turk. We used a 2× 2
experimental design with ‘type of narrative’ (heterodiegetic/homodiegetic) and
‘type of predicate’ (individual-level/stage-level) as factors. 32 participants were
shown 16 short stories (4 for every condition) each followed by 2 pairs of parafic-
tional sentences with In (2 targets, 2 controls) in simple present and simple past
versions. Below is an example item consisting of a homodiegetic narrative followed
by target sentences with individual-level predicates:
Subha Datta
My dear friend Subha Datta is a woodcutter and every day he goes to the forest
near his home to get supplies of wood. Sometimes he takes his three boys with
him, and now and then, as a special treat, his two little girls are allowed to trot
along beside him. Subha has told his sons that as soon as they are old enough
he will give each of them a little axe of his own. The girls, he has said, must be
content with breaking off small twigs from the branches he cuts down.
One day, Subha told his children that none of them could come with him,
for he meant to go a very long way into the forest, to see if he could find better
wood there than nearer home. Vainly the boys entreated him to take them with
him. “Not today,” he said, “you would be too tired to go all the way. You must
help your mother today and play with your sisters.”
• In the fairy tale, Subha Datta encourages his daughters to chop wood.
• In the fairy tale, Subha Datta encouraged his daughters to chop wood.
• In the fairy tale, Subha Datta made a living by cutting wood.
• In the fairy tale, Subha Datta makes a living by cutting wood.
The questionnaire consisted in a four-alternative forced-choice task. Participants
were given the instruction to “choose the sentence that best describes (part of) the




Overall results show that participants chose mainly past tense, except in the
homodiegetic/individual-level condition, where they preferred present tense. This
tentatively supports analysis [2] (i.e., the time of evaluation is the time of the
fictional narration) and speaks against Zucchi’s (2001) observation of a general
preference for present tense in parafictional statements with In. However, since
the participants answered questions about stories that were on a screen in front
of them, they may have been inclined to simply copy the (narrator’s) tense use
rather than report their own preferences. In future experiments it would be inter-
esting to check tense use preferences in parafictional statements about well-known
narratives without showing them to the participants.
Other languages
Another potentially fruitful direction for future research is to explore to what extent
the presented observations generalize to other languages. Although I focus on
English language use in this dissertation, on the face of it, the In and Acc contrast


























































































‘In The Hobbit, Bilbo travels to the Lonely Mountain.’
(158) French
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‘According to The Hobbit, Bilbo travels to the Lonely Mountain.’
Dutch ‘in’ and ‘volgens’, Spanish ‘en’ and ‘según’ and French ‘dans’ and ‘selon’
seem to display similar behaviour to In and Acc in English (e.g., preferences for
‘in’, ‘en’ and ‘dans’ over respectively ‘volgens’, ‘según’ and ‘selon’ for contensive
statements about fiction). This suggests that there is indeed an important contrast
here that is not just a peculiarity of English grammar. It would be interesting to see
whether the In/Acc contrast generalizes to languages that are not Indo-European.
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8 Unreliable narration and
imaginative resistance
This chapter is a slightly revised version of the paper ‘Extracting fic-
tional truth from unreliable sources’ which is co-authored with Emar
Maier and fortcoming in OUP’s The Language of Fiction. The most sub-
stantial difference between this chapter and the volume contribution
are: first, the addition of a brief discussion of the need of some kind
of revision operator for workspace updates and how this relates to the
overall project of modelling fictional and non-fictional discourse uni-
formly in a Stalnakerian framework (section 8.2.1 and 8.2.2). Second,
the removal of the introduction of the workspace account.
8.1 Introduction
It is a fiction author’s prerogative to decide what’s true in the fictional worlds
she creates. After all, it’s her words that create this world, by saying what it’s like
in there. When Tolkien wrote that “Frodo had a very trying time that afternoon”
it automatically became true in the Lord of the Rings saga that Frodo had a very
trying time on a particular afternoon. This line of thinking can be summed up in
the principle of Authorial Authority:1
Authorial Authority: If s is part of text T (and not a quotation), then the
proposition expressed by s is true in the world of T.
This principle seems to hold for all fiction, and only for fiction. If a historian or
journalist writes that Napoleon was 1.47m tall, this does not thereby become ‘true in
the world of the historical text’.2 What the historian writes is true or false depending
We would like to thank Andreas Stokke, the audience at the Language of Fiction workshop
at Uppsala University, the audience at the Linguistic Perspectives on Perspective-Taking in
Narrative Discourse workshop at the University of Wuppertal and the audience at the
Multiple Perspectives workshop at Radboud University for valuable comments, questions,
and discussions.
1This formulation has been adapted from Badura and Berto (2019).
2Though see for instance Zucchi (forthcoming) for an opposing view on which any
discourse or text T makes it true that ‘in/according to T, φ’ (for any φ in T). As has been
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on what the actual world is like. At first sight then, Authorial Authority promises
to help pin down what fiction is, and how it differs from non-fiction.
Unfortunately, truth in fiction is not always so straightforward. First, as has been
discussed in chapter 4, fictional truth can be implicit. Lewis and many subsequent
authors in philosophy and narratology have observed that there are many proposi-
tions that are true in a given fiction beyond the ones that make up the text. In the
Harry Potter books, milk comes from cows, water is H2O, and people are annoyed
if you cut in line. More interestingly, the opposite is also true. There are cases where
a text says that p, but that fails to be true in the world of the fiction. These cases
of Authorial Authority breakdowns are likewise much discussed in both literary
studies and philosophy, but in rather different terms. The first group talks about
unreliable narrators, i.e., narrators that misinform or misjudge because they are
trying to deceive, are prejudiced, naïve, or confused. For instance, in The Adventures
of Huckleberry Finn the narrator, Huck, gives the following report on a dinner with
the widow Douglas:
(159) The widow rung a bell for supper, and you had to come to time. When you
got to the table you couldn’t go right to eating, but you had to wait for the
widow to tuck down her head and grumble a little over the victuals, though
there warn’t really anything the matter with them.
Huck reports that Douglas grumbles over her food before eating as if she were
unhappy with it but the reader realizes that Huck fails to understand that actually
she was praying. Hence even though the text states that Douglas grumbled over
her food, this is not true in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Rather, it is true in
the fiction that the widow prayed before taking her meal and that Huck mistook
this for dissatisfied grumbling.
Somewhat independently from literary scholars’ debates about unreliable narra-
tion, there is a now long-standing debate in philosophy about so-called ‘imagina-
tive resistance’, a phenomenon whereby readers of a fictional text resist imagining
and/or accepting a part of a story. Consider the story Fish Tank:
(160) Sara never liked animals. One day, her father caught her kicking the neigh-
bor’s dog. He got really angry and she was grounded for a week. To get back
at her father she poured bleach in the big fish tank, killing all the beautiful
fish that he loved so much. Good thing that she did, because he was really
annoying.
Readers can go along imagining a sadistic protagonist kicking her neighbor’s dog
and killing her father’s fish, but when they arrive at the evaluative statement “Good
thing that she did” they resist. Even though the text explicitly states that it was




good that she did this, readers report that they can’t or won’t imagine that this is
so, nor do they accept that it is true in the story.
In sum, cases of imaginative resistance and unreliable narration alike constitute
clear prima facie counterexamples to the intuitive Authorial Authority principle
for fiction. But if we can’t trust the author’s words to give us the fictional truths,
how do we know what’s true in the story? How do readers of stories like the above
figure out what the fictional world is like?
This chapter starts with a brief discussion of the need of some kind of revision
operator for workspace updates and how this relates to the overall project of mod-
elling fictional and non-fictional discourse uniformly in a Stalnakerian framework
(section 8.2). We then present an extension of the workspace account that takes into
account the role of the (unreliable) narrator and the phenomenon of imaginative
resistance by incorporating insights from belief revision logic (section 8.3). We then
apply this framework to the two concrete examples of unreliable narration and
imaginative resistance above (section 8.4).
8.2 Workspace revision
8.2.1 Basic motivation
Separate from issues concerning unreliable narrators and imaginative resistance,
there is in fact already a basic need for some kind of revision mechanism in the
workspace account (see sections 3.3.1 and 4.4). This is because fictional stories often
introduce content that is inconsistent with our shared background information.
Let’s consider another example of a fictional discourse to illustrate this. Suppose a
reader picks up Heinlein’s classic 1961 sci-fi novel Stranger in a Strange Land. At this
point it is for instance common ground between her and Heinlein that someone








At the start of the fictional discourse, a new workspace is opened up that is a copy
of the current common ground (assuming that no relevant genre conventions are
common ground). Now the workspace is updated with the information expressed
by the first sentence (162) of the novel:
(162) Once upon a time when the world was young there was a Martian named
Smith.
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wrote(x’,y’) stranger.in.strange.land(y’) . . .
martian(z’) Smith(z’)
W〉
As has been discussed in chapter 4, after the fictive discourse (i.e., at fictive closure)
the content expressed by (163) is quarantined from the content in the persistent
common ground because it is placed under a fiction operator; after the fictional
discourse it isn’t common ground that there exists a Martian named Smith but it is
common ground that ‘In Stranger in a Strange Land, there exists a Martian named
Smith’. This neatly avoids a clash in the common ground between the incoming
fictional information and our background information which will definitely in-
clude some uncontroversial information about the history of space travel, hidden
somewhere in the ‘. . . ’, that conflicts with the existence of Martians named Smith.
However, remember that a new workspace is a complete copy of the entire
current common ground. Hence the inconsistency remains present in the workspace
during the fictional discourse and, afterwards, embedded under the fiction operator
in the new persistent common ground.3 This is unsatisfactory. We do not accept
inconsistencies as true in the fiction just because incoming fictional updates clash
with our background information. Rather, we need an analysis of how we easily
give up background assumptions about actual space travel and the non-existence
of Martians from the workspace, when confronted with a fictional text that states
or entails otherwise.
The workspace account has been formulated with workspace revision (i.e., W ∗ p)
as an option for workspace updates.4 This allows us to model our interpretation
of fictional truth in a way that fits the Lewisian analysis of the fiction operator
(i.e., everything that is common ground simpliciter is also true in the fiction unless
it is contradicted by the fictional discourse). An interesting feature of this way
of modelling fictional discourse is that it predicts that, since the proposition that
Martians do not exist (¬p) is part of the workspace at the start of the discourse,
Heinlein himself also temporarily accepts ¬p at the start of the discourse. He sub-
sequently updates the workspace with p by introducing a Martian in the fictional
discourse and hence ¬p is removed from the workspace, i.e., Heinlein and his
readers no longer accept that ¬p. In other words, Heinlein can fictionally state p
while accepting ¬p. In non-fictional conversations, however, such common ground
revision that is prompted by a speech act by one of the conversational participants
3In a similar way fictive opening with genre conventions (e.g., that in fairytales, dragons
breathe fire) can lead to inconsistencies in the workspace.
4Similarly, in the unofficial common ground accounts, updates of unofficial common
grounds can involve revision if we assume that a new unupdated unofficial common
ground (CBASE) is a copy of the current official common ground (see section 3.3.1).
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seems odd, if not impossible.5 If some speaker a accepts ¬p for the purpose of the
conversation, why would they then say (something that implies) p? Doesn’t the
fact that a asserted p mean that a apparently did not accept ¬p in the first place
and hence that ¬p wasn’t actually common ground (even though the hearer might
have thought it was)? Up until now, I have tacitly assumed that this is indeed
how workspace updates work in fictional and non-fictional discourse. In fictional
discourse what is part of the workspace does not necessarily dictate what speech
acts can be made. A speaker that produces fictional discourse can accept ¬p but
can nonetheless decide to make p part of their fictional discourse (e.g., decide that
Martians or hobbits exist in the fiction) and hence come to, during the discourse,
revise their acceptance of ¬p. A speaker in non-fictional discourse, however, does
not seem to be free to revise what they accept in this way.
The version of the workspace account that we’ve been working with in previous
chapters thus allows for some asymmetry between fictional and non-fictional
discourse; although both assertions and fictional statements update a temporary
workspace (which is a copy of the current common ground), only in the case of
fictional discourse can these updates also lead to workspace revision. This shows
us that it is challenging to combine total uniformity of fictional and non-fictional
discourse (i.e., the desideratum we took from Matravers’ theory) with complete
uniformity of how speaker and hearer engage with a discourse (i.e., how discourse
is modelled in Stalnaker’s common ground framework that abstracts away from
individual mental states). On the current analysis, a speaker’s engagement with
fictional discourse differs from her engagement with non-fictional discourse; in
the first case she can contradict what she accepts, in the latter she cannot. This
asymmetry is not contra Matravers’ theory per se because it entails a difference in
the production of fictional versus non-fictional discourse, not in the interpretation
of the discourse. Matravers’ theory really only predicts uniformity of the reader’s
interpretation of fictional and non-fictional discourse. In line with Matravers, the
hearer’s conception of the workspace can involve revision in both the case of
non-fictional and fictional discourse. This is what we model in this chapter.
8.2.2 A psychologistic turn
Alternatively, we may place the asymmetry somewhere else if we analyse fictional
discourse that contradicts shared background information as giving rise to a de-
fective context, i.e., conceptions of what is commonly accepted diverge (at least
momentarily). Although the reader may have accepted that Martians do not exist at
the start of the discourse (and considered this to be common ground), Heinlein did
5By contrast, common ground revision that is prompted by for instance the shared per-
ception of some event that contradicts previous shared background seems possible.
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not (e.g., because he knew what kind of story he wanted to write) even though this
information is persistent common ground. On such an analysis, workspace updates
never involve revision, also not in the case of fictional discourse. The asymmetry
between fictional and non-fictional discourse is now placed at the starting point of
the discourse, i.e., what is commonly accepted at the start of fictional discourse is
not necessarily a duplicate of the persistent common ground, although this is still
the case for non-fictional discourse.
In formulating the workspace account I have up till now used DRS’s as repre-
sentations of Stalnakerian common grounds, i.e., speech acts have been defined
in terms of how they update the common ground.6 However, if we maintain that
there is a defective context in the Heinlein case, then the workspace account (with
its copying mechanism for new workspaces and revision operator)7 only correctly
represents the hearer’s interpretative processes. Only the reader’s conception of
the workspace included the information that Martians do not exist and was subse-
quently revised, the actual workspace never contained this information. We could
then opt for a moderate psychologistic move (see also the discussion in section
5.2) and define speech acts in terms of the hearer’s conception of the workspace
and common ground. DRS’s would then represent represent part of the mental
state of the interpreter of the discourse, viz. the interpreter’s beliefs about what
is common ground between herself and the speaker (i.e., what Stalnaker would
call the hearer’s presuppositions). In short, an assertion that p triggers the hearer
to update her conception of what is temporarily common ground with p and (at
the end of the non-fictional discourse) perform assertive closure, i.e., update her
conception of what is persistent common ground with p. A fictional statement p
(of a story s) triggers the hearer to update her conception of what is temporarily
common ground with p and perform fictive closure, i.e., update her conception of
what is persistent common ground with ‘In s, p’.
In this chapter we remain agnostic with respect to whether common ground
revision is possible in the case of fictional discourse but adopt a mentalistic repre-
sentation of DRS’s anyway. This is because our current aim is to model how revision
6With the notable exception of chapter 5 where I suggested that one way to model lies
in a Stalnakerian framework is to define speech acts in terms of how they update the
hearer’s conception of the (persistent) common ground.
7In fact, we are not necessarily forced to make this psychologistic turn. Arguably, we
could formulate a version of the workspace account purely in terms of common ground
updates where it is not part of the workspace (and nobody mistakenly considers it
to be part of the workspace) that Martians don’t exist at the start of the Heinlein
discourse. Such an account could involve starting out with a tabula rasa workspace (i.e.,
nothing is commonly accepted at the start of any new discourse) and accommodation
of background information from the persistent common ground where necessary (see
also section 3.3.1 for a brief discussion of such an approach).
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processes involved in a hearer’s interpretation of a discourse are uniform across fic-
tional and non-fictional discourse. If we want to model this we have to assume that
the DRS’s below represent the hearer’s conception of the workspace because (on
either analysis of fictional discourse) in the case of non-fictional discourse, revision
only takes place at this level, i.e., the actual temporary acceptance-based common
ground is not revised. Consider for instance what happens when a hearer believes
it to be common ground that only birds fly and then a trusted source says “You do
know that bats are not birds, right?”. In that case the hearer’s presuppositions do
not coincide with the actual workspace – the speaker may have never believed or
even accepted that only birds fly – and what we’re interested in capturing is how
the hearer’s presuppositions rather than the actual common ground are revised in
light of the new information.
As for notation, we officially represent interpretation contexts as a pair consisting
of (the hearer’s conception of) a persistent or stable common ground and an active
workspace or the empty set. As before, in workspaces we’ll use primed copies of
the original discourse referents (x’, y’,. . . ) and in some examples we’ll just display
the current workspace or the stable common ground. For reasons of space we’re
not explicitly implementing any theory of anchoring or direct reference in DRT
here (see the discussion in section 4.6.1 and e.g., Kamp (1990); Kamp (forthcoming);
Hunter (2013); Maier (2009b)). We will assume that the notational convention of
‘priming’ all discourse referents in creating a workspace reflects a formal linking,
so that if x is somehow anchored (i.e., directly referential) to Trump, so is x’.
8.2.3 Writers in fiction
Before we turn to revision, there is another striking feature of our output DRS that
requires comment. According to the DRS that represents the update caused by the
Heinlein discourse (163), it is part of the workspace that there is a writer named
Heinlein who wrote a book named Stranger in a Strange Land. Hence, after fictive
closure, it will become common ground that in the fictional world of the book there
is a writer named Heinlein who wrote a book named Stranger in a Strange Land. In
other words, somewhere in the fictional universe there exists not only a Martian
named Smith but also some guy named Heinlein writing about Martians. Revision
might help us avoid this counterintuitive consequence in cases where the content
of the story conflicts with the existence of a human fiction author writing a fictional
book. However, in many cases there may be nothing in the story to contradict the
existence of an author with a certain name, somewhere in the background in a
remote (in space and time) corner of the universe, away from the main events of the
story. In the case at hand, some stable common ground assumptions about Heinlein
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will perhaps have to be given up to maintain consistency.8 For instance, it is highly
unlikely that someone published a famous science fiction story about a Martian
named Valentine Michael Smith, which much later, years in the future (after World
War III) turned out to happen exactly as described. On the other hand, the mere
fact that there was a sci-fi author (in the distant past) named Heinlein seems less
controversial and may well survive revision, yielding something like the output
in (163), with a discourse referent for Heinlein in the representation of the fiction.
Note that this fictional Heinlein counterpart in (163) is not to be equated with the
narrator of the story. For one, the narrator is temporally located at some unspecified
time after the events, while this fictional Heinlein lives in the 1960’s. Moreover, the
fictional narrator by definition tells the story ‘as known fact’ (Lewis (1978)), while
the fictional Heinlein, like the real one, wrote the story as pure fiction. We return to
the status of the narrator in section 8.4.
Summing up, on our account some common ground facts surrounding the real-
world author and book may be imported into the representation of the fictional
world. Revision, especially if based on plausibility, may remove some unwanted
imports (like the fact that the content of Heinlein’s 1961 fiction happens to match
post WW3 reality). For the remaining imports, like those depicted in (163), we’ll
follow Walton’s (1990) lead: without any textual or other evidence to the contrary,
we assume that there was a 20th century author named Heinlein in the world of
Stranger in a Strange Land. But as this information is completely irrelevant to the
events in the story, none of the fictional characters nor the narrator will ever refer to
the Heinlein discourse referent, so it will quickly fade into the background, as will
presumably be captured by a more realistic processing model of regular common
ground updating that tracks the salience of discourse referents and/or associated
conditions.
8.3 Fiction updates and belief revision
8.3.1 Introducing belief revision
In the 1980’s, around the same time as linguists started developing dynamic se-
mantics, researchers in computer science, AI, and philosophy of science started
developing logical tools to describe how a system of beliefs reacts to an influx of
new, possibly conflicting information. Unlike regular dynamic semantics, belief re-
vision describes also nonmonotonic updates, i.e., removing previously established
8Consistency need not be understood as mere logical consistency. It’s best thought of
in terms of a gradable, context-dependent notion of possibility, coherence and/or
plausibility. We won’t formalise this notion here.
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information from the context or belief state because the new information conflicts
with those previously held beliefs.
As in dynamic semantics, there are ‘representational’ (or ‘syntactic’) versions of
the theory, where a belief is a set of sentences in some logical language, and more
semantic versions, where a belief is modeled as a set of possible worlds (Grove
(1988)). Since we’re already using the representational framework of DRT, we’ll
adopt a version of the former, classic belief revision theory, known as the AGM
model (Alchourron et al. (1985)). More specifically, we’ll adopt a version with beliefs
modeled as belief bases, which contain only the agent’s core beliefs, rather than
the logically closed belief sets that contain everything that the agent is arguably
committed to on the basis of their belief base and general principles of rationality
(see Hansson (1994, 1998); Nebel (1998)). For instance, if I believe that it’s raining,
I’m committed to believing that it’s raining or sunny, but that particular disjunction
is not usually part of my core belief base.
The basic operation in AGM is contraction of a belief base K with a statement φ,
that is, reducing the set K in such a way that it no longer entails φ. AGM spells out a
number of postulates to axiomatize well-behaved contraction operations. One way
of constructing such a well-behaved contraction operation is on the basis of a given
‘epistemic entrenchment’ order: φ < ψ iff φ is less entrenched than ψ, i.e., ψ has
more epistemic worth (e.g., because it derives directly from a trusted knowledge
source) and therefore is less easily given up than φ. Natural and moral laws for
instance may be considered to be more entrenched than concrete contingent facts,
especially if based on hearsay rather than direct perception. An agent’s belief base is
fully characterized by a set of statements K and an entrenchment ordering < (again,
satisfying certain axioms of rationality, like transitivity and the fact that logical
consequences of φ are at least as entrenched as φ itself, Gärdenfors (1988)) on the
set of well-formed formulas of the language. Contracting K with (a non-tautology)
φ (notation: K÷ φ) now means that we chose a K′ ⊆ K such that K′ does not entail
φ. Epistemic entrenchment helps us single out an optimal such K′, for instance with
the following definition of entrenchment-based contraction:
(164) K÷ φ = {ψ ∈ K | φ < (φ ∨ ψ), or φ is a tautology}
Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988) show that the above definition generates a well-
behaved contraction operation, obeying all their rationality postulates. However,
when we consider only finite belief bases, rather than logically closed belief sets, as-
suming a full entrenchment order on the entire language seems like overkill. Hence,
Williams (1994), for instance, introduces the notion of an ‘ensconcement’, which
is essentially a finite entrenchment on the formulas in the base. We refer to Nebel
(1998) for in-depth study of entrenchment and related notions (e.g., ‘prioritized
base revision’) applied to belief bases rather than belief sets. Below we’ll continue
to use the familiar term ‘epistemic entrenchment’, requiring only an intuitive under-
standing of how an entrenchment relation on a finite set of statements K can guide
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the process of contracting K with φ, by letting it eliminate from K as few as possible
of the least entrenched conditions as needed to avoid entailing φ. Concretely, we
just start from the lowest rank and then move up to the next if that doesn’t help us
get rid of φ.
Once we have contraction, AGM defines belief revision with p as the process of
first contracting with ¬p and then adding (‘expanding with’) p. But since we’re
dealing with belief bases, which, unlike belief sets, need not be consistent, we can
also do it the other way around: first expand with p and then contract with ¬p.
Either way, the resulting belief base always entails p, i.e., new incoming information
trumps all previous beliefs. In so-called ‘semi-revision’ we level the playing field
and treat old and new information on a par, with only epistemic entrenchment
as the guiding factor. Formally, this amounts to adding p and then removing the
contradiction:
(165) (K ∪ {p})÷⊥
Below we implement this kind of revision in our DRT update mechanism so
we can deal with the pervasive nonmonotonic updating required to incorporate
fictional statements that contradict the initial common ground copy. See Badura
and Berto (2019) for a similar application of belief revision to fiction, but in a more
semantic possible (and impossible) worlds approach.
8.3.2 Belief revision in the DRT workspace
First, consider a mini-discourse that leads to an inconsistent workspace in the
domain of non-fictional conversation. Consider a conversation between a speaker
and a hearer who believes it to be common ground that there is a person called
Maxine who is vegan and who loves animals. We open a new workspace with an
exact copy of this information. The speaker now says (166), resulting in an updated
workspace (167).













Given certain background assumptions about the relation between loving and
beating, and donkeys being animals, conveniently hidden in the ‘. . . ’ in (167), the
conjunction of loving animals and beating donkeys may well entail a contradic-
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tion.9 Depending on for instance how much the hearer trusts her own background
information about Maxine (and about donkey keeping) and how reliable she takes
the speaker to be, she will then want to revise the workspace, giving up some
piece of information in order to restore consistency. We can implement the central
insights from AGM belief revision introduced above to model this.
Note first that instead of belief bases we now have DRS’s (pairs of sets of dis-
course referents and DRS conditions). To incorporate the entrenchment order we
number the DRS conditions and add a third DRS compartment specifying a par-
tial order on the conditions via these number labels. This models the epistemic
entrenchment of the various bits of information that make up the DRS and thereby
guide the process of resolving inconsistencies.10 Concretely, the stable common
ground representation at the start of the vegan discourse may now look like this,
modeling a situation where the hearer quite strongly supposes it to be common
ground between himself and the speaker that Maxine indeed bears that name, and




3:loves.animals(x) . . .
1 > {2, 3}
C
Second, we assume that instead of a classic dynamic DRS update of the workspace
with incoming utterance information we perform semi-revision; new information is
added to the workspace, presuppositions are resolved, and the new information is
assigned a position in the epistemic entrenchment ordering. We then contract with
Falsum to remove any contradictions entailed by the updated DRS K′ (as per (165)).
Intuitively, we do this by eliminating as few as possible of the least entrenched
conditions until the DRS is consistent again.
To continue our example, let’s assume that it’s common ground that the speaker
is a close friend of Maxine, and appears to have no reason to deceive the hearer. We
can capture this by placing the new information relatively high, say just below the
information that the person under discussion bears the name Maxine, but above the
animal-loving-veganism. (From here on we’ll display only the current workspace,
with primed discourse referents, leaving out the stable common ground DRS.)
9We might eventually want to incorporate plausibility and/or coherence metrics into our
model and replace ‘contradiction’ with ‘low plausibility/coherence’, i.e., a score below
a certain contextually determined plausibility threshold.
10For convenience, we number only the conditions, not the discourse referents. This is just
a technical hack: if a DRS is inconsistent we can always restore consistency by merely
removing conditions, because in the extreme case a discourse referent that does not
occur in any conditions doesn’t actually contribute any information (except that the
domain is non-empty). The set of DRS conditions thus plays the role of the belief base.
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3:loves.animals(x’) . . .
4:donkey(y’) 5:own(x’,y’)
1 > {4, 5} > {2, 3}
W
When we encounter the next sentence we again start by updating the DRS, resolving
anaphora, and extending the epistemic entrenchment ordering. Let’s say the current
speaker’s contributions about Maxine are all assumed to be of equal epistemic
value:




3:loves.animals(x’) . . .
4:donkey(y’) 5:own(x’,y’)
6:beat(x’,y’)
1 > {4, 5, 6} > {2, 3}
W
Given some very general, uncontroversial background assumptions (hidden in
the ‘. . . ’ or kept in a separate encyclopedic knowledge compartment of a full
representation of context, Kamp (2018)) about the relationships between animal
loving and donkey beating, this DRS is arguably inconsistent. And even if not
logically inconsistent it’s questionable as a representation of the common ground,
as it’s unlikely that Maxine is both an animal lover and a donkey beater. The least
entrenched conditions are 2 and 3. Elimination of condition 3 (‘loves.animals(x’)’)







1 > {4, 5, 6} > {2, 3}
W
After processing this mini-discourse, we perform assertive closure, which turns the
workspace in (173) into the new, updated common ground.
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8.3.3 Cautious update
In the above instance of semi-revision the hearer considered the speaker to be very
reliable, i.e., the incoming information was assigned a place high in the epistemic
entrenchment ordering. We have thus essentially modeled a non-monotonic gener-
alization of what Eckardt (2014) calls a Trust Update, i.e., we add the information
of the speaker’s utterance directly to the common ground. However, as Eckardt
also notes, we do not always trust the speaker. Suppose that the hearer actually
knows Maxine really well and assumes it is definitely common ground that Max-
ine is vegan and also definitely loves animals. However, she also knows that the
speaker may not be very reliable when it comes to Maxine, so what she says may
be based on shaky assumptions, or lies, and hence shouldn’t automatically become
established common ground. In terms of entrenchment, the incoming information
about Maxine’s donkey, conditions 4-6 in the pre-contraction DRS (172), now in-
stead dangle at the bottom of the entrenchment hierarchy: {2, 3} > {4, 5, 6}. Since
this DRS again represents an inconsistent common ground, we need to remove a
low ranked condition to restore consistency. On the current ranking, revision will




3:loves.animals(x’) . . .
4:donkey(y’) 5:own(x’,y’)
6:beat(x’,y’)
1 > {2, 3} > {4, 5, 6}
W
In other words, the speaker’s last utterance (‘she beats it’) is inconsistent with
previous, more entrenched information and is therefore essentially ignored by the
hearer.
This not quite right. Especially when we’ll be trying to extract meaning from
unreliable narrators in fiction, we can’t completely ignore speakers just because
we don’t trust them. Even if we do not trust a speaker’s assertion that p, we can
still extract valuable information from the utterance, viz. the information that the
speaker themselves believed that p, or at the very least, in case they are lying,
that they asserted that p and are thereby committed to p. Although the distinction
between these two kinds of unreliability is important, not least in making sense of
literary unreliable narrators, we’ll lump them together here and use the uniform
weak Stalnakerian attitude verb of acceptance (≈ treating a proposition as true, see
chapter 2) to describe the hedged information we can extract from an unreliable
speaker.
We suggest incorporating this Cautious Update (Eckardt (2014)) into the non-
monotonic workspace update mechanism: whenever semi-revision leads us to
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cancel part of the semantic contribution of the current speech act, we instead
replace the offending condition φ with a suitably hedged version under a modal
operator: ACCEPTxφ, depending on whether the hearer considers the speaker to
be misinformed or deceptive, with x a discourse referent picking out the current
speaker. In this case we’ll assume there’s been a discourse referent s’ and a condition
0 representing the speaker in the workspace (and stable common ground) all along.
Note also that the hedged condition, here 7, will be assigned a new, typically higher,








{0, 1} > {2, 3} > 7 > {4, 5, 6}
W
Interestingly, because the DRS represents the hearer’s beliefs about what is common
ground between her and the speaker, once the DRS is updated with the hedged
version (i.e., that the speaker accepts that Maxine beats her donkey) we can’t
really keep the information that Maxine loves animals. Although it is not strictly
contradictory or even prima facie implausible that Maxine loves animals while the
speaker accepts that she beats her donkey, it cannot be common ground between
speaker and hearer that this is so. To see this, note that φ being common ground
entails that it is commonly known that everyone (so, in particular, the speaker)
accepts φ. Thus, the assumption that (175) is common ground will entail that it
is commonly known that the speaker accepts (175). Since (175) is essentially a
conjunction of the various conditions therein and common ground and acceptance
operators distribute over conjunction, it follows that (i) it is common ground that
condition 7 holds (i.e., it is common ground that the speaker11 accepts that Maxine
beats her donkey), and (ii) it is common ground that the speaker accepts condition
3 (i.e., it is common ground that speaker accepts Maxine loves animals). This would
mean that it is now common ground that the speaker is inconsistent, which is clearly
not the case here (regardless of whether she’s lying or confused about the facts, she
probably doesn’t believe in contradictions). Instead, we have to give up condition
3, the assumption that Maxine loves animals. Note that the hearer herself probably
really believed condition 3 to be true, and even took it to be common ground. In
11Note that at this point we rely on the fact that s’ denotes the actual speaker, i.e., our
assumption that s’ is linked to s which is in turn anchored to the actual current speaker.
See our brief discussion of direct reference and workspace linking in 8.2.2.
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fact her personal belief in condition 3 will likely remain unaffected, but after the
speaker’s assertion it can no longer be considered part of the common ground, for
it has become clear that they don’t share a commitment to this information. The








{0, 1} > {2, 3} > 7 > {4, 5, 6}
W
As we will see below, a similar reasoning applies to the case of cautious updating
in fiction.
We can incorporate all the above reasoning into a definitive nonmonotonic,
cautious workspace update algorithm along the following lines:
(177) Update a workspace K with a preliminary DRS representation φ (of incom-
ing utterance), notation: K + φ
a. expansion: K ] φ = merge K with φ, resolve all anaphora and presup-
positions, and extend the epistemic entrenchment ranking to the new
conditions.
b. contraction: (K ] φ) ÷ ⊥ = remove as many low ranked conditions
from K ] φ as needed to ensure that CGE(K ] φ) is consistent (where E
denotes in every world the set of people engaged in the discourse in that
world, and CGEK entails ∀x ∈ E(ACCEPTxK), ∀x ∈ E(ACCEPTx(∀x ∈
E(ACCEPTxK))), . . . )
c. caution: for any condition ψ added in the expansion phase but subse-
quently removed in the contraction phase, update with the correspond-
ing hedged condition ACCEPTs?ψ (where ‘s?’ is an anaphor that needs
to be bound to the current speaker), i.e., ((K ] φ)÷⊥)+ ACCEPTs?ψ
Continuing with our example. After assertive closure, (176) will become the stable
common ground, i.e., Maxine the vegan animal-lover owns a donkey and the
speaker accepts (perhaps even believes, but in any case commits herself to it by
asserting it) that Maxine beats her donkey. Note again how this correctly captures
the hearer’s conception of the common ground, but not the speaker’s, because the
speaker might actually consider it to be common ground that Maxine beats her
donkey, nor does it accurately capture either the speaker’s or hearer’s private beliefs
about Maxine. To align all these mental states and conceptions of the common
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ground, the hearer would have to manifest her distrust and renegotiate an aligned
common ground with the speaker.
8.4 Interpreting fiction
Now that we have introduced our basic framework we will apply it to the inter-
pretation of fiction. We show how various interpretation strategies emerge from
our workspace account, allowing us to model the various ways of constructing
imaginative story worlds from fictions featuring impersonal and personal, reliable
and unreliable narrators.
We start with a simple face value interpretation of a fictional text with a reliable,
impersonal narrator. Then we turn to cases involving Cautious Update triggered
by unreliable narrators as in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Lastly we apply
our framework to a typical case of imaginary resistance.
8.4.1 Authorial Authority revisited: face value interpretation
by shielding
The algorithm we sketched in (177) for updating a workspace works the same with
fiction as with non-fiction. In section 8.1 we identified one prima facie difference
between fiction and non-fiction: the principle of Authorial Authority (i.e., whatever
the text asserts, is true in the fiction). We can reformulate this principle now in
terms of epistemic entrenchment: conditions derived from interpreting a fiction
outrank pre-existing conditions in the workspace (derived from copying the stable
common ground and genre conventions). In other words, when reading fiction we
simply interpret the incoming information as extremely reliable.
For instance, reconsider the workspace we get by expanding an input context
with the Heinlein opening passage, i.e., (163), but now with an epistemic entrench-
ment ordering on its conditions. For expository purposes we’ve also included a
condition 5 to abbreviate the previously hidden cluster of commonly known scien-
tific facts about the evolution of life in our solar system that would clash with the





5:mars.is.uninhabited . . .
6:martian(z’) 7:Smith(z’)




In the context of a factual inquiry, condition 5 would outrank almost anything
you can tell me. If you tell me, factually, you saw a Martian the other day, I’d sooner
assume you’re joking,12 speaking metaphorically, or lying, than remove some of
the basic scientific assumptions underlying 5 from the workspace.13 When it’s
understood as fiction, information deriving from the text may well outrank basic
science, as illustrated in (178). Those fictional statements are effectively ‘shielded’
from contraction, i.e., they will never be given up, even if they are inconsistent
with some other seemingly uncontroversial statement that is part of our general
background knowledge.
In (178), eliminating one or several of the least entrenched conditions (1-4) will
not make the workspace consistent. Next up in the epistemic entrenchment ordering
is condition 5, whose elimination does make the workspace consistent. We end up
with a workspace where some facts about human space travel and life in our solar
system are no longer valid.14 Unlike the destructive copy operation of Assertive
Closure, Fictive Closure however doesn’t remove these retracted assumptions
from the stable common ground. If after reading a few more pages we close this





5:mars.is.uninhabited . . .
6:y
x’, y’, z’
1:Heinlein(x’) 2:book(y’) . . .
5:mars.is.uninhabited . . .
6:martian(z’) 7:Smith(z’) . . .
{6, 7} > 5 > {1, 2, 3, 4}
5 > {1, 2, 3, 4, 6}
C
We call the interpretation strategy of assigning the highest possible epistemic rank
to information deriving from a text, a face value interpretation of a fictional text
12Perhaps joking is a form of narrative fiction, in which case we’d no longer be engaging
in factual inquiry but fiction.
13Talking to a young child, crazy person, or time traveller may make me remove 5 from
the workspace, if it becomes clear to me that these basic facts are really not common
ground between us. We’ve discussed the reasoning behind such revisions triggered by
Cautious Update in the vegan example in section 8.3.3.
14Recall, Cautious Update is not triggered because we’re retracting only old information
(see (177)).
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Matravers (2014); Altshuler and Maier (2020b); Badura and Berto (2019), i.e., an
interpretation in line with the principle of Authorial Authority.
Face value interpretations are appropriate in many cases (e.g., it gives us the
desired result that it is not true in Stranger in a Strange Land that Martians don’t
exist). However, as pointed out in the introduction, in some cases even in fiction
we cannot blindly trust the speaker. In the remainder of this paper we will discuss
the interpretive processes at work in making sense of such narratives, starting with
unreliable first-person narration.
8.4.2 Unreliable narrators
Consider again our central example of unreliable narration from The Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn, abbreviated from (159):
(180) The widow rung a bell for supper . . . When you got to the table you couldn’t
go right to eating but you had to wait for the widow to tuck down her head
and grumble a little over the victuals . . .
Let’s assume that before engaging with the novel the reader takes it to be com-
mon ground between her and Twain that the latter produced a novel called The
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and a lot of other background information, including
some information that entails that when people in 19th century Missouri bow over
their food and mumble a bit before eating they are saying a prayer. As before we
represent this rather trivial cultural background assumption as a deeply entrenched





5:mumble.before.dinner.is.prayer . . .
5 > {1, 2, 3, 4}
C
When we open the book and start reading, we open a copy of (181) as our workspace.
Unlike the Heinlein story, the story is written in the first person, featuring Huck Finn
as the narrator. Huck is obviously a different person from (the fictional counterpart
of) the author Twain (represented by the linked discourse referent x’). This means
the reader quickly accommodates an extra discourse referent for the first-person
pronouns, representing a narrator named Huck Finn who we take to be asserting
the sentences that constitute the story, and who is thereby committed to their truth.
Twain, with whom we are maintaining a common ground, is merely ‘presenting’
or ‘reproducing’ Huck’s assertions and is not committed to their truth (nor is his
fictional counterpart, for that matter). By contrast, note that in the Heinlein story
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there was no ‘I’, no sign of any personalized character telling the story, and hence
no need to accommodate an extra discourse referent for a asserter/narrator.
Since Huck is evidently a naive young boy, we don’t always trust his asser-
tions, just as we don’t always trust our face-to-face interlocutors. When a conflict
arises between the reader’s background knowledge, as imported from the common
ground, and the text, we might therefore want to revise the contribution of the text
rather than the background. In other words, since the text is considered to be the
assertions of a child, the semantic contributions of the text should not generally
end up at the top of the epistemic entrenchment ranking. More generally, for first-
person narratives, i.e., narratives where we accommodate a discourse referent for a
first-person speaker, we relax the principle of Authorial Authority, by giving up
the requirement that new information is shielded from revision by automatically
ranking it at the top.
When the reader arrives at the mumbling passage, (180), she first updates the
workspace with the unproblematic fictional statements (e.g., that Douglas rung
the bell and that Huck had to wait for dinner etc) that do not conflict with any
background information. When we get to the statement that Huck had to wait for
Douglas to grumble over her food, a conflict arises. The general knowledge that
when people bow over their food and speak before dinner they are praying implies
that Douglas was mumbling a prayer rather than grumbling over the food.
(182)
x’, y’, u’, s’
1:Twain(x’) 2:author(x’)
3:adventures.of.huck.finn(y’) 4:wrote(x’,y’)
5:mumble.before.dinner.is.prayer . . .
6:Huck(s’) 7:narrator(s’) . . .
8:Douglas(u’) 9:rang.bell(u’) 10:wait.for.dinner(s’)
11:grumbling.over.food(u’) . . .
5 > {6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11} > {1, 2, 3, 4}
W
Eliminating one or several of the least entrenched conditions (1,2,3 or 4) will not
make the workspace consistent. Hence we move up in the epistemic entrenchment
ordering. Eliminating only condition 11 (Douglas grumbled over the food) will
make the workspace consistent. But note that this is one of the new contributions,
so we have to be cautious and update with the hedged variant, i.e., that the speaker
asserted, and therefore accepted as true, that Douglas grumbled over the food.
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(183)
x’, y’, u’, s’
1:Twain(x’) 2:author(x’) . . .
5:mumble.before.dinner.is.prayer . . .




5 > {6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} > {1, 2, 3, 4}
W
Interestingly, unlike with the cautious update in the vegan case from section 8.3.3,
the workspace can retain the generic background information that when people
bow over their food and softly mumble before dinner they are praying, even after
the cautious update with the hedged information that the speaker, Huck Finn, takes
Douglas to be grumbling. What’s more, since we eliminate as little as possible in
making the workspace consistent again – even though we eliminate condition 11
– we maintain information such as that Douglas mumbled over her food before
dinner. This, in combination with condition 5, implies that the workspace is updated
with the information that Douglas was praying before dinner (something that was
never mentioned in the fictional text).
These kinds of inferences are possible in the workspace because the workspace
derives from the (reader’s conception of the) stable common ground between
Twain and his readers, not that between Huck Finn, the relevant speaker whose
speech acts are being interpreted, and his (fictional) narratee. Hence, after a cautious
update, the workspace that we copied off this common ground may still retain what
Twain and his readers commonly accepted, if only temporarily while entertaining
the content of the fiction at hand. This explains how in the case of fiction, a reader
and author can have what Booth (1961) calls a ‘communion behind the narrator’s
back’; it is as if the reader and Twain are listening to the narrator together and it is
common ground between them that the narrator believes something false. In fact,
such a ‘communion’ may also take place in non-fictional discourse. For instance,
in case a ‘speaker’ reads out a (non-fiction) letter written by someone else, the
hearer will also have to accommodate an extra discourse referent for the letter
writer who, unlike the current speaker, actually asserted the content of the letter
and is committed to its truth. In such a scenario there might also arise a communion
behind the letter writer’s back where it is common ground between speaker and
hearer that the letter writer is unreliable.
If we apply fictive closure to (183) we update the stable common ground with
this information embedded under the relevant fiction operator. Hence after reading
this passage the reader takes it to be common ground between her and Twain and
other engagers that in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn the widow Douglas rung
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a bell for supper and prayed before dinner, and that Huck (mistakenly) took her to
be grumbling unhappily over her food.
Generalizing beyond this particular example it is worth stressing that cultural
or other background information, like our condition 5 about prayer and dinner
customs in (183), need not outrank incoming fictional statements, even in a first-
person narrative (for instance if the narrator were judged more mature and reliable,
or if we’re dealing with a fantasy story about an alien civilization without religion
or prayer). How highly entrenched certain background information is relative to
incoming textual information heavily depends on genre, i.e., with respect to what
clusters of facts the fiction is expected to be realistic (Ryan (1991)). For instance,
if we are aware of the genre of A Christmas Carol as a 19th century gothic horror
story, we may expect it to be realistic with respect to geographical facts (i.e., where
countries and cities are located) but not necessarily with respect to all taxonomic
facts (i.e., what species exist and how they are individuated). Therefore a statement
such as “He rode into London, the capital of France” would trigger an unreliable
narrator interpretation (we are reluctant to cancel our geographical background
information that London is the capital of England). But a statement such as “[H]e
looked the phantom through and through, and saw it standing before him” will
not trigger an unreliable narrator interpretation in the context of A Christmas Carol.
On the other hand, knowledge of for instance crime novel genre conventions may
lead us to expect A Study in Scarlet to be realistic with respect to both geographical
and taxonomic facts. Hence the same two fictional statements as part of A Study in
Scarlet, would both trigger an unreliable narrator interpretation where Watson is
hallucinating or otherwise mistaken about the location of London and the existence
of ghosts.
8.4.3 Imaginative resistance
In section 8.1 we discussed a seemingly related case of Authorial Authority break-
ing down, viz. in the story called Fish Tank which is a typical example of what
philosophers call Imaginative Resistance ( Liao and Gendler (2016)):
(184) Sara never liked animals. One day, her father caught her kicking the neigh-
bor’s dog. He got really angry and she was grounded for a week. To get back
at her father she poured bleach in the big fish tank, killing all the beautiful
fish that he loved so much. Good thing that she did, because he was really
annoying.
Face value interpretation
Let’s explore what a face value interpretation of this story would look like. Suppose
that the reader of the story believes it is common ground between her and the
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author that killing animals (for no good reason) is wrong. Moreover, she takes this
moral law to be quite deeply entrenched, i.e., she’ll be quite reluctant to give up
the assumption that it is part of the established common ground between her and
the author on the basis of new information and experiences. At the start of the
discourse the workspace is a copy of this common ground:
(185)
x’, y’
1:author(x’) 2:fish.tank(y’) 3: wrote(x’,y’)
4:killing.animals.is.wrong . . .
4 > {1, 2, 3}
W
The workspace is updated with the statements that Sara never liked animals, kicked
the dog, got grounded, and poured bleach in the fish tank. Since there doesn’t seem
to be a personal, first-person narrator the reader might assume an impersonal,
omniscient narrator and, per Authorial Authority, assign these statements the
highest possible ranking in the epistemic entrenchment ordering. Now we expand
the workspace with the statement that Sara did a good thing, and still treat that as
equally ranked with the rest of the text. We get a conflict between the moral law
about killing animals and the fact that it’s a good thing she killed her father’s fish,
which will be resolved by eliminating the moral law.
(186)
x’, y’, u’, v’
1:author(x’) 2:fish.tank(y’) 3:wrote(x’,y’)




{5, 6, 7, 8, 9} > 4 > {1, 2, 3}
W
Fictive closure leads to an output where the reader takes it to be common ground
in the community of engagement that killing animals is wrong, and there’s a story
called Fish Tank in which a girl called Sara poured bleach in a fish tank because
she’s annoyed and this was a good thing, since apparently in this fictional world
moral laws are such that killing animals for trivial reasons is okay.
Non-face value interpretations through cautious update
Intuitively the face value interpretation is unsatisfactory for Fish Tank; many readers
– even non-philosophers – feel that even though it is explicitly stated that Sara did a
good thing, she actually did not do a good thing in the fictional world she inhabits.
Empirical studies like Kim et al. (2018) and Altshuler and Maier (2020a) support
200
8.4 Interpreting fiction
this intuition, suggesting that fictional statements, even in third-person omniscient
narrations, are not always shielded from contraction and that moral truths are
really quite hard to give up.15 The flexibility of our model allows us to model this
alternative interpretation by simply adopting a different entrenchment ranking
strategy on the incoming textual information.
Concretely, for the non-face-value reader, the initial updates are the same: in-
coming information gets a high rank by default, as we’re dealing with fiction and
there is no reason to distrust the fictional speaker, in fact no reason to assume
the presence of a narrating source at all. When we get to the final statement the
reader may reconsider this assumption, because it will lead to the unwanted face
value interpretation. So instead let’s rank the final sentence contribution below the
obviously deeply entrenched moral law. Our update algorithm, as spelled out in
(177), then leads to the elimination of the final contribution followed by a hedged
update:
(187)
x’, y’, u’, v’
1:author(x’) 2:fish.tank(y’) 3: wrote(x’,y’)




{5, 6, 7, 8, 10} > 4 > 9 > {1, 2, 3}
W
One difference with our previous examples of cautious updating (Maxine the vegan
and Huckleberry Finn) is that the indexical/anaphoric element in the hedging
operator ACCEPTs? ‘the current speaker accepts that φ’ has no obvious antecedent;
there is no discourse referent for a salient current speaker in the workspace universe,
as there has been no sign of a first-person narrator.16 And it is not at all clear who
this speaker should be, i.e., who is it that asserts and thereby commits themselves
to Sara doing a good thing?
15For whatever reason, see e.g., Gendler (2000), Yablo (2002), or Weatherson (2004) for
philosophical investigations of what makes moral truths especially hard to give up, and
Andow (2019) for an empirical investigation.
16We might take the evaluative construction good thing itself as lexically presupposing a
first-person judging agent, i.e., ‘good’ = ‘good according to me’ (Altshuler and Maier
(2020a)). We refrain from going down this path to stay neutral with respect to the
semantics and pragmatics of evaluative terms. On our account it is the cautious update
itself that pragmatically triggers the accommodation of a fictional first person committed
to this moral judgement.
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A first option is to take the actual author, represented by a discourse referent x
in the stable common ground and hence by the linked discourse referent x’ in the
workspace, to be the speaker:
(188)
x’, y’, u’, v’
1:author(x’) 2:fish.tank(y’) 3: wrote(x’,y’)
4:killing.animals.is.wrong . . .
5:Sara(u’) 6:father(v’,u’) . . .
10:ACCEPTx′ did.good(u’)
{5 . . . 10} > 4 > {1, 2, 3}
W
As the resulting interpretation involves de re reference to the actual author, just
like 1984 involves a de re reference to the actual London, we’ll call this the de
auctore reading. This reading is reminiscent of what Gendler (2000) calls a ‘pop-out’
interpretation in that the value judgement in the closing statement represents the
evaluating of (a fictional counterpart of) the actual author.17 Now, note that in this
de auctore interpretation the source of the (fictional) speech acts, who is committed
to the objectionable content, is the actual speaker, so at this point, before the fictive
closure operation, the situation is entirely parallel to the non-fiction case involving
cautious updates. In particular, the reasoning that made us retract the information
that Maxine loves animals from (175) to (176) applies here, yielding (189).
(189)
x’, y’, u’, v’
1:author(x’) 2:fish.tank(y’) 3: wrote(x’,y’)
4:killing.animals.is.wrong . . .
5:Sara(u’) 6:father(v’,u’) . . .
10:ACCEPTx′ did.good(u’)
{5 . . . 10} > 4 > {1, 2, 3}
W
A reader may resist a de auctore interpretation for various reasons.
First, in some stories the narrator is a richly personalized character in the story
(e.g., Huckleberry Finn). Taking the actual author (e.g., Mark Twain) as the story-
teller in the fictional world would thus require making a host of (metaphysically
drastic) revisions to our conception of who the author is in order to engage with the
fiction. Although we do not want to exclude such an interpretation in principle, it
17Though we haven’t spelled out the semantic details of direct reference and linking,
we assume that after fictive closure the linked discourse referents x and x’ either still
represent the same individual occurring in different worlds (with some different non-
essential properties in each world), or they represent counterparts of each other.
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seems more intuitive to work with two separate conceptions of two separate people
(i.e., author and narrator) instead, as we saw in our analysis of the Huckleberry
Finn example in Section 8.4.2.
Second, as shown above, a de auctore interpretation of The Fishtank (189) will
force us to remove 4 from the workspace. Hence, the information that killing
animals is wrong will not end up embedded under the ‘In Fish Tank’ operator at
fictive closure. The reader will thus not consider it to be common ground that in
Fish Tank, killing animals is wrong. This does not capture the intuitions described
above about the best interpretation of Fish Tank, i.e., that it is true in Fish Tank that
Sara did not do a good thing. As we will see below, in order to arrive at such an
interpretation, we we need to establish a communion behind a narrator’s back.
Alternatively, the anaphoric subject of the hedge ACCEPTs? may bind to one of
the fictional characters. However, in this particular text there are no textual clues
that either of the salient available fictional characters (Sara or her father) is to be
understood as uttering these evaluative words (out loud or silently in thought). We
see none of the (sometimes subtle and ambiguous) textual and contextual clues
that would license a free indirect discourse or protagonist projection interpretation
here (see e.g., Eckardt (2014); Hinterwimmer (2017); Altshuler and Maier (2020b);
Stokke (forthcoming-b); Abrusán (forthcoming)).
What we’re left with is the option of accommodating a new fictional charac-
ter, s’, who is presumed to be offering this evaluation in a speech act: a fictional
speaker/narrator responsible for telling the story, or at least this final part of it:18
(190)
x’, y’, u’, v’ s’
1:author(x’) 2:fish.tank(y’) 3: wrote(x’,y’)
4:killing.animals.is.wrong . . .
5:Sara(u’) 6:father(v’,u’) . . .
10:ACCEPTs′ did.good(u’)
11:narrator(s’)
{5 . . . 11} > 4 > {1, 2, 3}
W
After fictive closure on this workspace the reader considers it common ground
between her and the author that there’s a story called Fish Tank in which there is a
girl named Sara who kills her father’s fish. Moreover, in this story killing animals
is morally wrong, as in the real world, and finally, this story is (partly) told from
the perspective of a fictional narrator who claims that Sara did a good thing killing
the fish. In other words, we started out interpreting the text on a par with the
18Altshuler and Maier (2020b) coin the term ‘narrator accommodation’ and argue that
this is what causes the disruptive experience that is inherent in the phenomenon of
imaginative resistance.
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Heinlein story, i.e., as a third-person omniscient or rather impersonal narration,
every statement to be taken at face value without the mediation of a personal
narrator, and then switched to an interpretation along the lines of our Huckleberry
Finn interpretation, i.e., as a first-person narration, all statements weighed against
the available contextual and textual evidence and potentially treated as representing
merely the point of view of the fictional character narrating the story.
Note that similar speaker accommodation (and hence a similar disruptive ex-
perience as in standard cases of imaginative resistance) may occur in the case of
non-fictional discourse. Consider a case where I listen in on someone telling a
story and don’t realize that they are in fact reproducing someone else’s speech.
At some point they reach a part of the narrative that includes statements that
are outrageously inconsistent with what I know of the speaker’s own beliefs. I
may then choose to accommodate an extra ‘asserter’ (separate from the actual
speaker/author) who is committed to the truth of the relevant statements.
8.5 Conclusion
We can’t always take a text at face value – so-called unreliable narrators may present
a confused or misleading picture of the fictional world, and in cases of imaginative
resistance readers refuse to accept parts of a text as true in the corresponding
fictional world. We have proposed a way to model the interpretive processes that
allow readers to extract fictional truths from such fictional narratives by combining
a psychologistic version of the workspace account (where DRS’s represent the
hearer’s conception of the common ground) with insights from belief revision
theory. Our starting point has been that revision processes should apply uniformly
across fiction and non-fiction when dealing with unreliable information sources.
Combining these two theoretical additions to the established DRT framework
allowed us to describe precisely the various interpretation strategies readers can
choose when interpreting different types of narratives. On our analysis, the ‘epis-
temic entrenchment’ of certain background assumptions relative to incoming infor-
mation from the discourse or text, as well as the presence or absence of a personified
speaker/narrator are the key factors in determining the kinds of readings available.
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The central aim of this dissertation has been to model fictional discourse and
related forms of discourse in terms of common ground updates. To this end I have
attempted to combine insights from Matravers’ theory of fiction interpretation and
Stalnaker’s common ground framework. Put very briefly, speaker and hearer first
update a temporary workspace that is uniform for fiction and non-fiction and that
only exists for the purpose and duration of a particular conversation. Secondly, the
stable common ground is updated through either fictive or assertive closure.
When applying this basic framework to other types of discourse, I sometimes
found that the initial account needed to be extended. For instance, I argued that
in order to fit lies into the framework, the stable common ground could no longer
be construed as belief-based. This requires either a moderate psychologistic turn
(a departure from Stalnaker) or an acceptance-based stable common ground (a
departure from Matravers since we no longer model discourse updates as leading
to belief updates). Another example is metafictional discourse which, although it
seems strongly related and in a sense even dependent on fictional discourse, is hard
to model in the basic framework. It requires incorporating abstract objects or ‘dot-
objects’ into our theory which complicates the analysis of parafictional discourse
and fictive closure. Lastly, in order to model unreliable narration and inconsistent
workspace updates we need to incorporate some kind of belief revision tools into
the theory. Here we saw that holding on to both complete Matraversian uniformity
of our primary engagement with fiction and non-fiction and Stalnakerian uniformity
of how speaker and hearer engage with a discourse seems untenable because fiction
can involve common ground revision whereas non-fiction cannot.
On the other hand, sometimes I found that the basic account provided neat
analyses or explanations of certain phenomena that it was not designed to account
for. In particular, the parafictional update at fictive closure leads us to an analysis of
bald-faced lies as fictional statements. Moreover, it allows for a novel explanation
of export of fictional truth (as based on analogical reasoning) that avoids the
difficulties with existing accounts that maintain that fictions contain (indirect)
assertions.
Looking ahead, it is important to keep in mind that Stalnaker’s theoretical
focus lies on common ground updates in conversations. Likewise, the workspace
account focuses on explicit story telling (e.g., campfire stories or novels) as its prime
example of fiction practices; its main aim is to explain linguistic behaviour involved
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in engaging with fiction. However, to the extent that one can also analyse nonverbal
communication (e.g., music, dance, paintings, pictures, movies) as proposals to
update a common ground between ‘speaker’ and ‘hearer’, the workspace account
should be extendable to nonverbal media.
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In het algemeen vertrouw ik erop dat anderen mij de waarheid vertellen. Wanneer
ik een vreemdeling bij de bushalte vraag of lijn 4 hier stopt, dan verwacht ik
dat de vreemdeling (onbewust) het Maxime van Kwaliteit (Grice (1989)) volgt.
Dat wil zeggen, ik verwacht dat mijn conversationele partner zal proberen iets
waars te zeggen. Dit vertrouwen is essentieel; als er geen vertrouwen is binnen
een samenleving dat (de meeste) mensen deelnemen aan coöperatieve informatie
uitwisseling, dan lopen we het risico dat onze gehele taalpraktijk zijn nut verliest.
Waarom zou ik überhaupt proberen de vreemdeling over de bus te vragen als ik er
niet op kan vertrouwen dat hij iets waars zal proberen te zeggen?
Tegelijkertijd vinden mensen het simpelweg geweldig om anderen het Maxime
van Kwaliteit te zien breken of zelfs om het maxime zelf te breken. We vinden het
heerlijk om overduidelijk onware verslagen te lezen of te bekijken over onwaar-
schijnlijke romances in het Engeland van de negentiende eeuw, vuurspuwende
draken, pratende dieren, heroïsche aliens en futuristische samenlevingen. We vullen
niet alleen onze boekenkasten, slaapkamermuren en hoofden met verhalen en
beelden waarvan we weten dat ze onware ‘feiten’ rapporteren, we bediscussiëren
deze onwaarheden ook graag uitgebreid. Middelbare scholen verplichten hun leer-
lingen om de beroemdste onware verhalen van hun samenleving te bestuderen
(bijvoorbeeld Hamlet of Van den Vos Reynaerde) en mensen creëren samen uitgebreide
online encyclopedieën die rapporteren over hun favoriete verzameling onwaarhe-
den (bijvoorbeeld One Wiki to Rule Them All of Wookieepedia). Mensen kunnen juist
genieten van dit overduidelijk breken van het Maxime van Kwaliteit omdat het
voor iedereen duidelijk is dat de relevante verhalen onwaar zijn. Dit is een van
de belangrijkste kenmerken van fictie; niemand wordt misleid om iets onwaars
te geloven en hierdoor kunnen we ons algehele vertrouwen in conversationele
partners behouden.
De focus van deze dissertatie ligt op het modelleren van verschillende manieren
waarop we taal gebruiken wanneer we ons bezighouden met fictionele verhalen.
Dit algemene doel splitst zich op in een aantal puzzels omtrent verschillende
soorten uitspraken (bijvoorbeeld ‘gewone’ non-fictionele asserties, fictionele uit-
spraken, leugens, asserties over fictie, etc.). In deze dissertatie ontwikkel ik een
coherente semantische analyse van deze verschillende puzzels: de ‘workspace ac-
count’. Deze theorie is een extensie van Stalnakers (1970, 1978, 1984, 2002) beroemde
pragmatische ‘common ground’ framework. In dit framework worden asserties
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gemodelleerd als voorstellen om de ‘common ground’ (de verzameling gedeelde
aannames) tussen conversationele partners uit te breiden.
Hoofdstuk 2 introduceert het concept ‘common ground’ en beargumenteert dat
standaard formalisaties van deze notie hem ontoepasbaar maken op bijvoorbeeld
de conversatie tussen een schrijver en zijn lezers wanneer hij deze niet persoonlijk
kent. Ik ontwikkel en vergelijk twee alternatieve formalisaties die wel toepasbaar
zijn.
Hoofdstuk 3 introduceert de centrale puzzel in de studie naar de semantiek
van fictie: hoe onderscheiden we ‘normale’ non-fictionele uitspraken van fictionele
uitspraken? Wat gebeurde er toen Tolkien (191) opschreef in The Hobbit en hoe
verschilt dat van zijn non-fictionele uitspraken?
(191) In een hol onder de grond woonde een hobbit.
Ik formaliseer en bekritiseer bestaande voorstellen om fictie te modelleren in het
common ground framework: fictionele uitspraken zijn voorstellen om aparte ‘unof-
ficial common grounds’ uit te breiden (Eckardt (2014); Stokke (2013, 2018)).
In hoofdstuk 4 ontwikkel ik een alternatieve theorie (de workspace account) die
is geïnspireerd door de theorie van Matravers (2014) over fictie interpretatie en
Lewis’ (1978) analyse van de ‘In verhaal s, φ’-operator.
In hoofdstuk 5 evalueer ik verschillende manieren om leugens te incorporeren in
een common ground framework. Ik beargumenteer dat zogenaamde ‘bald-faced
lies’ (leugens waarbij er geen intentie is om de hoorder te misleiden) het beste
gemodelleerd kunnen worden als fictionele uitspraken.
In hoofdstuk 6 introduceer ik zogenaamde ‘metafictionele’ uitspraken. Dit zijn
uitspraken waarmee iemand praat over een fictionele entiteit als fictionele entiteit
zoals in (192):
(192) Frodo is verzonnen door Tolkien.
Ik vergelijk vier verschillende strategieën om deze uitspraken te incorporeren in de
workspace account.
In hoofdstuk 7 beargumenteer ik dat de operatoren ‘In story s, φ’ (‘In verhaal
s, φ’) en ‘According to story s, φ’ (‘Volgens verhaal s, φ’) – die vaak een uniforme
analyse krijgen – eigenlijk op verschillende manieren gebruikt worden. Ik stel
twee aparte semantische analyses voor voor deze twee operatoren die dit kunnen
verklaren.
Hoofdstuk 8 is grotendeels samen geschreven met Dr. Emar Maier en ontwikkelt
een extensie van de workspace account waarin uitspraken van onbetrouwbare
vertellers worden gemodelleerd. Dit zijn uitspraken in een fictionele tekst waarbij
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